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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
TURKEY AND NEO-OTTOMANISM: DOMESTIC SOURCES, DYNAMICS AND 
FOREIGN POLICY 
by 
Mustafa Gokhan Sahin 
Florida International University, 2010 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor 
This study examined the relationship between the Turkish Islamic movements and the 
present government of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, 
AK Party). Since the AK Party came to power in 2002 it implemented unparalleled 
political reforms and pursued to improve Turkey’s relations with the EU. Opponents 
argued that because of the dominance of the secular military in Turkish politics, the AK 
Party is forced to secretly advance its Islamic agenda using the language and symbolism 
of democracy and human rights. This study argued that the ideas of the AK Party show 
similarities with the “Ottomanist” thought of the late Ottoman era. With special reference 
to the preservation of the Ottoman State, Ottomanism in an eclectic way was able to 
incorporate Islamic principles like freedom, justice and consultation into the political 
arena which was increasingly dominated by the secular European concepts.  
Literature on Islam and politics in Turkey, however, disregards the Ottoman roots 
of freedom and pluralism and tends to reduce the relationship between religion and state 
into exclusively confrontational struggles. This conceptualization of the political process 
relies on particular non-Turkish Muslim experiences which do not necessarily represent 
vii 
 
Islam’s venture in Turkey. Contrary to the prevailing scholarship, Islamic movements in 
Turkey, namely, Naqshbandi, National View and Nur, which are discussed in detail in 
this study, are not monolithic. They all uphold the same creedal tenets of Islam but they 
have sharp differences in terms of how they conceptualize the role of religious agency in 
politics. I argue that this diversity is a result of three distinct methodologies of Islamic 
religious life which are the Tariqah (Tarikat), Shariah (Şeriat), and Haqiqah (Hakikat). 
The differences between these three approaches represent a typological hierarchy in the 
formation of the Muslim/believer as an agent of Islamic identity. Through these different 
if not conflicting modes, the AK Party reconnected itself with Turkey’s Ottoman heritage 
in a post-Ottoman, secular setting and was able to develop an eclectic political identity of 
Neo-Ottomanism that is evident in the flexibility if not inconsistency of its domestic and 
foreign policy preferences. 
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Chapter I: INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important political events in contemporary Middle East politics is 
the rise to power of the religiously oriented Justice and Development Party  in 2002 with 
a landslide victory. Since it came to power, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi, AK Party)1 followed a “zero-problem” approach in Turkish foreign 
policy leading to the establishment of solid relationships with neighboring countries like 
Syria, Iran and Greece (with whom Turkey was at the brink of war a few years earlier). 
Domestically, Justice and Development Party began to carry out the reforms necessary 
for Turkey’s bid for EU membership faster than any previous Turkish government.2 The 
rise of the Justice and Development Party and its accomplishments have been a serious 
challenge to scholars of Middle East politics who, for the most part, could not anticipate a 
pro-Western, conservative Muslim political party rooted in domestic Islamic social 
movements coming to power democratically, and not threatening the existence of the 
secular state.3
In order to examine the significance of this transformation one should understand 
the nature of Islamic social movements, Islamic political parties and their place in 
Turkey’s recent history. Scholars from different perspectives have offered varying 
  
                                                 
1 Since the establishment of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi in Turkish) its 
acronym has been part of an unresolved debate. According to official party records given to the Ministry of 
Interior the acronym is “AK Parti.” In Turkish “ak” means white and clean; a clear reference to the party 
image of uncorrupted character. Many scholars (and most political opponents) use AKP (or JDP in 
English). This work will use AK Party. 
2 Sultan Tepe states that “in just two short years in power the JDP [Justice and Development Party] has 
done pathbreaking work, adopting more than five hundred laws—a record number for any elected Turkish 
government.” For more see Tepe 2005, 80. 
3 Smith 2005a. Tepe calls this process a “quiet revolution,” see Tepe 2005. 
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definitions of Islamic social movements. Most of them, however, betray a structural bias 
in explaining the diverse array of social movements, thus limiting our ability to analyse 
the identities of these social movements in the public sphere. In explaining Islamic social 
movements, I employ Tarrow’s definition, with minor modifications. Throughout this 
dissertation, a social movement will be considered as a collective understanding and 
action by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with other 
social actors.4
Naqshbandi tariqah is the main historical-cultural Islamic movement in Turkey. 
For the past two hundred years, this tariqah expanded from being one of many Islamic 
movements into the most influential one due to its methods which proved successful 
when Turkish political and social life underwent a period of reform. In modern Turkey 
the Naqshbandi tariqah has branched off into various subgroups under the umbrella of the 
Naqshbandiyya.
  
5
The significance of the Naqshbandi order becomes clearer when the republican 
era of Turkish history is explored. From the establishment of the republic in 1923 by 
Mustafa Kemal (d. 1938) until 1945, Turkey was under a single party regime, the 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). After two failed attempts, in 
1924 and 1930, of leading political fugures to establish an opposition party, in 1945 Nuri 
Demirag established the National Development Party (Milli Kalkinma Partisi, MKP). 
MKP was liberal in economic policies but Islamist in cultural orientation. Although MKP 
 In this dissertation, only the major personalities and groups within the 
Naqshbandi order are analyzed.  
                                                 
4 Tarrow 1994, 3-4. 
5 Naqshbandiyya means Naqshbandi Order. 
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was more religious in character, the secular Democrat Party (Demokrat Party, DP) 
(established in 1946 by the dissidents from the ruling Republican People’s Party) gained 
the support of religious Muslims, especially followers of Said Nursi, and came to power 
with over 50% of the votes. Since the 1950s the Islamic parties that gained the support of 
the voting block of Islamic movements affiliated with Naqshbandi order were 
increasingly successful. 
The DP government was later toppled by the military in 1960. Since the 1960 
coup, one that came with constitutional mandates empowering the military 
establishement, Turkish political life became a playground for the military officers who 
rotated easily controlled politicians one after the other. As a result, only a handful of 
politicians were able to continue their political career while the military was directly or 
indirectly involved in the political process. Therefore, from the 1960s until today four 
major politicians dominated Turkish political life: Suleyman Demirel (Center Right, 
1964-2000), Alparslan Turkes (Nationalist, 1965-1997), Bulent Ecevit (Center Left-
Leftist, 1966-2002) and Necmettin Erbakan (Center Right-Islamist 1969- 2002). Due to 
the anti-democratic nature of the political process, laws were passed which enabled these 
leaders to centralize control over the entire party structure (including but not limited to 
approving memberships and candidates, opening branches, and setting the ideological 
orientation of the party). In Turkish political history, there is almost no example of 
successful opposition candidates challenging incumbent party leaders.  
Islamist parties were not an exception to this dynamic. With the support of a 
Naqshbandi leader, Zahid Kotku, in 1970 Erbakan established the National Order Party 
(Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) as the political branch of the Naqshbandi order. Gradually, 
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however, Erbakan, as a charismatic leader, took sole control of the party, naming his 
movement Islamist National View Movement (Milli Gorus Hareketi, MGH). Due to his 
authoritarian style, other members of Islamic movements left his movement during the 
mid-1970s. However on their own they could not become as succuesful as Erbakan; it 
was only after the year 2000 that a major division within the MGH led to the 
establishment of a successful alternative, AK Party. 
Leaders of AK Party argued that the ideas and policies of their party are closer to 
contemporary European attitudes on democracy, human rights, and open economies. 
However, the Justice and Development Party’s earlier association with the MGH caused 
suspicion in Middle Eastern and Islamic studies about the actually degree of ideological 
differences. The general analysis sees the Justice and Development Party as an 
ideological clone and offshoot of the Islamist National View Movement, discounting the 
Justice and Development Party’s diverse background with the traditional Islamic 
movements who, contrary to their counterparts in the Middle East, historically had a 
special relationship with the state in Turkey. A close look at the tradition of Islamic 
movements in Turkey and their influence over the Justice and Development Party prove 
that the unique relationship between Islam and the contemporary state in Turkey cannot 
be referenced exclusively to the National View Movement.  
The Justice and Development Party’s rise to power and general success mark it as 
the main Islamic actor in a country where Islam has been represented by a diversity of 
other movements. However, the Justice and Development Party’s success does not come 
from any single organic link with Islamic movements but is rather a result of the 
confluence of different understandings of and approaches to Islam blended with Turkish-
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Ottoman identity. Therefore, with regards to the changes in Turkish politics I will try to 
utilize the concept of “Neo-Ottomanism” to represent the unique relationship between 
religion, representing the Ottoman past, and the secular state, established after 1923.  
The immediate rise of the Justice and Development Party occurred in the context 
of the complex political upheavals of the late 1990s. This era was known in Turkish 
politics as the 28th February Process (28 Şubat Süreci), a reference to the famous 
February 28, 1997 National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) meeting 
dominated by secularist generals who ousted the Islamists from government. This ‘soft 
coup d'état,’ as many Turks now call it6
For many, the closure of Islamic parties by the secular establishment was aimed at 
giving a clear message to Islamists that the road to political power as a religious party 
was a non-starter. However, the policies of the Justice and Development Party, as an 
Islamically oriented political party, are different from its predecessors. Furtermore, the 
Justice and Development Party’s electoral success shows that wider sectors of the 
, banned the Welfare Party which represented 
Erbakan’s Islamist National View Movement in the parliament. Later, the members of the 
National View Movement established the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP). In 
continuation of the 28th February Process initiated by the secular army and its supporters 
in the judiciary, the Constitutional Court banned the Virtue Party. The policies of the 
National View Movement leadership then came under scrutiny within the party by a new 
generation of religiously sympathetic political leaders both in terms of substance and 
style.  
                                                 
6 Yavuz 2003. See also Kuru 2009, 161. 
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population rather than the mere supporters of Islamist National View Movement share 
their ideas.7
Since the establishment of the republic, the main discussion on modern Turkey has been 
centered on the place of religion (representing the Ottoman past in its entirety) in the new 
era. Founding fathers identified religion as a traditional institution that functioned as 
cultural baggage or dead weight and was not part of the modern scientific imagination. 
Accordingly, they thought that traditional representatives of Islam would wither away 
because the process of westernization would bring with it positive developments such as 
economic progress, secularization, and enhancements in education, transportation and 
mass communication, all of which would somehow diminish the need for religion among 
the masses.
  
Main Characteristics of the Literature on Islam in Turkey: Religion, Secularism 
and Identity between Rupture and Continuity 
8
Literature dealing with Islam and politics in Turkey followed the same reasoning, 
that Islam was cultural and historical baggage that had no place in the public domain of a 
modern, secular state. There are three main characteristics of this scholarship. First, it 
 For the founding fathers, the modern path involved the secularization of 
state and society devoid of any higher value system other than loyalty to the state through 
a new sense of Turkish national identity.Reforms were promulgated to create a new 
Turkish Republic as a break from the traditional Ottoman past. 
                                                 
7 According to a survery done just before the 2002 elections, only 28% of Justice and Development Party 
supporters voted for a religious party [Erbakan’s Parties] previously. For more see Vertigans 2003, 76. 
8 One of the famous representations of this commitment is found in Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s famous 
speech he gave in the city of Kastamonu in 1925. When he introduced his reforms involving new dress 
codes (prohibiting wearing traditional fez and turban) and closing the dervish lodges, he stated that 
“Republic of Turkey will not be a country of shaikhs [and] dervishes...” 
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portrays religion as an anti-modern, anti western factor; secondly, they disregard the 
strong continuities between the late Ottoman and early republican eras, consequently 
portraying religion as an epiphenomenal factor belonging to the past, not the future. The 
arguments typical of this scholarship are represented by a handful of scholars who have 
saturated the discourse with essentialist analysis. 
Unlike other parts of the Middle East, Turkey has attracted very limited attention 
from scholars working on Islam and politics, for two broad and basic reasons. First, for 
these scholars, modernization reforms were proving successful and secular Turkey was 
becoming more of Occidental than Muslim. This is an example of “value-laden” 
approaches in the social sciences. Pippin reminds us that modernization has a dual 
character that is manifest among the intelligentsia and within scholarship. These scholars, 
he argues, see the experience of modernization both as a process of historical 
transformation and, more importantly, as an adoption of a new ‘philosophical and 
civilizational ideal.’9
Secondly, for decades Islamic studies in western institutions produced very few 
scholars on Turkey; often Arabic and Persian were prioritized over Turkish and the main 
 The normative convictions of this philosophical and civilizational 
ideal result in the necessary (deliberate or not) misreading of the internal dynamics of an 
“other” (in this case Islam in Turkey). The consequence of cultivating a dualistic reading 
of world affairs based upon imaginary others is total: it reduces socio-cultural and 
historical analysis into irrelevant representations where certain key assumptions about 
cultural superiority are taken for granted. 
                                                 
9Pippin 1997; Houston 2004, 49-69. 
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research questions were asked in reference to classical issues in Muslim history such as 
the life of the Prophet, theology, and law. For them there was, certainly, another 
important technical problem about studying Turkish; scholars had to learn two entirely 
different alphabets (and in some cases grammars) to master in one language. First, they 
had to learn Turkish with Ottoman paleography and then the modern Turkish in Latin 
script. One of the major exceptions in the field is Bernard Lewis who is competent in 
both “old” and “new” Turkish.10 For a long time his ideas have near monopoly on the 
role and place of Islam in Turkey. In his translation of Turkish scholar Fuad Koprulu’s 
“Islam in Anatolia after Turkish Invasion” (originally printed in 1922 in Turkish in the 
original Ottoman alphabet), Gary Leiser states that this major contribution by Koprulu 
(whom Leiser calls the “founder of the study of the religious history of the Turks in the 
entire Middle East”) “was virtually lost to the scholarly world, including to some degree 
Turkey” because it was not accessible to scholars who did not know the Ottoman Turkish 
language. According to Leiser, “only a handful of Western scholars, such as H. A. R. 
Gibb, Harold Bowen, Bernard Lewis, and Speros Vrynois, have known of this work and 
used it.”11
Bernard Lewis’s main argument is straightforward. He argued that the 
establishment of the republic was a clear rupture from the Islamic past into a modern, 
westernized future.
  
12
                                                 
10For an interview-article in which Lewis demonstrates mastery of Ottoman and modern Turkish see 
“Turkiye'nin gelecegi icin bedbin degilim bilakis nikbinim” (I am not pessimistic but optimistic about 
Turkey’s future) see Zaman Newspaper September 27, 1998. 
11 Leiser’s translation is published in 1993. Koprulu 1993, xviii. 
 For Lewis, in every era of history modernity has been the standards 
12Lewis 2002 [1961]. 
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of the dominant civilizations.13
Bernard Lewis has adopted the elitist view that the autocratic and traditional 
Ottoman Empire collapsed and was replaced, as if by destiny, by a modern, secular 
democratic Republic.
 The idea of the emergence of a new, modern Turkey 
represents the optimism inherent in the notion that the past, being religious, was 
unproductive and outdated, whereas a secular future promised endless opportunities.  
14 The Kemalist reform program is not considered by Lewis as 
irreligious; its purpose was not to destroy Islam, but to disestablish it – to end the power 
of religion and its exponents in political, social, and cultural affairs, and limit it to matters 
of belief and worship. In this Kemalists were on the side of history in reducing Islam to 
the role of religion to the private phere. In a modern, Western, nation-state, religion only 
has public utility if it is in the service of national unity or the ideological legitimacy of 
the state.15In his main study of Turkey Lewis portrayed the Republican elite headed by 
Kemal Atatürk as national saviors against a backward religious tradition (Islam). The 
narrative put forward by Lewis gives the secularist establishment inaugurated by Ataturk 
positive moral status, vis-à-vis Islamist actors. More recently, Samuel Huntington’s 
article “Clash of Civilizations,”16
                                                 
13 Lewis 1997, 129. 
14 Lewis 2002 [1961]; Davison 1998, 87. 
15 Lewis 2002 [1961], 406. 
 solidified this scholarship by constructing an enemy 
16 Huntington 1993. Basically, Huntington's thesis is based on Lewis' scholarship, 1990. Subtitle of Lewis’s 
article is very telling; “Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West, and why their bitterness will not 
easily be mollified.” 
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bent on violent warfare with the United States and other western countries on the bases of 
cultural differences.17
Other scholars on Turkish Islam who share the same ideas as Lewis are Tarik 
Zafer Tunaya,
 
18 Niyazi Berkes,19 and Feroz Ahmad.20 Tarik Zafer Tunaya was one of the 
earliest scholars to address the role of Islamism in Turkey as an anti-modern factor. He 
argued that, against the anti-modern positions of Islamic social movements, the Kemalist 
state introduced a progressive secularism that successfully actualized modernity.21 
According to essentialist scholars like him, there is a constant struggle between 
modernity and tradition in the Muslim world and in Turkey; while secularism is the jewel 
of a modern life-style, traditions based on Islam are relics of the past and are only 
impediments to participation in the modern world.22 These scholars saw continuity only 
in the sense of traditional past trying to plague the modern present.23
The “Turkish Model” literature follows the same kind of reasoning. It argues that 
the Kemalist experience in Turkey is a unique example where a traditional society was 
finally able to transform its backward status to achieve the pinnacle of success by 
 
                                                 
17 Hall and Jackson state that Huntington’s thesis “… has attracted an enormous amount of attention, both 
for its simplicity in dividing the world into mutually exclusive communities characterized by deep-essential 
differences, and for its pessimistic conclusion that these differences are so fundamental as to make the 
communities in question more or less implacably opposed to one another.” Hall and Jackson 2007, 1-15. 
18 Tunaya 2003 (originally published in 1962). 
19 Berkes 1998 (originally published in 1964). 
20 Ahmad 1993. 
21 For more see Tunaya 2003. 
22 The same essentialist views on Islam in general are also represented by Tibi 2002. 
23 Tunaya 2003, 129. 
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becoming, quite generically, modern.24 The Kemalist model is not only a key example 
used in scholarly writings but also a paradigm emulated by authoritarian regimes of the 
Muslim Middle East. No country following the Kemalist model, however, is or has been 
able to accommodate Islamic groups or religious concerns into the political system. Pre-
revolution Iran and Nasr’s Egypt are prime examples.25
Recently, a new generation of scholars has begun to voice arguments against the 
dominance of essentialist ideas in the discussion of Islam and modernity. Contrary to the 
Turkish Model argument Zurcher, for example, argued that the early republican era was 
so authoritarian that there was a huge chasm between the government and the people 
because the demands of the marginalized and relatively helpless sectors of society were 
never represented in state policy.
 
26 For him the authoritarian nature of the Ottoman 
government was transferred into the republican era by the leading elite who were part of 
the major late Ottoman secular political party of Committee of Union and Progress. 
Yavuz considered this process to be draconian measures aimed at eliminating Islam from 
the public sphere.27
In Zürcher’s words the reform process to separate Islam’s influence in education, 
politics, and daily life was an attempt to separate Turkey’s link with its Middle East 
neighbors by de-emphasizing Turkey’s Ottoman past and its historical, cultural and 
  
                                                 
24 Mango 1993; Heper 1997. The Turkish Model thesis has been criticized by Altunisik 2005. 
25 Sayyid reads modernization projects in the Middle East from a Kemalist project perspective. Sayyid 
2003, 69-72. 
26 Zürcher 2003. 
27 Yavuz 2000.  
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religious links to the Middle East.28 Zürcher has drawn attention to Lewis's scholarly 
bias. Based on archival evidence he has demonstrated that the late Ottoman period was 
full of Muslim reformist thinkers who accepted the possibility of having mutually 
beneficial cultural and intellectual exchanges with western nations.29
This new generation of scholars was able to re-read the uncontested definitions 
and explanations of the previous generation of essentialist scholars. The new generation 
of scholars argued that the main weakness in essentialist approaches is that it seeks to 
explain complex social events by reducing them “to a few “essential” causes.”
 
30
One of the main methodological and theoretical criticisms of essentialist 
scholarship is that it ignores the diversity in principles and ideological orientations of 
Islamic movements in Turkey. This is based on the Constructivist premise that identities 
are not given but constructed. Therefore, Huntington’s work is problematic because it 
depends on an uncritical and passive readership to accept that Islam is a monolithic 
entity.
 For 
essentialists the current condition of the Islamic world is a result of Islam and Muslims 
themselves. Islam is identified as the source of Muslim inferiority vis-à-vis the secular 
west, which produced and embodies the secular paradigm. 
31
                                                 
28 Zürcher 2003, 196-200. 
29 Besides Zürcher others have argued that the Kemalist project had its sources in late Ottoman era 
developments. For more see Mardin 1989, Özbudun 1996 and more recently Heper 2000. 
30 Yavuz 2003, 16. 
31 Kubálková 2003, 93. 
 We can argue that, the fundamental assumptions of all of dominant perspectives 
within the literature are based on the same premises. According to these explanations, 
13 
 
first, Islamic principles are essentially irreconcilable with dominant western principles 
like democracy, human rights and freedom. These explanations consider Islamic values 
to be antithetical to the humanist values of the West; therefore, there cannot be a pro-
western, modern, democratic Islam.32 Second, it is only possible to have a moderate and 
democratic Islam if there are strict secular controls over it.33
Conventional scholarship argues that it is not a moderate reading of Islam that 
leads to a peaceful and tolerant vision of the world among Islamists, but strict secularist 
measures that socialize Islamic groups into a kind of passivity that softens their inherent 
inclination towards conflict. This argument, in simplified terms, asserts that it is not 
possible to have a moderate Islam unless we de-Islamize it. One must first reorient the 
Islamic gaze from the sacred realm to the secular world and then use Islamic language 
and symbols to legitimize the secular order.
  
34
Among Turkish scholars important critiques of Lewis' scholarship were produced 
mostly by Turkish scholars living in the West. Most of the time, due to government 
scrutiny, scholars were not able express their ideas and were often pressured by 
 It is a vision of Islam that is completely 
domesticated and subordinate to secularism in Turkey. This argument gives token 
acceptance to Islam as a tool for group identification and mobilization while dismissing 
the possibility of different implications the Islamic worldview would have for the style 
and substance of domestic politics.  
                                                 
32 Erdogan, a constitutional law professor and no relation to the Prime Minister Erdogan, has been one of 
the most ardent critics of this understanding. Erdogan 1999. 
33 Sayyid 2003. 
34 Davison 2003 discusses the secular policies of the Turkish state. 
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government officials or ‘academics’ connected with government officials. Serif Mardin 
can be considered in this vein. His analyses were based on interpreting religion as 
continuity rather than historical baggage.35 He consistently rejected the study of Islam as 
a new phenomenon.36 A recent controversy happened when the Turkish Academy of 
Sciences denied the membership application of Serif Mardin because his books on Islam 
criticized the secular reading of Islam in Turkey.37
The Islamic world is made up of a mosaic of different races, cultures and 
histories; it is impossible to speak of one Islamic identity. From Morocco to Indonesia, 
there are over fifty countries with different political and economic systems, histories, 
languages and cultures, all of which share the same fundamental religious tenets.
 
38 
Scholarly works that focus on particular Islamic cases must be contextualized within that 
specificity so that universal ideas about the nature of Islamic socio-political activism do 
not distort reality. However, individual cases are used to develop universal explanations 
that are applicable for the entire Muslim world and Islamic political identities.39
Most of the movements that are dealt with in academic studies are revolutionary 
political movements that had resorted to violence as a form of political expression. 
Universalizing the nature of the relationship between Islam and politics or the place of 
Islam within a state has been reduced to fundamentalist and anti-western movements. 
  
                                                 
35 Mardin’s book on Nursi is a major example. For more see Mardin 1989. 
36 Cigdem 2005, 33-34. 
37 “Kemalist Bilim Anlayisi” (Kemalist Coception of Science) Sabah July 7, 2007. 
38 Ahmet Kuru’s recent work shows the differences not only between the western world and the Islamic but 
also within the Islamic world. Kuru 2009. 
39 Gole 1996; Gole 2000.  
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Theorizing based on the actions of a limited number of movements in more strategically 
placed areas, such as the oil rich Persian Gulf, does not contribute to our knowledge or 
ability to understand Turkey. In these studies individuals as agents of change are ignored 
altogether.40
There are differences within the overall Constructivist approach to the 
relationship between actors and their environments (agent-structure debate) in identity 
formation process. In this work, I tried to utilize a framework that does not overtheorize 
structure over agency. This does not necessarily mean disregarding the role of structure 
over the agent. However, structural explanations cannot adequately understand the self-
referential if not dogmatic identities of the religious actors that constantly challenge the 
structural limitations around them. Mesbahi argues even Constructivists, who see social 
 
There are different manifestations of Islamic activism that have yet to be 
articulated in the mainstream literature. Contrary to the monolithic and unitary portrayals 
of Islamic movements common in western media and academia, a deeper analysis of 
Islamic social movements suggests that they are substantially more plural and flexible 
than conventional studies presume. In order to understand the internal dynamics of 
Turkish Islamic movements this study utilizes a qualitative interpretive methodology. By 
examining the historical development of the distinct religious communities and their 
attitudes towards important religious and political issues involving the West and the 
secular state, this study will shed light on the existence of diverse Islamic identities which 
were long absent in the conventional studies. 
                                                 
40 Saktanber analyzes individual Muslim actors constructing Islamic identity. Saktanber 2002; Kandiyotu 
and Saktanber 2002. 
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relations as a “co-constitutive” process, often omit the qualities that come from actor’s 
own imaginings and interpretations which are formulated independent of social relations, 
from reading a religious text.41
I argue that the plurality of Islam in Turkey is represented by three interconnected 
yet distinct Islamic approaches. They are Shariah, Tariqah and Haqiqah. Although these 
Islamic approaches represent distinctive aspects of Islamic life and thought, they are not 
closed entities. They are all on the same page in terms of their main creedal tenets while 
also disagreeing on some critical issues. On the other hand, although these three 
approaches have substantial influence on the AK Party, it is neither a direct continuity 
nor independent of any Islamic movement. AK Party is made up of politicians coming 
from different religious (also secular) backgrounds. Its principles are an amalgam of 
conservative
  
42
In the following theoretical chapter, I summarize the main questions followed by 
a representation of the method preferred for this study in examining the relationship 
between three Islamic approaches represented by the Hadith of Gabriel and Justice and 
Development Party’s Neo-Ottomanism. The following three case study chapters will be 
devoted to each one of the grassroot Islamic movements in Turkey. The third chapter 
introduces the influential Naqshbandi Order. The fourth chapter deals with the Nur 
Movement and its Gülen offshoot. The fifth chapter examines the Islamist-National View 
 cultural expressions together with the ideals of independent Muslim 
thinkers in the country; Neo-Ottomanism can be a useful term to define it. 
                                                 
41 Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Fall 2002 class notes from “Seminar on Islam in International Relations” about 
power and limitations of Constructivism in understanding Islamic agency. 
42 Kilinc utilizes “Conservatism” to understand Abdulhamid II era Ottoman policies. For more see Kilinc 
2002.  
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Movement that has done the most to develop the idea of political Islam in the modern 
Turkish consciousness. In this chapter, the narrative of the separation of the National 
View Movement and Justice and Development Party will be examined. In chapter six, I 
analyze how these three Islamic movements influenced Justice and Development Party. 
This chapter traces the current Islamic government’s foreign policy choices to the Islamic 
method they emulate. The conclusion reviews the case studies and the resulting 
theoretical implications, focusing on the trajectory of relevant political issues.  
For this study, different sources were consulted. In terms of examining the histories 
of these movements, primary and secondary sources in Turkish have been utilized. These 
sources include the texts published by the leaders of these Islamic movements, their diaries, 
and important interviews. In terms of understanding the members of these organizations 
through personal interaction, I attended public and private events as an observer. 
Surprisingly, United States is also home to many members of these Islamic communities and 
their leading figures. I met with politicians (Minister of Education of the Justice and 
Development Party), mayors (first elected mayor of Islamist Welfare Party), government 
bureaucrats (in charge of auditing the Turkish schools abroad), leaders of Islamic groups 
(such as an American Naqshbandi Shaikh in Tucson, Arizona who received his Islamic 
studies diploma from the Naqshbandi order in Turkey), members of the Turkish Naqshbandi 
students in North America in their annual 2006 gathering; immediate students of Fethullah 
Gülen (leader of the prominent Gülen Movement); and the leaders of other Islamic groups 
including but not limited to Mustafa İslamoğlu, and Faruk Celebi, the leader of the Rumi-
Mevlevi order who currently resides in Miami, FL. 
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Research in Turkey also produced rewarding data. In 2006, I visited important places 
that allowed me to gather more data about the National View, Nur and Naqshbandi 
movements. Specifically, in October 2006, I visited cities of Burdur and Isparta, where the 
Nur movement first began and later flourished. Especially in Isparta, my visit to “Nur 
houses” where Said Nursi lived was very helpful in understanding the dynamics of the Nur 
community firsthand. In November of 2006, I went to Ankara where I visited institutions 
established by people inspired by the ideas of Fethullah Gülen. These visits continued in 
Istanbul in late November, mostly to Naqshbandi institutions, in Fatih-Çarsamba, a town 
famous for its Naqshbandi residents and leaders.  
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Chapter II: THREE ISLAMIC APPROACHES IN TURKEY 
This chapter deals with the normative foundations for Islamic belief, practice, and 
identity. The source that I will use to draw out the parameters of normative Islam is the 
Hadith of Gabriel. In this hadith, various modes of Islamic life and practice are presented 
and serve as the basis of a typology of Turkish Islamic actors. This specific typology has 
never been utilized in other studies analyzing Islam and politics, especially those focused 
on the interplay between Islam as a religion in a modern world and Islam as a political 
ideology.43
Once we are able to identify the distinct qualities and differences between various 
cultural manifestations of Islam it becomes clear that there is no monolithic expression of 
Islamic political identity. Employing the Hadith of Gabriel in my analysis of Islam in 
Turkey will enable me to further explore the sources of pluralism among and between 
Muslims in Turkey; this will enable me to present an overall framework in which classify 
and identify Islamic political actors based on a system of thought and representation that 
is natural to them. The implications of this, which will become clear as this study 
progresses, is that the Justice and Development Party cannot be understood through rigid 
terminological identifications (like an us-them dichotomy, anti-westernism, political 
authoritarianism or taqiyya) which have been applied to other Islamic groups in the 
Middle East. On the other hand this typology is capable of accommodating a wide range 
of actors, from the most radical to the more or less pacifistic. In this way, theorizing 
about Islamists will not impose on them certain characteristics that are only found in 
 The Turkish case is not an exception.  
                                                 
43 One of the earliest attempts of utilising the Hadith of Gabriel in analyzing Islam is by Martin Lings in 
Lings 1961, 45. See also Chittick 1992, 2-6 and more importantly Murata and Chittick 2006 [1994].  
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other groups labeled Islamic; their specificity is therefore maintained. In the Turkish case, 
there are various modes of being within Islam which are hierarchically outlined through 
the Hadith of Gabriel; the AK Party’s Neo-Ottomanism is not free from different modes 
of Islam. 
A common theme in the literature about Turkish politics from the beginning of 
the 20th century has been a misapprehension of Muslim revivalist movements and their 
critical position vis-à-vis Westernization. Revivalists attributed the backwardness of the 
Muslim community, directly or indirectly, to the abandonment of Islamic religious faith 
and practice.44 The Naqshbandis were one such movement in Turkey. Because of their 
organizational superiority over rival orders (tariqahs), and their status as representatives 
of orthodox Sunni Islam, they were able to spread quickly and become a major religious 
movement that has unsettled relations with the state. Scholars view the role of the 
Naqshbandi order in protest against westernization as foundational.45 They were the first 
major critics of secular reforms in Turkey during the late Ottoman era. They did not see 
the secular reforms of the state, backed by the western powers, as a viable solution to 
what were, for them, domestic problems.46
                                                 
44 Haddad and Voll 1999; Kara 2001. 
45 Ahmad 1991. 
46 Aral, among others, states that westernization is an elite-backed reform process, Aral 2007. Davutoglu 
explains the consequences of the gap between the elite and the masses by referring to R.D. Laing’s The 
Divided Self. Davutoglu 2002, 59. 
 Yet these studies did not to recognize the fact 
that Naqshbandis were an umbrella tariqah for Turkish Muslims wherein different sub 
groups had developed different responses towards the modern questions. 
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Turkish Muslim attitudes towards “others,” including the secular state apparatus 
and Western powers, has been more complex than most studies will lead one to believe. 
Now, contrary to the dominant trends in identity theories, the relationship between the 
Muslim Self and the non-Muslim Other is not limited to the boundaries of a “self-other” 
dichotomy.47
Contrary to Western concepts of religion, Islam functions as a system of values 
where identity is not a product of social relations, but of faith.
 The existing literature on this issue gives an inordinate amount of credit to 
imaginary constructs in the formation of identity because, naturally enough, any actor has 
to pay attention to their environment and existing power structures. However, structural 
factors should only be seen as environmental factors that affect choices and opportunities 
rather than strict limitations on Islamic actors and groups. Due to strong connections with 
normative sources, Islamic actors do not act like ‘billard balls’; rather they are thinking 
agents following deliberate policies in line with their identities, interests and goals. 
48 As a religious belief, its 
value system comes not from the social life but outside of it. 49
                                                 
47 Fore more on alternative explanations of identity formation see Hopf 2002, 1-38. 
48 Serif Mardin’s contribution to the study of Islam has been his unique approach in analyzing Islam on its 
own terms. For his description of Islamic identity, inter alia, see Mardin’s articles collected in Mardin 2005 
and especially page 271. Ahmet Davutoglu, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey who was 
instrumental in shaping Justice and Development Party’s foreign policy is, interestingly enough, a student 
of Serif Mardin. In Davutoglu’s own formulation, Islamic identity is self-referential. He prefers to use ‘self-
concept’ to ‘identity’ and argues that identity is based on social recognition and requires two parties while 
self-concept represents individual consciousness that does not require/need social recognition. In 
Davutoglu’s explanation policy making process can change because it relies on identity while orientation of 
identity does not change because it relies on self-concept. Davutoglu 1997, 11.  
49 I follow Geertz’s explanation: “the major characteristic of religious beliefs as opposed to other sorts of 
beliefs … is that they are regarded as being not conclusions from experience…but as being prior to it. For 
those who hold them, religious beliefs are not inductive, they are paradigmatic; the world… provides not 
evidences for their thruth but illustrations of it. They are a light cast upon human life from somewhere 
outside it.” Geertz 1968, 98-99. 
 For Muslims, this comes 
from the traditional sources of Islam: the Quran and the Hadith. Both of these sources 
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deal with the history of the early Muslim community and the prophethood of 
Muhammad. Therefore, in explaining specific Islamic understandings while the external 
environment is an important factor in the formation of identity, the references of various 
Muslim actors within Islamic discourse deserves primacy of place in the study about 
Muslim self-concept. 
Major Islamic movements in Turkey mentioned here are the Naqshbandi, 
National View, and the Nur-Gülen movements. The National View and Nur-Gülen 
movements are both offshoots of the Naqshbandi tariqah. Although these major Islamic 
movements are all on the same page when it comes to the creedal tenets, they have 
articulated plural images of their individual identities, the secular Turkish state, the place 
of Turkey in the world and its relations with the West. When Turkey began its bid for 
European Union membership some major Muslim communities were suspicious of EU 
membership. For them EU’s imperialism was not for the good of the Muslim population. 
The Naqshbandis argued that this course would have devastating effects on the Islamic 
culture in the country.50 National View's leader, Erbakan, argued that the EU was a 
Christian institution, and was therefore unable to accommodate Turkey. He argued that 
Turkey must establish a union with Islamic nations.51
                                                 
50 Mardin 1991. 
51 Some of Erbakan’s projects were a United Nation of the Islamic countries, the establishment of an 
Islamic common market, the introduction of a common Islamic currency, a joint Islamic defence force, and, 
the establishment by the Islamic countries of a cultural cooperation organization. Erbakan 1971; Kamrava 
1998, 279; Mecham 2004. Aral 2005 has a more moderate view on Turkey’s relations with Muslim 
countries during the Erbakan era. 
 On the other hand, decades before 
Turkey’s European bid, in the 1930s, at the beginning of the Europe-inspired 
authoritarian regime in Turkey, the Nur Movement’s leader, Said Nursi, supported the 
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idea of Muslim and Christian nations forming strong ties52 and foresaw a better and 
closer relations between the Turks and Europeans. Later during the 1990s, Fethullah 
Gülen, rooted in the Nur movement, argued that there were few legitimate or urgent 
concerns on the question of EU membership, provided Turkey was self-confident in its 
[Muslim] identity.53
To understand the plurality of of Islamic understandings and their representation 
in the Justice and Development Party’s policies we need to study the major Islamic 
movements and the Justice and Development Party’s relations with them. I argue that 
there are three modes of Islamic approaches in Turkey. The first Islamic approach is 
Shariah (Şeriat). Shariah is the outward interpretation of religion and its enforcement 
over the society by means of a state apparatus. The second approach is Tariqah (Tarikat). 
Tariqah signifies religion as the practice of particular established norms within religious 
orders; it is the progressive internalization of the basic articles of faith. The third 
 The various responses of Turkish Muslims to the same "others" and 
environmental constraints defy simplistic representation because the reaction and 
response of different leaders were studied attempts on their part from within the 
individual expressions of Islamic approaches these movements adhere to.  
                                                 
52 Nursi’s argument is relatively strong. He argues that Christians and Muslims have common enemies 
against which they should form an alliance. Nursi’s legal justification is a sound Hadith (saying of 
Muhammad), Nursi 1996, 663.  
53 Pashayan 2007. Besides, earlier nationalist-Islamist scholars like Erol Gungor who wrote on the 
contemporary issues of the Islamic world argued that the Muslim world’s perception of the West could not 
be described as an enemy/other relationship. For him, not the Islamic world but the western perceptions and 
consequent domination attempts made the relations worse. He argued that during the Cold War, Muslims 
sided with the Christian West against Communist Russia; therefore, the real Western perception of enmity 
against the Muslims did not come to the surface until the end of the Cold War. Gungor 1996. Similarly, 
Hakan Yavuz argues that Turkish Islamic movements were pro-western during the Cold War, although they 
had suspicions about its imperialist aspirations, Yavuz 2004, 222. 
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approach is Haqiqah (Hakikat). It symbolizes religion as a form of spiritual journey based 
on the self’s connectedness with God.  
While this study utilizes religious terminology to explain the variations in Islamic 
practice in Turkish politics from the late Ottoman period, the normative connotations of 
Shariah, Tariqah, and Haqiqah are based on the classical sources of Islamic tradition. The 
references to Islamic sources considered authentic by the Muslims will enable me to 
examine Islamic movements in their own understandings rather than employing an 
incompatible typology that might not adequately address the diversity among them. The 
operative text that demonstrates this gradation in religious practice is popularly known as 
the Hadith (tradition) of Gabriel. Many Muslims and Islamic scholars consider this hadith 
as authentic. More importantly, this hadith defines and demarcates different Islamic 
understandings and is accepted by the Turkish Islamic movements studied in this work. I 
will cite the text in full: 
On the authority of 'Umar who said: While we were one day sitting with 
the messenger of Allah (Muhammad) there appeared before us a man 
dressed in extremely white clothes and with very black hair. No traces of 
journeying were visible on him, and none of us knew him. He sat down 
close by the Prophet, rested his knees against his, put his palms on his 
thighs, and said, "O Muhammad! Inform me about Islam." The messenger 
of Allah said, "Islam is that you should testify that there is no deity save 
Allah and that Muhammad is His messenger, that you should perform 
salat (ritual prayer), pay the zakat (alms), fast during Ramadan, and go on 
Hajj"… He [Gabriel] said, "You have spoken truly."… He went on to say, 
"Inform me about Iman (faith)." [Prophet Muhammad] answered, "It is 
that you believe in Allah and His angels and His books and His 
messengers and in the Last Day, and in qadr (predestination), both in its 
good and in its evil." The man said, "You have spoken truly." Then he 
said, "Inform me about Ihsan (literally doing what is good, beautiful)". He 
(Prophet Muhammad) answered, "It is that you should serve Allah as 
though you could see Him, for though you cannot see Him yet He sees 
you… Then he [Gabriel] left and I stayed for a time. Then He [Prophet 
Muhammad] said: "O 'Umar, do you know who the questioner was?" I 
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said, "Allah and His messenger know best". He said, "He was Gabriel, 
who came to you to teach you your religion."54
This tradition fits neatly into the tripartite division of Turkish Islamism noted 
above. The shariah (Islam in the Hadith) approach is the most basic, broadly based, and 
widely discussed in the literature about the Muslim world. It is relevant to nominal 
identity in its most basic form as well as to issues of law and order and personal behavior. 
The outward and basic interpretation of the religion requires enforcement over the society 
by means of a state apparatus. In its basic meaning Islam here means submission. The 
Quranic response to the Bedouins who say “We have faith” is “Say [O Muhammad!]: 
You do not have faith; rather say, ‘We have submitted;’ for faith has not entered your 
hearts.”
 
 
55
Tariqah approach is the complete and steadfast identification of the believer with 
the basic theological propositions of Iman (faith) as universal moral values. For the 
Turkish Naqshbandis, tariqah meant a specific method that involved spiritual, ethical and 
 In the shariah-based approach the Quran, sunna of the prophet Muhammad (the 
normative practice) and the sources of law that are not based on direct texts but derive 
from a legal methodology which utilized the Quran and traditions of the prophet 
Muhammad need to be implemented in society through state institutions. This narrow 
aspect of Islam, popularly known as Shariah, is the most popular one among Islamist 
political movements for whom religion is a law meant to be implemented coercively. As 
will be discussed in the Islamist National View Movement chapter, Sharia has become 
the most important aspect of Islam for movements involved in active political life. 
                                                 
54 Nawawi 1996, 3-5. 
55 Quran 49:14. Because it focuses exclusively on the political realm, Chittick considers this as the 
narrowest meaning of Islam, Chittick 1992, 3. 
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social principles in order to perfect the soul of the believer under the strict auspices of a 
leader (Murshid or Kamil Murshid). The most important aspect of this ‘perfection 
process’ is that it should be implemented in and around a Sufi center (tekke and zaviye) 
where tariqah members live a highly interconnected life.56 An Iman-informed approach 
to modern politics would question the absolute premises upon which secularism 
establishes itself as normative. An imagination of life lived according to the principles of 
God is considered as the most important aspect of Tariqah.57
The last approach, herein labeled Haqiqah, is based upon the spiritual principle 
(Ihsan in the Hadith) that when the Muslim is in a state of prayer he should be wholly 
attentive to the object of prayer, God
 Issues relevant to Turkish 
politics that would be addressed by this approach are corruption, the importance of family 
values, and issues of practicing religion in social life according to a strict adherence to 
tradition.  
58 rather than worldly objects. This is an ideal 
spiritual station where individual believers can ascertain the quality of their own worship 
by going beyond the surface of practicing religion and entering into the spiritual depth of 
religious conscious.59
                                                 
56 Gunduz 1984, 169-170. 
57 Turkish Naqshbandi leader Kotku argues that this is the main reason why Tariqahs emerged in the 
Muslim world. Kotku 1984, 16-17. 
58 In ihsan tradition masiva means ‘things other than God.” For an example of masiva in ihsan tradition of 
Nursi (and Gülen) see Nursi 1996, 220. 
59 Chittick 1992, 5.  
 This requires a self-controlled religious practice that does not 
require an apparatus to control and promote practice of religion other than voluntary 
joining; it is a theology of anti-institutionalism. Therefore, its application in (Turkish) 
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politics, and at a general level of Islamic politics, is a bit problematic. How does one 
know if the Justice and Development Party is in a state of Ihsan? That determination will 
be based upon two interrelated factors: the level of emphasis which the party (in 
contradiction to an Islamist regime or the Erbakan government) places on the state as the 
agent of Islamic values, and the substantive policy principles of the party. 
In their origins, these three Islamic approaches stemmed from the centuries old 
tradition of the Naqshbandi orders. Naqshbandi orders have been a major Islamic social 
movement of religious expression in Turkey. The primacy of the Naqshbandi order in the 
social and political life of Turkey runs generally uninterrupted throughout the history of 
the Turkish presence in Anatolia.60
This study does not reject the possible material or ideological impacts of the non-
Turkish Islamic influences coming from the rest of the Muslim Middle East. Non-Turkish 
Islamic reactions to the secular modernization process has manifested in a radical 
 This is incomparable in the rest of the Muslim World. 
It is therefore imperative to analyze the Naqshbandi tradition and its transformation over 
time. The most important aspect of the Naqshbandi message has been the reformist nature 
of the order; the leadership was cognizant of the rising power of the state apparatus and 
constantly developed new methods of religious interpretation so that they could address 
the challenges of rising political and ideological threats. However, over time different 
members of the Naqshbandi order developed variant interpretations of the original 
Naqshbandi message based on their own intellectual inclinations and personal 
aspirations.  
                                                 
60 Esposito 2001. 
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withdrawal from the secular state apparatus. However, in Turkey the reaction of the 
Naqshbandi order was different. Instead of being confrontational, the Naqshbandis 
preferred to resist the coercive methods of the secular state via pacifist means. This 
unique approach is characteristic of all major Turkish Islamic movements who were able 
to preserve their religious identities without threatening the secular state. The personal 
and organizational space created by their focus on teaching Islam through social channels 
and redressing injustices through civil society activism and political lobbying via 
apolitical means contributed to their success and added credibility to their future political 
program. The rich and established tradition of the Naqshbandi order in Turkey did not 
import methods from other Muslim and non-Muslim experiences. It was a product of an 
indigenous tradition of Islam. First, in order to promote their message among the people, 
the Naqshbandis already knew how to deal with oppressive governments based on their 
centuries old experience with various political apparatus’s.  
Second, and more importantly, the centrality of the Caliphate in the hands of the 
Ottomans for centuries created a self-perpetuating Ottoman identity. As an Islamic 
tradition, the idea of state as equal to the religion itself experienced its peak during the 
Ottoman era.61
Naqshbandi approach as the main religious demographic in Turkey did not 
approve of violence or openly confrontational policies towards the state. This does not 
 Therefore, socio-political and cultural relationships between Islam in 
Turkey and rest of the Middle East were mostly one directional: from the Caliphal core to 
the periphery.  
                                                 
61 Sayyid 2003; Berkes 1998, 13-14. Kaplan examines the pre-republic era din-u devlet understanding 
(unification of religion and the state) and its incorporation into the republican era textbooks. For more see 
Kaplan 2002. 
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necessarily mean that other religious movements followed the exact same method. Many 
Islamic actors interpreted their own selves and the structure around them differently. This 
led to different guiding principles and strategies among the representatives of Islam in 
Turkey. The way different Islamic groups reacted to new environmental conditions 
demonstrate to us the different internal dynamics (or identities) these actors developed 
over time.  
An important example would be the influence of scholars like Sayyid Qutb, Ali 
Shariati, and the occurrence of the Iranian revolution on the National View Movement.62 
The National View movement has politically been the most critical voice against the 
secular state and the West. Necmettin Erbakan founded and provided leadership to the 
movement from the early seventies. The National View movement’s cultural orientation 
can be identified with the Shariah approach. They are especially prone to the ideological 
uses of “otherness” with Islamic symbols and terminology to understand the self and the 
other. However, as the National View Movement leadership attempted to implement 
methods reminiscent of Qutb’s ideas or those of Iranian revolution involving street 
protests, the religious wing of the organization denounced it and distanced themselves 
from National View Movement’s political activities.63
                                                 
62 Daği explains the non-Turkish Islamic influence on the National View Movement. For more Daği 1998. 
63 Yasar 2004. 
 In this way, the anti-modernist 
message of Qutb and others lost their appeal with the grass-roots Naqshbandi-Sufi 
tradition. The National View Movement became the sole representative of the Shariah 
approach in the political arena. It was interested in implementing Islamic religious laws 
through the state apparatus. It tried to institutionalize Islam within the state’s law-making 
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and enforcement structure. In this movement, control of the State via the political process 
has been the primary goal. This Islamic approach emphasizes the state as the primary 
instrument of Islamization of society.  
The understanding that makes up the Naqshbandi tariqah is founded on the 
traditional understandings that emerged in a sacred past that are not necessarily open to 
change and flexibility. It is based on the theological principles enunciated in the hadith of 
Gabriel: the reality of God as Lord over the world, the importance of prophets and their 
scriptures as divine sources of guidance, and elements of the unseen such as angelology 
and predestination. Tariqah emphasizes the spiritual development of individuals and 
religious communities via the voluntary practice of the Sunna (normative deeds of the 
prophet Muhammad); these traditional methods have been reinforced within the tariqah 
system over the centuries. The Naqshbandi order’s Tariqah path is a moderate one in 
between the Shariah and Haqiqah approaches. Tariqah approach is consistently “other 
cautious” but does not necessarily try to create "enemy others" on a constant basis like 
the National View Movement. It distinguishes between its vision of Islam and different 
worldviews they see as innovation. But the driving force or motivation among the tariqah 
actors does not depend on political adversaries to be combated. Their focus is on the 
social community. 
On the other side of the spectrum lies the Nur movement, which has consistently 
viewed the state as an institution that provides security rather than cultural identity. In the 
Nur community, the dominant Islamic approach is the “Haqiqah” Islam, which has a 
more or less “other-less” Islamic understanding that focuses on the self rather than the 
other. Its main point of reference is the tradition itself connecting believers to the Divine 
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Truth (Haqiqah) and the believer as agent of tradition. This is a self referential-identity 
that is not spoken of in the scholarship. Nur community, as it is represented in the hadith 
of Gabriel, emphasizes worshipping God as if they could see him. In their religious 
psychology, nothing happens independent of the will of God. Therefore, they do not (one 
could argue that they are unable to) devote energy in constructing an "other," but are in 
constant dialogue with God through individual worship.64
The Nur (the Light, understood in a spiritual sense) movement of Said Nursi
  
65, 
and most recently Fethullah Gülen,66
                                                 
64 Ihsan is described above: "It is that you should serve Allah as though you could see Him, for though you 
cannot see Him yet He sees you." 
65 Nursi 1996, 1277-1278. Nursi’s entire body of work, including his biography, are compiled in Nursi 
1996. Throughout this dissertation, this collection is consulted.  
66 Recently some major scholars began to focus on Nur and Gülen movements in Turkey. Abu-Rabi 2003; 
Yavuz and Esposito 2003. 
 give primacy to belief in the Oneness of God. Belief 
in God, the Nur community holds, is the first and foremost principle of an Islamic 
identity. For them, the concept of ihsan established the equality of all believers before 
God and motivates them to come together to encourage one another on the path of God. 
The believers are also united in their distrust and apprehension of a society without 
ethical or moral values grounded in belief in God. In that respect the main actor in 
Haqiqah approach is the individual believer struggling to accomplish his duty towards 
God over and above the spiritual distractions ubiquitous in a secular society. The person 
affected by and operating within the cultural sphere of haqiqah is focused on worshipping 
God with single-minded attention. Socially haqiqah is manifest in an ambiguous attitude 
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towards power. One does not seek power for its own sake; the focus is to promote the 
truths found in the tariqah path with minimal tension.  
By looking at the relationship between the three major Islamic movements and the 
Justice and Development Party, I will embark on the rather understudied issue of 
contested identities of Islamic movements, their self-concepts, their perceptions of the 
West and their unique relationships with the state apparatus. In concrete terms, this 
involves how Islamic movements view themselves, how they view others and what is 
their vision about the Turkish state in the world. Therefore, the main topic of this study is 
centered on the special relationship between Islamic movements and the political system in 
Turkey. On the other hand, special attention to the Justice and Development Party 
government will show the limits of the influence of these three Islamic movements on the 
Justice and Development Party, which can at most be considered an indirect continuation of 
them.  
In order to grasp the diversity within the Muslim world and the existence of 
different Islamic political identities one needs to analyze Islamic identities from within 
their changing environments where a reaction to the western world and the imposition of 
modern norms is just one issue addressed by Islamists. Few studies of political Islam, and 
the varied role of Islam in the modern world, are able to break out of this narrow focus. 
Serif Mardin is a scholar who has been able to transcend these discursive limitations. 67
                                                 
67 Mardin 1989.  
 
He argues that instead of focusing “on the differences in the role of religion as between 
‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ societies taken as polar opposites,” we need to recapture “the 
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internal spring of Islamic social structuring as a dynamic process.”68 The internal spring 
of Islamic social structuring is rooted in a tradition of ambivalence to political power. 
The three distinct Islamic approaches (Shariah, Tariqah and Haqiqah) represent different 
approaches to the state, themselves, and sometimes imaginary others. Its simplest form is 
Shariah.69 Holy Law has cross-cultural and global implications for Muslims because it is 
“God’s eternal and immutable will for humanity, as expressed in the Quran and 
Muhammad’s example.”70
The death of the prophet Muhammad brought about the major question of political 
authority in his absence. The major split between the partisans (Shi’a) of Ali and the 
Sunni school school of thought (ahl al-sunna wal jam'a) on political legitimacy. The 
Shi’a argued that the prophet Muhammad’s caliph should be his closest relatives who 
represented his family and were a link in the chain of divine knowledge revealed to the 
prophet. The debate on the status of Muhammad’s family (Ahl al Bayt) as trustees of his 
message is important because he did not have a male heir and his lineage was widely 
recognized to continue through the children of his daughter Fatima and Ali ibn Abu 
Talib. Prophetic traditions as well as the Quran support the superior status of 
 But each actor discussed in this study practices Islam at a 
different level based on the hierarchy explicit in the hadith of Gabriel which stretch from 
political quiescence to accommodation. 
Political Quiescence and Accommodation 
                                                 
68 Mardin 1991. 
69 Zubaida 2005. 
70 Esposito 2003. 
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Muhammad’s family. In addition, Muhammad had often praised Ali for his knowledge of 
religion and at times left him as the leader of the community in his absence.71
However, Ali was younger than Muhammad’s immediate peers were and after his 
death, this older generation was able to win popular support and political legitimacy.
  
72 
Ali did not contest the leadership of his three immediate predecessors73
But this issue is also important for the majority Sunnis, who generally do not 
accept Shia claims about Ali and the ahl al-bayt. Within the early Islamic state individual 
believers implemented the Sharia in their personal lives, while the teachings of the 
prophet Muhammad were being transmitted orally. Scholars of law, the ulema, were 
prominent in their role as transmitters and proponents of Shariah. However, whose role 
was it to confer legitimacy, on specifically religious grounds, on the rulers of the Muslim 
— though he did 
articulate the claim that his position as leader was usurped from him— because he did not 
want to create fitna, or civil violence and division, among the members of the burgeoning 
Muslim community. Ali eventually became the fourth caliph after Muhammad but 
immediately had to confront the politically active Umayyad family who had created 
positions of power for themselves within the political structure of the Muslim state in 
places like Syria and Egypt. The issue of the legitimate succession of the prophet as well 
as the status of his descendents in representing Islam is still a contentious issue and the 
subject of a scholarly discourse in its own right. 
                                                 
71 See Madelung 1997. The author discusses the place of “the family of Muhammad” in the Islamic 
tradition. 
72 Madelung 1997, 1-27. 
73 During Uthman’s caliphate, and right before his death, Ali tried to advise Uthman about the negative 
consequences of Uthman’s so called nepotism.  
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community? The religious classes were interested in promoting the practice of Islam and 
the recognition and institutionalization of sacred law. Some scholars may also have been 
motivated by personal ambition, but the point is that the avenue to Islamize society was 
by the law: the establishment, in legal form, and socialization of divine norms. The state 
in the early period of Islam, particularly the dynastic lineages that were developing, had 
as its interest what any power structure does: growth and survival. This resulted in a 
dichotomy between the reason d'être of the state and the divine will, as articulated by the 
scholarly classes. 
Two social classes emerged: the ulema (the faqihs or recognized Islamic scholars 
of law), and the Sufis.74 The ulema tried to institutionalize their legal ideas through the 
state.75 The Sufi movement grew as a reaction to this legalistic if not secular approach to 
Islam. They focused attention on cultivating spirituality and distrusted the state because 
they did not want their faith to be corrupted by association with institutions of power. 
Within this dynamic lies the origin of Islamist relations with the state as the instrument of 
the divine will.76
                                                 
74 Lapidus 1994, 253; Armstrong 2000. 
75 Lapidus identifies the ulema, especially in the Ottoman case, as “bureaucrats”. For more see Lapidus 
1994, 254. 
76 The peak of this process is the Iranian Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini argued that the Islamic state, 
being the absolute trustee of the Prophet, has precedence over all other ordinances or religious practices. 
An important issue emerged in Iran about the distribution of land for administrative purposes. Some other 
Iranian clerics argued that because shariah protected private property and made no provision for the ruler to 
redistribute it, they argued, the state has no authority to regulate the issues protected by the contracts 
between the private parties. Khomeini, as the leading faqih,promoted the idea of maslaha or expediency 
arguing that for public good state can bypass sharia law. Zubaida 2005. Bulac argues that state should not 
bypass sharia law for public good. Bulac 2007, 91. 
 For the greater part of Islamic history, political powers have been able 
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to co-opt the ulema by patronizing Islamic law and acquiescing to other demands made 
by the masses of dedicated Muslims.77
The Sufi scholars preferred to stay away from direct involvement in the affairs of 
the state. Although they were also part of the ulema (Islamic scholars), they preferred to 
be independent from external constraints and political pressure; they therefore rejected 
government employment. Their rationale for remaining aloof from politics was to 
preserve the dignity of Ilm (Islamic sciences).
  
78 Two major examples of the tension 
between the state and Islamic scholars with this type of mindset are of Imam Abu Yusuf 
and Imam Ahmad b Hanbal. Imam Abu Yusuf was one of the earliest Islamic scholars of 
the Hanafi school of thought; he accepted a government position and became a Qadi 
(Judge).79 Before him, other leading scholars (including his own teacher Abu Hanifa) had 
rejected similar offers to protect the integrity of their intellectual office. Imam Abu 
Yusuf’s participation in politics led to his exclusion from the scholarly community. His 
critics argued that religious scholars should not be under the control of any government.80
                                                 
77 The exception is Shia Islam. Until the Qajar period the Shia ulema did not address the state because their 
position was made inviolate through their theology. Essentially, any claim to rule in the name of Islam was 
of questionable legitimacy in the absence of a recognized descendent of the Prophet Muhammad.  
78 Bulac states that Sufi scholars (Islamic scholars who did not accept government jobs) did not challenge 
the state directly; however, they continuously expressed their dissatisfaction in their theoretical writings 
concerning the ideal leadership and authority. This is what he calls quiescence (Temkin). Bulac 2007, 90. 
79 His real name is Yaqub ibn. Ibrahim al-Ansari, Esposito 2003, 5. 
80 For Imams rejecting government positions see Şener n.d and Bulac 2007, 88-94.  Bulac argues that with 
Abu Yusuf’s governmental job the decline of ulema began, as the state was able to successfully co-opt the 
religious leaders. 
 
Ahmad b. Hanbal was imprisoned by the state for not accepting a government mandated 
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theological position.81 He was severely punished and spent the rest of his life in jail and 
under severe conditions. Ahmad b. Hanbal’s standpoint later became the mainstream for 
Sunni Islam.82
The ulema eventually gave in to the pressures of the political authorities but 
demanded that the state help establish the Shariah in return for legitimacy; after all, the 
name of the ruler was mentioned at every Friday congregational prayer. On the other 
hand, Sufi scholars had no interest in governmental affairs and preferred to live austere 
lives in personal devotion to God. As a famous example, tensions did lead to conflict 
with respect to controversial issues, some of doctrine and some of political power. Al-
Hallaj was executed for saying ana’l haqq (I am the truth; or divine), but he also was 
aloof from the state and refused to use his popularity to give legitimacy to the Caliph.
 
83
There was no authority that could monitor rulers in their handling of God’s law. 
There developed a dichotomy wherein a certain body of scholars and their lay students 
and followers became tacitly aligned to the state, or ruling authorities, as the instrument 
to apply the Shariah in society as well as work for other Islamic causes. They did not 
intentionally sell their consent for the sake of establishing the Shariah. Nor did the Sufi 
scholars fall under the control of the government. The sufis were less inclined to 
associate with any institution because, more or less, their goal was directed towards 
  
                                                 
81 The religious question was about whether the Quran was the created or eternal word of God. The Rival 
Mutazilite school of thought argued that the Quran was created because they wanted to safeguard the 
transcendence of God from co-eternality. Ahmad b. Hanbal rejected this view, arguing that Quran is eternal 
word of God and not created. 
82 Lapidus says that Hanbalis, Malikis, and Naqshbandis in India “not only maintained their autonomy, but 
were active opponents of state elites in the name of Islamic principles.” See Lapidus 1994, 254. 
83 Lapidus 1994, 112. 
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mystical experiences and worship. They did not have time for mundane issues, and often 
would use the materialistic hypocrisy of the ruling classes as pedagogical examples in 
their teachings. 
This is a rough division between the ulema, who were involved in government, 
and Sufi mystics operating in society. Lapidus states that in the course of fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries Ottomans brought the majority of the religious establishment under 
state control. The bureaucratization of the ulema gave them enormous access to positions 
and endowments, however, the ulema could no longer stay as the representatives of the 
Muslim masses.84 Ottoman ulema simply became civil servants paid by the state.85 
Because the ulema grew close to the state and maintained rigid ideas about the law, they 
became deaf to social developments86
                                                 
84 Lapidus 1994, 326-27. 
85 Barkey 2008, 104-108. 
86 The Turkish Sheikh al Islam Zembilli Ali Efendi said “the gates of ijtihad (renewing the religion) is 
closed” arguing that the religious accomplishments until then represented the utmost developed version of 
Islam where there is no need to question and attempt to change it. Tarik Zafer Tunaya criticizes this 
situation and argues that, as a result, the Ottomans gave in to dogmatism. See Tunaya 2004, 48. 
. The classical texts (the Quran and Muhammad’s 
recorded traditions) and scholarly debating circles is where the nature of Islam is defined. 
The state-backed jurists accepted the interpretations of the Hanafi school of thought 
which was introduced among the Turks by the various Naqshbandi orders. Overall, the 
Hanafi legal establishment allowed Sufi brotherhoods to practice interdependent and free 
in their own affairs. The autonomy accorded to Sufi brotherhoods was also useful to the 
Ottoman state which needed the cultural assets of these brotherhoods and their ability to 
organize and inspire people as the empire was expanding throughout the Balkans. 
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Muslim immigrants voluntarily settled in the new lands and continued the proselytizing 
activities of their ancestors.87
Originally, because Turkey was a religious country where the state was connected 
to the religious classes,
  
88 this diffused religion and religious actors within all areas of the 
government. The scholarly religious classes (Ilmiye Sinifi) had the authority to judge 
religious issues. The highest religious authority was the office of Shaikh al Islam 
(Şeyhülislam). The decisions of the Ottoman Sultan became law after the, albeit symbolic 
at times, approval of the Shaikh al Islam. This system functioned efficiently during the 
age of Ottoman hegemony. Then the ulema fell behind in the production and 
dissemination of knowledge and other developments. As an institution, they were stuck in 
the past whereas all around them new modes and innovations were developing. Often the 
members of religious circles were themselves opposed to reform. They became the 
representatives of the status quo, which they identified with their own well-being. One 
major example is the opposition of the religious circles to the use of the mass print 
technology in Istanbul. They worried that if religious books were printed by machines 
hundreds of scribes would lose employment.89
                                                 
87 The Bektashi orders carried on in this mission, see Lapidus 1994, 326. 
88 During the establishment of the Ottoman state, the Sheikh of the local business fraternity (Ahi) who 
happened to be the religious leader at the time presented Osman with a sword and gave him his daughter, 
Malhun Hatun. How symbolically and insignificant it might appear, at the time this was representative of a 
legitimation process for the political power in the eye of religious authority. For more see Koprulu 1992, 6; 
Inalcik 1973, 55. 
 This kind of opposition delayed the use of 
the printing press in the Ottoman Empire for over a century. 
89 Muteferrika was the first person to establish a print house in the Ottoman Empire. However it was closed 
after a bloody rebellion, supported by scribes, in 1730. Babinger 2004, 9 and 30-32. Bulac argues that after 
ulema lost their support from military circles because of the reforms of Mahmut II, they began to use 
shariah as a political tool in order to defend their weakening position against the newly rising pro-western 
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The anti-reform status of the religious establishment and their inability to lead the 
country through changing historical circumstances came hand in hand with another 
development. As Serif Mardin reminds us, the decline of the religious classes (as a result 
of their inability to guide the development of the nation) came together with the rise of 
secular ideas from the European world. The bureaucratic elite (kalemiye sinifi which 
means “Men or Class of the Pen”), who had been closely allied with the scholarly classes, 
began to adopt the secular ideas of Europe where they went for education. They did not 
have a formal education in the religious sciences, as Mardin states, and they were more 
attracted to secular ideologies.90
As the new elite gradually preferred secular ideas to the previously dominant 
religious ones, they disconnected themselves from preceding Young Ottoman ideas and 
became the epitome of the secular ideas in the Ottoman bureaucracy.
  
91 The decline of the 
status of the ulema and the rise of the secular bureaucratic elite corresponds to the reform 
projects of Sultan Mahmut II. He was the first Ottoman Sultan to introduce secular 
schools alongside the religious education system.92
                                                                                                                                                 
secular elite. As a result, for the ulema anything coming from the west was considered as anti-Islamic and 
forbidden. Bulac 2007, 94.  
90 Mardin says that “Ottoman bureaucrats who were trained in the ‘palace’ system rather than in the 
madrasa (medrese), or religious school, had an unusual view of the interrelation of politics and religion. 
Their outlook may be described as raison d’etat.” Mardin 1983, 139. 
91 Mardin argues that it is easier to show the transition from Young Ottomans to Young Turks and from 
Young Turks to Ataturk’s revolution. However, he argues that the more important aspect of this transition 
is the gradual weakening of the Islamic content. See Mardin 1962, 404. 
92 Due to the overarching impact of his secular reforms Mahmut II (d. 1839) was called by the religious 
ulema as the “infidel Sultan” (Gavur Padisah). For more about Murat II’s reforms see Heyd 1970. 
 Eventually they began to challenge 
the religious class, even on religious matters, based on the basic training they received in 
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Europe. This, mainly French educated, generation of bureaucratic elite who acquired 
increasing power identified culturally and ideologically more with Paris than Istanbul. 
They wanted to displace the institutional power of the clergy in Istanbul in conscious 
emulation of the relegated clergy in Paris.93
Previously the bureaucracy served the interests of the nation with the same 
ideological commitment as the religious classes. However, the emergence of ideological 
differences between these two classes led the bureaucracy to begin to develop its own 
concept of religion as a private matter with no claim on the state or the political 
discourse. Winning the support of another class, the army officers (seyfiyye, the men of 
sword), like themselves who also did not receive a religious education, the bureaucratic 
elites moved to disentangle the office of the Shaikh al Islam from positions of influence 
with the Sultan.
  
94
                                                 
93 Dar-ul-Funun (house of sciences), the first Turkish university in the modern sense was established in 
1870 as a result of a proposal by a French politician, Jean Victor Duruy. Before he became the first 
educational adviser to the Turkish government, Duruy was the Minister of Education in France in 1863. As 
a result, Dar-ul Funun was founded under the auspieces of the French government. The director of Dar-ul 
Funun was a former madrasa teacher named Tahsin who was sent to Paris by the Turkish government in 
1857. Berkes argues that “[d]uring the twelve years [Tahsin] spent [in Paris] he became a zealous disciple 
of modern science, a free-thinker, and a believer in progress. His new creed was the kind of materialism 
that raged in Europe after the publication in 1855 of Ludwig Büchner’s Fraft und Stoff…the favourite of 
the Turkish doctors. Although a member of the Young Ottomans interested in the revival of the Muslim 
nations, Tahsin believed that the road to progress lay in the repudiation of religious dogmas and in 
enlightenment by science and education.” For more see Berkes 1998, 179-181. On the other hand, Mardin 
informs us that the place of science and religion was debated by people under French influence and also by 
major Islamist figures. Jamaladdin Afghani was one of them. After his arrival to Istanbul in 1869 Afghani 
was invited to give a lecture in the opening ceremony of Dar-ul Funun. However, his ideas on science and 
religion created a controversy when they were interpreted as arguing for superiority of science over 
religion. Eventually other controversial debates led to the closure of the Dar-ul Funun University. For more 
see Mardin 2005 [1991], 12-13. 
 As the men of religion began to loose their authoritative status they 
94 For more see Tunaya 2003. Mardin explains this process as follows “for reasons which are not yet well 
understood, the Ottoman secular bureaucracy acquired increasing power during the eighteenth century…” 
He cites major examples where Ottoman Sultans executed influential religious leaders, or in 1703 a 
Şeyhulislam who wanted the position of Grand Vizier. Mardin argues that “the most effective aspect of the 
Ottoman government’s control over the ‘Learned Institution’ – that is, the hierarchy of men of religious 
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started to express their increasing powerlessness in reactionary terms. The pan-Islamist 
policies of Abdülhamid II can be considered in this vein. For many Muslims in the 
country Abdülhamid II was the "Great King" (Ulu Hakan) who was considered “worthy 
of paradise” (Cennetmekan). It is during his thirty-three year reign that the Ottoman state 
faced the biggest political, economic and military challenges of its time. To protect the 
country from collapse, Abdülhamid II popularized the religiously based Shariah authority 
to a greater extent than many of his predecessors had done.95 He promoted Panislamism 
to keep the weakening empire together96
From the beginning, the religious orders (tariqahs) functioned as institutions for 
those who sought refuge from the spiritual emptiness. As they did for over a thousand 
years, the members of the tariqahs sought knowledge from learned, pious teachers trained 
in spiritual technique to maintain personal piety and purity. Over time, with the 
increasing influence of secular ideas into Turkey the religious orders and the political 
establishment became alienated from one another. However, not all Sufi scholars in the 
 He was harsh on opposition groups from the 
bureaucratic classes, which he repressed in order to forestall the decline of Islam as a 
result of the growth of a secularly inclined civil service and military. His reign represents 
the last attempt by a failing religious social institution to try to salvage a role for itself in 
a world order that it had previously ignored. 
                                                                                                                                                 
learning or ilmiye- was that the more important ulema became in effect part of the official class and were 
dependent upon the state for their emoluments.” Mardin 1983, 140. 
95 Hodgson says that ‘Abdulhamid needed an ideology to enforce his despotism. “This he achieved through 
rallying conservative Muslim opinion generally, and particularly through encouraging a sentiment labeled 
‘pan-Islamism’. Hodgson 1974, 253. 
96 For more see Hanioglu 2001. 
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tariqah networks prided themselves on these accomplishments because they were acutely 
aware of the rising secular threat to religion as a new phenomenon which required new 
techniques. For centuries, the Naqshbandi order had progressively been developing 
spiritual techniques for lay Muslims to cultivate a high level of faith. In these stagnant 
conditions, the older leaders of the Sufi tariqahs were unable successfully to address the 
threat of secularism and hegemonic western nation states: Britain, France, and Russia. 
Said Nursi would soon begin to argue that the institutionalized tariqah system (of the 
Naqshbandi) was not enough to meet the challenges coming from novel ideologies.97 He 
argued that secularism was based in science and technology, thus they were more 
dangerous for a believing mind trained with the old methods.98
He proposed a renewed focus on Islamic tradition— for example, he denounced 
the primacy of the Murshid (the teacher in the religious orders) and argued that the only 
teacher is Muhammad himself— and the normative practice of Muhammad.
 Rather than representing a 
competing religious belief system which could be dealt with by well trained scholars, 
secularism was empirical, objective, and empowering. The traditional tariqah system did 
not deal with the problems of the time. Therefore, Nursi did not join them and after 
abandoning his political career, he initiated a human-centric religious movement that 
focused on belief more than any other issue.  
99
                                                 
97 Sixteenth letter in Nursi 1996, 375. 
98 Nursi 1996, 2205.  
99 Nursi 1996, 7-8. 
 For him 
this was the surest and shortest way to achieve a solid connection with God. From 1925 
until he died in 1960 he published his ideas in a series of 114 books called the “booklets” 
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(risale). The booklets were his contribution to tafsir (interpretation) of the Quran 
according to the principles put forward by Muhammad. He rejected the institutions that 
had mixed the primary practice of the prophet with the teachings and methods of various 
teachers; he called his pacifist mission “Haqiqah.” 
Later, Necmeddin Erbakan’s Islamist-National View Movement promoted an 
approach deeply attached to the self-other dichotomy and uses of the “other” in identity 
formation. Erbakan’s movement has constantly been anti EU-USA, anti-Zionist and against 
the idea of religious dialogue. This is Shariah approach;100
Erbakan later used the nationalist anger of immigrant Turks in Europe to bolster his 
position as an Islamist leader. In doing so he applied the us-them dichotomy in identity 
formation in its most extreme form. With student organizations like National Youth 
Foundation (Milli Genclik Vakfi, NYF) National View Movement tried to establish Anatolian 
social bases. The ideological source of the movement is mostly a byproduct of political 
developments in the Middle East after WWII. The de-centralizing of the political right paved 
way for Erbakan to politicize the rising Muslim consciousness. The anti-western and anti-
Israeli radicalization of the Islamic movements in the Middle East and the success of the 
Iranian revolution provided inspiration for him. From the beginning, Erbakan’s movement 
 it gives primacy to the 
authoritarian transformation of the society (similar to Abdülhamid II). The National View 
Movement is a relatively new movement with intellectual origins in the Naqshbandi tariqah. 
Some time in the late 1960s or early 1970s the Naqshbandi leader Mehmet Zahid Kotku 
directed Erbakan to establish a political party as a means of reaching out to the public. 
                                                 
100 By Shariah approach, I mean strict and narrow interpretation and implementation of law. 
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sought out and utilized real and imaginary "others" such as Freemason, Zionists, Crusader 
Europeans, and the imperialist USA.101
Nur community is trying to renew the tradition that had disappeared with the 
marginalization of the Naqshbandi movement. Followers of the Nur movement have a self-
understanding that does not define the self in contrast to others because they are focused 
wholly on the practice of religion
 
The static Naqshbandi methods had long lost their appeal in the eyes of the masses, 
for which the Naqshbandi movement had little to offer in the face of enormous social and 
economic transformations. The Naqshbandi movement eventually became a rather closed 
community of like-minded members who no longer had an influence on the rest of society. 
Today most Naqshbandis dress and live more conservative lives than ordinary Muslims in 
Turkey. Besides personal conduct, Naqshbandi members often live in self-isolated enclosures 
(such as Carsamba in Istanbul). This is a result of an "other" consciousness; the Tariqah 
approach considers social life as the main source of moral degeneration and prefers to live in 
isolation from secular society, which it does not wish to engage. Their identity is not 
dependent on the existence of the "other" but they do recognize and are affected by 
secularists.  
102 and work toward the ideal of Ihsan. In that sense the Nur 
movement can be considered as "otherless."103
An Islamic understanding of identity involves the normative construction of the 
self. However, these norms do not come exclusively from society but from revelation. 
 
                                                 
101 Dagi 1998. 
102 Fifth letter in Nursi 1996, 355. 
103 Aras and Caha 2000. 
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Revealed norms are to be experienced both individually and socially as a whole. The 
ethos of Islam originates in the Quran and the practice and teaching of Muhammad. The 
sources that Muslims read in order to understand the will of God for humanity are both 
universal and specific to the social conditions of seventh century Arabia. Traditionally—
that is, before the rise of secular nationalism— Islam was practiced as a way of life and 
was relevant to every aspect of a believer’s life. Actually, those who were sincere in their 
desire to know God and live according to the normative example of Muhammad were 
eager to model their lives on him. The Quran and Sunna were, and are, the foundation of 
the faith for the community and the individual. The raison d'être of Islam is to bring 
believers into the worship of God and to free them, or give them control, over their ego 
(nafs). 104
This has always been in conflict with the anthropomocentricism dominant in a 
modern world. God consciousness is contrasted with the Ego in contrasting visions about 
the purpose of life.
  
105. Living life without worshipping God is the definition of an 
egocentric life.106
                                                 
104 Bulliet explains how Islamic culture is transmitted by the prophet and his friends (as individuals) and 
transformed in later generations by individuals (by challenging the established authorities). See Bulliet 
1994; Bulliet 1996. 
105 In Quran chapter 51 verse 56: "And I have only created the jinns and the mankind for nothing but they 
worship me." 
106 The issues surrounding terrorist activities stem from a selfish identity formation that is more of a 
product of an egocentric or anthropocentric worldview then a theocentric, Islamic one. The literal reading 
of religion and its sources that cause radical activities is explained by Shah-Kazemi 2006. 
 Said Nursi argues that Islam tries to form a community that is made of 
responsible, God-fearing individuals. According to him, the person who is selfish will by 
definition put the satisfaction of personal desires before all else. To institutionalize and 
rationalize desire the ego must be able to define others from its own perspective. The ego, 
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in Islamic and Sufi psychology, is not capable of understanding that it is a product of the 
external environment. The nafs is constructed in relation to an "other," and the nafs, like 
other structures or institutions, is interested in survival and power. 
To be able to know and act upon the will of God, human beings need to have a 
well-developed identity. Human behavior is predicated on identity. The way people think 
about themselves will determine how they define the world around them and what paths 
they pursue. To have an identity one should be a Subject, the agent who acts upon an 
object. The object derives its meaning from the actions of a Subject upon it. The ego uses 
this dynamic to establish itself as a reality, as part of who we are. It does so by directing 
its gaze at an "other" and projecting ideas onto that object, this reinforces the ego identity. 
Ideally, the Muslim with faith uses the Quran and traditions to establish his or her 
identity. An "other" is not needed; in fact, identity formation vis-à-vis external objects 
would conflict with religious identity.107
The egocentric approach is applicable to the modern state. The modern state has 
two closely related characteristics that are relevant for this study. The first is that it is 
dependent on a materialist reading of the world and is only concerned about institutional 
survival and growth. In addition to this, it bases identity on a particular understanding of 
the material world: nationalism, communism, socialism. Secondly, it needs a real or 
imagined "other" in order to formulate identity. This dynamic is not only ideological but 
is the cause of real conflicts. According to Hobbes, the "other" members of society are 
mere enemies whom one naturally fears. People must strategize against various threats, 
 
                                                 
107 In the Thirty third Word Nursi philosophically deals with this issue. Nursi 1996, 299. 
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this is evident in his use of the famous saying Homo Homini Lupus.108
For Nursi, this understanding of social interaction should not have any place in 
Islamic theology. The triumph of Hobbesian realism represents a shift from the theo-
centric perspective to an egocentric mode. Said Nursi explains this situation as a loss of 
belief and trust in God. The consequence is that one’s own self and the world begin to 
look like a Hell. Men by nature, according to Said Nursi, are limited to their own 
environment and do not have the ability to control the world around them; this gives rise 
to despair and a fixation on power and control.
 The social world 
is a brutish environment devoid of trust and security. The theory of state comes from this 
understanding, later explained by Weber, that to end all violence we need to give the state 
the monopoly of violence. 
109
Nursi’s point is in line with the Quranic story of Adam and his sons.
 According to Nursi, the ability to 
construct a self-identity without comparing the self with external actors is only possible 
for the believer in God. Nursi argues that the self fails to truly understand its place, 
position and power because it has denied the relevance of God to life. There is separation 
between the self and God in Islam. In all three spheres—shariah, tariqh, and haqiqah— 
the self is subservient to God. 
110
                                                 
108 Man is a wolf to a man. 
109 Nursi 1996, 1961. 
110 Chapter 5 verse 27: “And (O Muhammad) recite to them the story of the two sons of Adam (Abel and 
Cain) in truth; when each offered a sacrifice (to Allah), it was accepted from the one but not from the other. 
The latter said to the former: “I will surely kill you.” The former said: “Verily, Allah accepts only from 
those who are al Muttaqun (the pious).” 
 The 
Quranic description of Cain and Abel identifies one of the sons as respectful to God, 
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while the other was under the influence of the ego. Satan tried to create enmity between 
the two by showing the differences between them. When Cain mentioned the differences 
to Abel, his response was “I will not attack you I fear from Allah” Eventually Abel was 
murdered by Cain because of his need to identify the self in relation, negatively, with 
external objects.111 The Quranic message for Said Nursi is that the believer rejects the 
method of identity formation of Cain, who in an attempt to define his own identity 
through an imaginative misinterpretation of Abel committed a grievous sin. Nursi likes to 
focus on commonalities so that he trains his own ego in the opposite method. In his 
construction of identity the inclusion of other is dominant. He argues that against all the 
minor differences we have major commonalities: “we believe in the same creator, we 
believe in the same message, we believe in the same books, we believe in the same 
messengers.”112
Returning to the typology used in this work, what is particularly important about 
the Hadith of Gabriel is that the different modes of practicing Islam correspond to 
different tendencies in viewing others. As stated before, for the Shariah-based actors, 
such as Necmettin Erbakan and his political party movement, negative portrayals of the 
other is critical in constructing Islamic identity. It decreases in importance in the Tariqah 
approach and more or less disappears in Haqiqah approach. As different modes of 
 This is why he promotes inter-faith dialogue with people of the book, 
positive relations with Armenians, and decreasing the conflict between Turks and Kurds 
in contemporary Turkey. 
                                                 
111 The same story is more symbolically articulated by Naguib Mahfuz in his Children of the Alley, Mahfuz 
1996, 75-77. 
112 Risale of Brotherhood (Uhuvvet Risalesi) in Nursi 1996. 
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practicing Islam leads to different perspectives on others, this process has undeniable 
implications for the political process. The following chapters will analyze the historical 
trajectories of the three Islamic approaches and their relationships with the Justice and 
Development Party’s policies.  
51 
 
Chapter III: NAQSHBANDI ORDER: TARIQAH  
In this chapter, I argue that the Naqshbandi tariqah is symbolized in the hadith of 
Gabriel by iman, faith. Its historical manifestation is characterized by the centennial 
renewal of the faith side by side the intellectual and theological critique of innovation. 
This approach is primarily practiced in inter-community relations (mostly closed to 
outside world) and a shared piety towards God. However, Naqshbadis had to deal with 
the fact of innovation and they became sensitive to the idea of “other” in terms of 
practices that deviated from the Islamic norms established by the Prophet and practiced 
by his companions. They look back to the earliest generations of companions as models 
of Islamic behavior. Because they were focused exclusively on the correct practice and 
belief they did not engage in controversial political debates. They substituted direct 
political involvement by indirectly working to influence the state from the grass-roots 
level. Their ideal institution was not the state, but master-disciple relationship, 
represented by the tariqah orders. The Naqshbandis attempted to influence the state 
through the individual leaders (caliphs) who lived in the capitol-major cities of the 
Islamic world. But they preferred to live secluded from the main centers of power.  
Contrary to the literature of negative essentialists, the Republican Era was not an 
abrupt rupture of Islam's venture in Turkey. It was, rather, a period of change in what 
should be considered the continuity of Turkish Islam, one that outlived many of its 
political opponents. The Naqshbandi movement was very influential among loosely 
connected Muslims through proselytizing activities both among the elite and the masses; 
to better understand the role of the Naqshbandi tariqah in the venture of Islam I will 
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analyze its impact on the secularized political arena rather than the impact of the secular 
state on Islam. 
The most prominent tariqah among Turks has undeniably been the Naqshbandi 
tariqah. The Naqshbandi order was named after its founder Bahaeddin Nakqshband (b. 
1318 CE). Over the centuries, the order became one of the most significant movements 
throughout Central Asia, Asia Minor and the Balkans. Eventually, Naqshbandi teachers 
socialized the majority of Turks into the practice of Islam. Its founder Bahaeddin 
promoted the spiritual development of individuals in the religious community through the 
implementation of the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and other methods that Sufi 
masters had themselves innovated as a result of studying and practicing Islam.  
In Arabic, tariqah means “the path, way.” In the Islamic tradition, tariqah 
specifically involves the members of Sufi brotherhoods who follow specific paths 
developed in order to achieve understanding of divine reality (Haqiqah). This usually 
happens by passing through spiritual levels Maqam. Gilles Veinstein argues that initially 
this type of spiritual journey was a personal experience. After the development of the 
Sufi Brotherhoods, the accumulated experiences of generations of teacher and students 
were used to form a spiritual method and a corpus of rituals. In the tariqah, the leader 
who was addressed as Sheikh, murshid or pir educated his disciples (Murid) in 
specifically defined (or mechanical, to use Veinstein’s words) ways to help murids along 
the Sufi path.113
                                                 
113 Veinstein 2004. 
 The established oral educational system within the tariqahs involved 
teaching the very basic religious canon together with spiritual exercises meant to 
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discipline the self and ego. This required communities centered around the personality of 
the Sheikh. Sheikh-centered spiritual progress was mainly based on a negative 
understanding of societal influences that might deter the members from fully realizing the 
spiritual insights of the Sufi way. For them society was a dangerous place for the spiritual 
aspirant to be in because they were away from the Shaikh's guidance and subject to 
unknown cultural influences. Shaikh, who already passed many stages of spiritual 
development, knew what the student needed for spiritual development. Therefore, he 
wanted them free from the dangers of the society.114
The place of Naqshbandi tariqah is not only important in the societal realm. Its 
political involvement deserves equal attention. It would not be exaggerating to argue that 
all of the different Islamic movements that have had political aspirations since the 19th 
century have been the members of a Naqshbandi order or one of its offshoots. Erbakan, 
founder of the Islamic political movement of National View, as well as the founding 
fathers of Justice and Development Party are notable ones. There are presently debates 
about the nature of the Islamic identity of the current Justice and Development Party 
government; to answer that question it is vital to understand the role of the Naqshbandi 
tariqah in influencing the Justice and Development Party. 
 This understanding inspired an 
Islamic life practiced mostly in intra-community relations secluded from the rest of the 
society. 
115
                                                 
114 Specific Naqshbandi term is “seclusion in the midst of society” (khalvat dar anjuman). For more see 
Kadri 1994. 
115 According to Yavuz “[t]he Nakşibendi orders operate as a repository of virtually all cultural and 
religious traditions that have existed in Turkey; they bridge the gap between the Ottoman period and the 
current Islamic sociopolitical revival.” See Yavuz 2003, 134. 
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Mardin states that the “official history in Turkey only represents [the Naqshbandi 
tariqah] through events or rebellions where Naqshbandism is associated with fanaticism, 
treachery and reactionary qualities.” This narrative, as Mardin argues, dismisses the 
positive contributions to society and culture during the period of growth of 
Naqshbandism. It gave birth to all of the most important Islamic social or political 
movements in modern Turkish history. 116
The beginning of major contacts between the Naqshbandis and the administrating 
class dates back to the beginning of Islamization of Anatolia. Emergence of Islam in 
Anatolia was a direct result of the westward movement of missionary Muslim Turkish 
tribes from Central Asia.
  
117 As they moved into Byzantine lands, the members of the 
Naqshbandi Order introduced Islam to Christians and pagans living in Anatolia. The 
institutions the order established were in the interest of proselytizing these people. When 
the worrior (Ghaza)  state and its leader, Ghazi, made raids into non-Muslim lands the 
Naqshbandis used the opportunity to preach to the non-Muslim residents of the newly 
conquered lands. Similar to modern day missionaries Naqshbandis opened hospitals, soup 
kitchens and other social facilities where they served Allah charitable works. In his 
famous article, Barkan called them Colonizing Turkish Dervishes (Kolonizator Turk 
Dervisleri).118
Colonizing Turkish Dervishes were instrumental in the establishment of the 
consequent Seljuk and Ottoman states. The state became guardian of their religious 
  
                                                 
116 Mardin 2006, 10. 
117 Özdalga 1999. 
118 Barkan 1942, 279-304. 
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movement, and they were dedicated to protecting it against external threats. The idea of 
the state among these Naqshbandi orders has not been seen as merely “instrumental.” 
They knew that they needed the state, however they were not necessarily happy with the 
unquestioned political authority of its leaders. They needed the leaders to provide 
services like security and safety so that the religious communities could flourish in 
society. Sometimes order members worked in administrative posts while some 
administrators became actively involved in the orders. Religious communities were 
constantly in contact with the state apparatus but this relationship was limited to 
appealing to the state to help religious orders spread Islam among the non-muslims. As a 
result, the Turkish state influenced society through its patronage of religious orders. This 
was a special kind of collaboration between the dervishes and the politicians, operating in 
their realm yet remaining separate.119
The focus of the Naqshbandi message comes from its call for renewing the faith 
through an emphasis on the practice of the early Muslim community. They view 
themselves as the legitimate representatives of the prophetic tradition, linked with 
Muhammad through a line of descendents going back to Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr is 
important for the identity of the Naqshbandi order because he was with the prophet from 
the beginning of his mission. The founding fathers of the Naqshbandi Tariqah view 
Muhammad as more than a historical figure. He is one sent by the divine will, and all his 
actions are worthy to be emulated. It was important for the Naqshbandis to trace their 
 
                                                 
119 Serif Mardin calls this a special relationship in Mardin 2006. 
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order to one of the companions of Muhammad because that was for them a source of 
legitimacy.  
The Naqshbandis represent the tradition of renewal in religion, called Tajdid. The 
concept of renewing the religion, as Friedman states “stemmed from the conviction that 
the period of the Prophet was the ideal which should be recaptured.”120 This 
understanding is an implicit acceptance that as time passes the authentic practice of the 
religion decays and changes. Muhammad stated this in a hadith. ‘The best of my 
community is the generation in which I was sent, then those who follow them, then those 
who follow them.’ Friedmann argues that this “is only one of the numerous traditions 
idealizing the earliest period of Islamic history and indicating that a process of 
deterioration would set in after its completion.”121 To remedy the deterioration 
Muhammad said that at the beginning or end of each century God would send one of his 
servants to the Islamic community who will renew the religion. Hamid Algar argues that 
this hadith should be accepted as authentic.122
Over the centuries, Muslim communities have followed different renewers 
(mujaddids). For the Sunni tradition in Turkey, the list of the mujaddids has some 
common personalities such as Imam Shafi'i, Imam Ghazali, Shah-i Naqshband, Imam 
Rabbani (Ahmad Sirhindi) and finally Khalid-i Bagdadi.
  
123
                                                 
120 Friedmann 2000. 
121 Friedmann 2000, 13. 
122 Algar 2001, 291. 
 The Nakshbendi tariqah in 
123 Kisakurek argues that after Khalid al-Baghdadi comes his own Sheikh as the last (or 33rd as stated in the 
title of the book) Abdulhakim Arvasi. For more see Kisakurek 1996; Kisakurek 1984. For the Nur 
community although they agree on the most if not all of the thirty-two mujaddids, the last Mujaddid is Said 
Nursi. 
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Turkistan has generally tried to promote the acceptance of Mujaddids from the 
Naqshbandi ranks.  
The Naqshbandi tariqah has a strict adherence to tradition and the idea of a 
renewal without innovation because Islam has always been and is still sufficient to 
answer all major questions in life. For Naqshbandis this is due to the divine source of 
Islam. In this understanding, tradition is equated with the actual revelation of God, as if 
its human agency is also divine. This is a major point where mainstream Naqshbandis 
and other major Islamic groups differ. Many Naqshbandis preferred to stay away from 
actively engaging in politics for the purposes of “al-‘amal bi’l ‘azima” and kept 
themselves in line with the tradition while the others argued that new circumstances 
required engagement with state institutions. 
The division between those who follow “al-‘amal bi’l ‘azima” (acting with 
strictness) and “al-‘amal bi’l rukhsa” created two major features that made up the 
Naqshbandi identity. The first one has been strict adherence to Qur’an and the tradition of 
Muhammad. This is the fundamental characteristic of the movement: renewal in the 
present and possibly the future by calling people to the past. Dina Le Gall argues that this 
has been the major Naqshbandi principle regarding tradition (the Quran and Sunna),124 
which was the simplest representation of “al-‘amal bi’l ‘azima”. However, in order to 
renew and refresh religious practice some Naqshbandis tried to influence the ruling class 
and bring the state apparatus closer to religion.125
                                                 
124 Le Gall 2003, 92. 
125 For more see Nizami 1991, 163. 
 They created a mode of relating to the 
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state where the tariqah and the state apparatus were in close communication but still 
maintained their distinct identity.  
Different personalities in the Naqshbandi tradition brought different methods and 
messages within the overall renewalist tradition. However, this divergence of methods 
should not be viewed as rigid constructs of how these religious orders operated. Some 
Muslims felt that promoting tradition was the ideal method for the Islamization of 
society. Others wanted to use the power and influence of the state to advance religious 
goals. Although not recognized in the literature, still others were able to combine these 
two approaches to varying degrees. The high point of religious revival that was able to 
combine the sacred and worldly methods in the Naqshbandi tariqah was manifested in the 
personality of Sheikh Ahmad al-Faruqi as-Sirhindi, more commonly known as Imam 
Rabbani.  
Under the leadership of Imam Rabbani (d. 1626),126 the order spread throughout 
the Indian subcontinent and transformed the heartland of the Muslim world. He came to 
be known as the renewer of the Second Islamic Millenium (Mujaddid Alf Thani).127 
Mardin states that, for Sirhindi “religion was not just an ontological position, a 
metaphysical theory and a critical guideline, but an organizational means to stop its 
infiltration by creedal formulations of Hinduism, a policy he felt was encouraged by the 
Moghul ruler Akbar [Shah].”128
                                                 
126 Some sources give the year 1624 or even 1627. 
127 Esposito 2001, 79. 
128 Mardin 2006, 10. 
 Sirhindi’s local impact later spread throughout the 
Islamic world through his influential work and writings such as the Letters, the famous 
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one (Mektubat in Turkish).129
While florid forms of Sufism flourished, the syntheses of Muslim and Hindu 
practices abounded, and the Mughal state pursued a policy of conciliation among 
Muslims and Hindus, Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, who claimed to be the mujaddid, 
the renewer of Islam in his century, waged an unrelenting struggle to persuade 
the Mughal authorities to adopt policies befitting an Islamic state. He called for 
the imposition of the poll tax on the Hindus and insisted on the obligation of 
Muslims to subordinate rather than to integrate non-Muslims into an Islamic 
society. He also opposed the insinuation into Islam of Sufi and Hindu practices 
such as veneration of saints, sacrifice of animals, and religious festivals.
 Rabbani’s contribution to Islam was not limited to a 
spiritual renewal but also temporal organization and protest against Akbar Shah as 
degenerating figure because of his eclectic religious views. He emphasized that rulers 
should be strict followers and proponents of shari'a. Akbar was extreme: he tried to 
establish a syncretistic religion by uniting Islam with other religions in India.  
Sirhindi’s reaction was quick and fundamental. Lapidus summarizes his attitude towards 
others:  
130
Before Sirhindi the Islamic world had experienced physical and spiritual shocks, 
an example being the Mongol invasions into the heartland of Islam. However since the 
invasion of Kazan in 1552 by the Russians the Muslim world was perpetually losing 
ground to the rising western powers.
 
 
131
Sirhindi’s goal was to ground Islam in the sources of revelation free from “alien” 
ideas. The historical encounter between Islam and Hinduism was, for Sirhindi, the main 
reason for the degeneration of the pure Islam. Therefore, he tried to emphasize an Islam 
 The revivalist Islam of Sirhindi became one of 
the most influential messages throughout the Islamic world.  
                                                 
129 After Imam Rabbani, the movement began to be called as Mujaddidiyya (Muceddidiyye). 
130 Lapidus 1997, 455. 
131 Mardin 1991, 210. 
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solely based on Quran (the revealed text) and the Sunna (the living tradition of the 
Prophet). This is a common feature of all revivalists in Islamic history. Sirhindi tried to 
cleanse Islam from un-Islamic practices and innovations. He explains that during his 
spiritual experiences he elevated and saw that “the highest levels of saints were the ones 
who recited the prayers of prophet Muhammad rather than other ordinary or ‘man-made’ 
ones.” Sirhindi argued that the surest way rise in the practice of Islam is to strictly follow 
prophet Muhammad’s Sunna.132
Naqshbandis who were coming to similar conclusions began to deal with the 
threat of secularism the same way Sirhindi did. However, in the Turkish case the 
Naqshbandis developed similar methods of Sirhindi, as much as a century before him. 
According to Algar, in the late 15th century Haji Ubeydullah Ahrar (d.1490) sent Emir 
Ahmed Buhari (d. 1516) and Simavlı AbdullahI İlahi (d. 1491) to Istanbul, capital of the 
Ottoman caliphate. Ubeydullah Ahrar, as Schimmel points out, was one of the major 
Naqshbandi leaders whose students traveled East and West Turkistan into China where, 
 
Sirhindi and his renewalist movement were some of the earliest Muslims to sense 
the existential threat posed by foreign involvement in the heartland of Islam. This grew 
out of the realization that non-Islamic elements were beginning to influence Islamic 
culture in a negative way. His emerging awareness of foreign domination led him to 
speak about identity using an “us-them” dichotomy. With the experience of Sirhindi, for 
many Naqshbandi movements political activity became a viable means to further the 
interests of the religion. 
                                                 
132 For more see Nursi 1996. 
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inspired by their master’s ideas, they tried to influence the political body to establish 
religious norms.133 Hamid Algar states that the earliest presence of the Naqshbandi order 
in Istanbul “was a result of direct transmission from the Central Asian homeland of the 
order.”134 Contrary to scholars who attribute a greater degree of Sirhindi’s influence on 
the Naqshbandi tariqah, direct transmission of was from Central Asia a century before of 
Sirhindi.135
The most significant and influential representative of the Mujaddidi branch over 
the course of Turkish history was Khalid al-Baghdadi
  
136 (1777-1826). Khalid al-
Baghdadi was of Kurdish origin. He was born in Norther Iraq’s Qaradagh region near 
Suleymaniyah. He is from the Shafii school of thought. From early on he received 
traditional Shafi’i Islamic education137 in and around his hometown.138 He was also well 
educated in Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh). Later he became famous among his peers for 
his studies in other fields including mathematics, logic etc. During his life, the Qadiri 
order was predominant in his native region, but he did not join their order. Instead, he 
traveled to India to study with a famous Naqshbandi master named Abdullah Dihlevi.139
                                                 
133 Schimmel 1973. 
134 Algar 1999, 1. 
135 As stated in Irfan Gunduz’s work this issue is significant because the Naqshbandis in Turkey usually 
trace their origins back to Sirhindi’s Mujaddidi Naqshbandi branch rather than the Central Asian ones. 
They consider Sirhindi more prestigious. For more see Gunduz 1984; Mardin 1991. 
136 Or Ziya' al-Din Khalid al-Shahrazuri. Shahrazur is the province of the town of Qaradagh (Karadag in 
Turkish) where al-Baghdadi was born. For more see Abu-Manneh 1982, 2. The “al-Baghdadi” attribution is 
famous among Turks. On the other hand, some other sources cite his year of death as 1824 or 1827. 
137 Abu-Manneh 1982, 2. 
138 Memis 2000, 30. 
 
139 Memis 2000, 54. 
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Abu Manneh explains that this is out of a spiritual quest where Khalid al-Baghdadi could 
not satisfy himself in Mecca or around his hometown.140 After receiving an intensive 
education and training under ed-Dihlevi he was given an ijaza authorizing him to teach 
according to the Naqshbandi method. He became deputy (Khalifa) but his diploma gave 
him an exceptional position, khilifa tammah mutlaqa, a rank as Abu Manneh explains ed-
Dihlevi seems to have denied other deputies.141
A few scholars call our attention to the organizational skills of a Khalid al-
Baghdadi as a religious figure.
 The date was 1810. As soon as he 
returned home, he began his teaching activities.  
142 Mardin argues that what makes Khalid al-Baghdadi 
important is the originality in his method. Contrary to his predecessors, he was able to see 
the interconnectedness of the Islamic world. He organized his followers into small 
missionary groups and then sent them to different parts of the Islamic world in order to 
promote the religion. He stated during his time in India that he wanted to work for the 
material benefit of Islam. He contributed to this dream through his organizational work. 
Through the efforts of his students the work of Khalid al-Baghdadi has had a lasting 
influence on religious activism in the region.143 Khalid al-Baghdadi was aware that the 
ruling elite were only interested in worldly success so he paid attention to statecraft in 
order to influence society.144
                                                 
140 Abu-Manneh 1982, 3. 
141 Abu-Manneh 1982, 5. Khalifa tammah mutlaqa means full (complete) and absolute succesorship.  
142 Mardin 2006; Abu-Manneh 1982, 12. 
143 Haydarizade 1292 cited in Memis 2000, 69. 
144 Abu-Manneh 1982, 14. 
 As a result, he gave equal emphasis to the organizational 
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structure of the Naqshbandi order and the spiritual or religious teachings. In his writings 
to his deputies he mentioned in detail how to influence government officials. Sometimes 
Khalid al-Baghdadi argued that the reason the ummah went astray was because of its 
rulers. It was Khalid al-Baghdadi’s vision that the Islamic world would be better off only 
by returning to righteous conduct.145
Khalid al-Baghdadi’s network of deputies, with whom he was in constant contact, 
numbered no fewer than 116. This web of deputies transformed the region and made 
Naqshbandi dominant over the Qadiri order. There are other explanations for the success 
of the Naqshbandi order. Hakan Yavuz attributes the worldly success of Naqshbandis to 
the movements’ ‘democratization’ of the deputy system.
 His principle focus in his both education and 
teaching was based on Fiqh (Islamic legal theory) rather than any other religious or 
positive sciences. This was a search for balance between worldly and religious pursuits. 
His superiority in the field of Fiqh is one of the reasons why he was able to attract such a 
large following, especially among other scholars from distinguished Islamic centers such 
as Bagdad, Damascus and Istanbul. 
146
                                                 
145 Fore more see Abu-Manneh 1982, 14. 
146 Yavuz 2003. 
 He argues that in Qadiri 
tariqah the deputies or the masters were chosen from the family of the Prophet while in 
Naqshbandi eligibility was decided on the basis of ability and merit. Moreover, their 
liberal acceptance of new students increased their numbers so that they became the 
predominant tariqah in the region. Mardin argues that encounters of Naqshbandis with 
“Catholic and Protestant missionaries whose influence they had to combat” were 
instrumental in leading the Naqshbandies to develop better methods to promote the faith. 
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In Mardin’s words, the Catholic and Protestant opposition and the sense of a powerful 
enemy “other” that it created made the Naqshbandis realize the need to increase their 
numbers and limit the appeal of rival ideologies.147
Because of his missionary system, Khalid al-Baghdadi was able to send his 
deputies to Muslim cities like Baghdad, Cairo, Jerusalem, and Asia Minor up to Istanbul. 
Memis lists 105 deputies of Khalid al-Baghdadi, 15 of whom were sent to Anatolia.
 However, it is unclear just how 
influential these external influences were on the development of the method used by 
Khalid al-Baghdadi. 
148
… [I]n the 19th century the entire Anatolia began to be crisscrossed by 
Naqshbandi networks. The increasing penetration of Sufi orders in this 
area amounted to the implantation of elements of an Islamic civility at a 
time when the Ottoman Empire had been unable to intervene in the inter-
tribal conflict and the ensuing anarchy. The Naqshbandi leaders also 
assumed roles of political leadership in this region.
 
The religious propagation of the this Naqshbandi branch throughout the Islamic world is 
important for the effects it had in Ottoman lands, Istanbul in particular. Mardin explains: 
149
Khalid al-Baghdadi was careful in choosing his caliphs and providing them with 
guidelines when he sent them to important places. This demonstrates his ability to assess 
opportunities to promote Islam. It looks like he gave different guidelines for his 
representatives in accordance to the needs and ability of comprehension of the people in 
the places to which he sent them. The guidelines to his caliphs in Istanbul are especially 
 
 
                                                 
147 Mardin 1991, 211. 
148 Memis also lists the representatives of these Khalifas along with a description of their duties and 
responsibilities. For more see Memis 2000 and especially chapter three. 
149 Mardin 2006, 11. 
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important. Es’ad Sahib explains the seven principles in detail.150
The third principle dealt with the personal family issues of Khalid al-Baghdadi’s 
deputies. We know that Khalid al-Baghdadi and some of his disciples were 
polygamous.
 First, he did not want his 
representative going to Istanbul to establish personal friendship with government 
officials. Khalid al-Baghdadi was interested in influencing the political elite indirectly 
rather than via direct association. Secondly, Khalid al-Baghdadi did not want his 
representatives to pursue a salary or donations from the government. This principle was 
meant to sustain financial and religious independence from influence or manipulation by 
the state.  
151
                                                 
150 Sahib 1334 cited in Memis 2000, 70. 
151 Memis 2000, 63. 
 However, he prohibited polygamy for his deputies in Istanbul and argued 
that these kinds of marriages hinder the works of religious guidance (Irshad ). The fourth 
principle was to preserve the dignity of the order by not intervening in the social relations 
of the visitors to or followers of the order. He also prohibited accepting money from the 
local people in exchange for religious counseling. Fifth, he regulated the relations of the 
deputies with women. Khalid al-Bagldadi did not want women, especially younger ones, 
to join the order. He thought that deputies associating with young women in the order 
would create problems. Sixth, he wanted the deputy in Istanbul to be in constant contact 
with him, even on minor issues. He instituted consultation on every issue and at regular 
intervals. The last principle is about living a humble life. He urged his followers to live a 
very modest life in imitation of Prophet Muhammad.  
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Most of these principles involve social responsibilities rather than personal ones. 
As a tariqah leader, Khalid al-Baghdadi emphasized the possible problems that would 
emerge in a cosmopolitan city like Istanbul alongside the spiritual problems the deputy 
might encounter. Because the caliph resided there, Khalid al-Baghdadi wanted to 
establish his tariqah in Istanbul on strong foundations and develop relations with the 
community. Khalid al-Baghdadi’s vision was targeted on the Sultan and the bureaucracy 
and also Christian, Jewish and Shia minority communities. His letters demonstrate a 
negative attitude towards non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims. Abu-Manneh says: 
 
“We find him exhorting his disciples to finish the "Khutm ul-Khaujakan" 
(i.e., the ending prayers which close the dhikr [prayer] in the Naqshbandi 
practice) by a prayer for God to "annihilate the Jews, Christians, fire 
worshippers (majus) and the Persian Shiites…”152
Because the Ottoman Sultans held the Caliphate, they were considered the 
representative of the entire Islamic world. Therefore, Khalid al-Baghdadi’s antagonism 
against the Jews and Christians could be due to the Ottoman wars with the invading non-
Muslim armies. Ottomans were losing on many fronts at the time and it probably 
increased the negative feelings among the Islamic communities toward the invading 
powers and their religions. Any war between Ottomans and any non-Muslim country was 
seen a war between Islam and its enemies. As Abu-Manneh says, in a letter to his 
followers in Diyarbekir in southeast Anatolia, he ordered his followers to pray for “the 
survival of the ‘glorious Ottoman state’ upon which Islam depends and for its victory 
 
 
                                                 
152 Abu-Manneh 1982, 15. 
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over the enemies of religion, the cursed Christians and the despicable Persians.”153
After Khalid al-Baghdadi died, the movement continued to be active in and 
around Istanbul. By sending more deputies and students to the region, the Naqshbandi 
movement was effectively identifying Istanbul as the center of gravity of the Ottoman 
and Islamic world. For its part Istanbul was the most stable region of the empire and 
ready for a spiritual and social movement.
 Since 
the days of previous Naqshbandi leaders, Naqshbandi communities began to feel pressure 
from foreign opponents. Therefore, the Naqshbandis revivalists were defending 
traditional Islam against all kinds of cultural, social and religious degeneration. They 
were not tolerant of non-Muslim and non-Sunni elements in the Islamic world.  
154 The best method for instituting change 
within the continuity of society was to slowly Islamize society through a return to 
Quranic and sunnatic principles. Another factor contributed in making the Naqshbandis 
influential in the capital. The military (Janissaries) backed by its religious wing had been 
holding an anti-reform position. The Janissaries who opposed to the military reforms 
assassinated Ottoman Sultan Selim III (1761-1808) who was known for his 
modernization efforts especially in the military.155
After Selim III, Sultan Mahmud II (1785-1839) got to the throne and began to 
implement reforms inside and outside of the military by supporting the Naqshbandis in 
  
                                                 
153 Abu-Manneh 1982, 15. Lapidus’s account of the events at the time might explain the situation. He says 
that “the dominance of Shi’ism was also assured by the violent suppression of Sunnism. …Isma’il 
desecrated Naqshbandi tombs…” Lapidus 1994, 297. 
154 In his work, Algar explains how a Naqshbandi Sheikh fell in love with Istanbul and never left it. For 
more see Algar 1999. 
155 Selim III is famous for establishing the Nizam-i Cedid (New Order) army as an alternative to the anti-
reformist Janissary Army. For more see Zürcher 2003, 23-26. For reforms during the same era see Berkes 
1998, 72-81. 
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order to fight against the Bektashi order, which was literally the religious wing of the 
army. However, Janissaries revolted against him when Mahmud II wanted to form 
another army. After a bloody attack, Sultan Mahmud II closed down the Janissary Army, 
in 1826156, and initiated many reforms157 and banned the Bektashi order. Under these 
circumstances, Mahmud II tried to utilize the Naqshbandis as a pro-sultan alternative to 
the Bektashis. The Naqshbandi tariqah, together with the Ulama, were more open to 
reforms initiated by the Sultan than other tariqahs. This is the beginning of the rise of the 
Naqshbandis.158 The replacement of the Bektashi Sheikh, after that order was dismantled 
by the Sultan, with a Naqshbandi one in the main Bektashi center159 shows that Sultan 
Mahmud felt it necessary to empower a more loyal one religious movement.160
Religious orders played a major role in articulating an authoritative interpretation 
of Islam. Mardin argues that when the Janissary corps referred to Islamic teachings they 
meant specifically their Bektashi interpretation of it.
  
161
                                                 
156 Zürcher 2003, 39. 
157 Shaw and Shaw 1977, 36-50. 
158 Abu-Manneh 1982, 25. 
159 This Bektashi center in Turkey is in the city of Kirsehir. The village where the founder Haji Bektash-i 
Veli’s mausoleum is, has been recently named Hacibektas. In his work Faroqhi explains government efforts 
to justify confiscating the Bektashi lands and foundations and giving to the Naqshbandi order. All of these 
justifications however were on the religious grounds. See Faroqhi 1976.  
160 Abu-Manneh 1982, 28. 
161 Mardin 1956, 10. 
 It was the only legitimate 
religious interpretation in the eye of many military staff. As Mardin states, the firman 
(religious or administrative statement) which abolished the Janissary Army and Bektashi 
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order, used religious justifications against these two institutions, arguing that Bektashi 
interpretation of religion was unislamic.162
In the coming years, important personalities began to emerge within the 
Mujaddidi Naqshbandi tariqah. One of the most important representatives of them was 
Ahmed Ziyauddin Gümüşhanevi (1813-1893). Gümüşhanevi was from merchant family 
of the city of Gümüşhane from Northern Anatolia. At an early age he went to Istanbul to 
pursue a religious education. From 1831 to 1844, he undertook traditional madrasah 
education and shortly after completing his education, he became a disciple of Ahmed b. 
Süleyman el-Ervâdî, one of the deputies of Khalid al-Baghdadi in Istanbul. Gümüşhanevi 
was initiated into the tariqah via el-Ervardi and his friends. Later Gümüşhanevi 
established his own tariqah (the Gümüşhanevi branch of Naqshbandi/Khalid al-
Baghdadi) in historic Istanbul by purchasing an unused or closed mosque and turning it 
into a new gathering place for his followers. 
 The rise of Naqshbandis continued thereafter. 
163
Gümüşhanevi’s rise in the community corresponded to the years of Ottoman 
decline. Two developments were particularly important. The first development was the 
1878 Russian-Ottoman War. Gümüşhanevi rallied his students to volunteer in the war to 
 
                                                 
162 The abolishment of the Janisary Army has become a major point in the westernization experience of the 
Turkish state and the society. Because Naqshbandis prefered not to interfere in governmental affairs Sultan 
chose them over other orders (especially the Bektasi order). Naqshbandis were happy with their favoured 
position. However, because of following reforms by the Sultan, government’s control over Islamic 
foundations and institutions increased and the ulema and religious orders lost power in the military and 
many bureaucratic institutions. For more see Hanioglu 2008, 59. Importance of the Naqshbandi case lies in 
their ability to survive during both the Ottoman and Republican era while other orders lost their appeal.  
163 For more about Gümüşhanevi’s life see Gunduz 1984, 14-34. 
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protect the Muslims and the Ottoman state.164 The second development was the 
emergence of a new kind of bureaucracy that trying to modernize the administrative 
system. Modernization of the empire hit the religious education system whose members 
were excluded from entering government posts.165
The madrasa accordingly lost its appeal and competitive edge. Gümüşhanevi’s 
major contribution was to revive the madrasah system by compiling major religious 
writings of the previous centuries that were not in the curriculum of religious schools. 
These attempts helped new students to access many authentic religious writings through 
Gümüşhanevi’s works.
 Only graduates of the secular military 
or regular schools were offered jobs in the government. Among other madrasah students, 
the disciples of Gümüşhanevi who did not hesitate to sacrifice their lives in the war to 
protect the state were excluded from government jobs by the bureaucracy of the very 
state that they fought for. Since then, this has become a dilemma that Muslims had to 
challenge. The very state that they fought for often times did not appreciate their 
sacrifices.  
166
                                                 
164 Borrowing from Algar, Yavuz mentions how the war united the Naqshbandis in defending the religion 
(din) and the state (devlet). For more see Yavuz 2003, 138. For Gumushanevi, religion and the state meant 
the same thing. 
165 Ortayli 2006. 
166 The most prominent example is the inclusion of Jawshan in his compilation. Very popular in 
contemporary Turkey, Jawshan is a prayer that dates to the early part of Islamic history. The contents of 
this prayer were initially transmitted by the descendants of Muhammad. Said Nursi argues that the Shia 
origin of Jawshan is the reason it did not get popular among Sunni scholars. With Gümüşhanevi’s 
compilation, it entered into the Sunni world of Turkish Muslims which later was used by Said Nursi. It is 
ironic to see Naqshbandis who were known for their anti-Shia stance to patronize Shia prayers among their 
followers. 
 Gümüşhanevi knew that he was living in tough times and was 
aware of his limits. When the government decided to open an interest based bank he 
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gathered all of his followers and established an assistance fund for his followers who 
needed money but did not want to participate in interest based banking. Gümüşhanevi 
was one of the earliest leaders to bring the community together and try to build 
institutions in line with Islamic principles. In the absence of an Islamic government, the 
Naqshbandis delivered services for society with weak leadership. 167
Gümüşhanevi died in 1893. Among his major followers were Haci Hasib Efendi, 
Abdulaziz Bekkine and Muhammed Zahid Kotku. Haci Hasib Efendi (d. 1949) assumed 
the Naqshbandi post because he was older than the latter two. Haci Hasib Efendi was 
known for his soft personality which was not able to challenge to the modern life style 
imposed by the devastating wars and social trauma. Kotku and Bekkine who were much 
younger would be more influential in the Naqshbandi history. Both Kotku and Bekkine 
had some form of spiritual and religious training before they received Naqshbandi 
training. Originally, Kotku introduced his close friend Abdulaziz Bekkine to the order. 
They studied the Naqshbandi thought from the deputies of Gümüşhanevi. Naksibend 
message became more appealing to them than any other tariqah available in Istanbul area. 
Bekkine was older than Kotku. Therefore, the Naqshbandi establishment (including 
Kotku himself) chose Bekkine for the post after the death of Haci Hasib Efendi. Kotku 
left for Bursa, a historically important city, and continued his teachings there. Bekkine 
 Naqshbandis, 
instead of challenging the government, offered solutions to emerging problems through 
their own social networks. Via the community bank the members of the tariqah loaned 
money to other community members without charging interest.  
                                                 
167 For more see Gunduz 1984.  
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had a short but successful tenure. He became the imam and preacher of the Ümmü 
Gülsüm (Umm Kulthum) Mosque in the Fatih district of Istanbul which was the center of 
the Gümüşhanevi Naqshbandi order. During his short tenure, Bekkine transformed the 
order and made it open to greater parts of society.  
Two different reasons can be given for Bekkine’s success. One is due to the 
structural changes in Turkish society. He assumed Naqshbandi leadership at a time when 
Turkey was passing from autocratic single party rule into multi-party democracy. 
Repression of religious education was loosened and Muslim scholars had more 
opportunities to promote Islamic teachings and practice.168
When I was returning to Istanbul from Russia, we took a Turkish 
ship. The Turkish conductor began to check for the tickets. When he 
found out that an old and poor man took the ship without purchasing 
a ticket he kicked him so bad that poor man fell on the floor. The 
Italian captain [unhappily] on seeing this, called the old man to his 
room and respectfully hosted him until we had arrived in Istanbul.
 However, his personality is 
more useful to explain the success of his institute than the structural considerations. 
Bekkine was young, energetic and, due to profound life experiences, visionary. His 
parents were originally Muslim subjects of Russia who immigrated to Istanbul before 
Bekkine was born. During his early childhood, he went back and forth between Kazan, 
Bukhara and Istanbul for his religious education and family businesses. During these 
trips, he was able to compare and contrast the positive and negative practices taking place 
in Muslim societies. In one of his speeches, he gave an atomistic explanation about the 
salvation of society from decay:  
169
                                                 
168 Jenkins 2008, 118-119. 
 
169 Catakli 2000, 40. 
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The Italian captain was more in tune with the behavior that characterizes 
Muslims than the Muslim conductor. Therefore, what became clear from this story to 
Bekkine was that one’s identity does not create or account for their personality. It is 
incumbent on individuals to construct their own personality, consciously, in relation 
to God. 
As was the case for all Naqshbandis, teaching the Islamic message to all members 
of society was the principle motivation for Bekkine. Like his predecessors, Bekkine 
based his activities in the mosque. Upon listening to Bekkine speak, those who regul arly 
attended the mosque joined the movement and later rose in its ranks. At that time there 
were very few practicing Muslims so it was crucial for Bekkine to win over ordinary 
Muslims to the basic practice of Islam. The limited number of religious institutions in 
Istanbul provided an opportunity for nontraditional Islamic movements to emerge easily 
and compete for followers. For a traditional movement like Naqshbandism this was a 
major concern. Bekkine was persistent in trying to keep the congregation within the 
Naqshbandi tradition rather than joining other nontraditional movements.170
                                                 
170 For more see Catakli 2000. 
 Bekkine 
passed away in 1952 and his close friend Kotku moved to Istanbul to replace him. The 
Naqshbandi community wanted Kotku as the new Hocaefendi, Senior Teacher, to replace 
Bekkine’s official government post in the Ümmü Gülsüm Mosque. With the help of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı, Diyanet), the government 
office in charge of all mosques and religious institutions in the country, the Naqshbandi 
movement was able to install Kotku inBekkine’s mosque as the new Imam.  
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For a short period, Kotku preached in the same mosque in the city of Fatih in 
Istanbul. Ummu Gülsüm mosque was relatively outside of conservative Fatih closer to 
Eminonu which has been a commercial center where both Muslims Turks and non-
Muslim minority resided. In 1958, Kotku moved to the Iskenderpasa Mosque which was 
at the heart of Fatih’s central residential neighbourhood. Iskenderpasa Mosque became 
the main center for the Naqshbandi movement.171
During his tenure, Kotku encountered issues that none of the previous leadership 
experienced. First, as Turkey passed into the multi-party system, the Democratic Party 
(Demokrat Parti, DP) came to power in 1950 with the support of the dissatisfied Muslim 
periphery both in the cities and in the countryside. The DP was a secular party that had 
sympathy towards Muslims' cause and eventually it easened up the restrictions on the 
religious practice. There were more pro-Muslim members in the party who, together with 
 This shows that Kotku was able to 
transform the small mosque community at the suburbs of the town into a major one at the 
heart of Istanbul. Later Kotku’s Naqshbandi branch was named after the mosque it is 
centered around; the Iskenderpasa community. In the new mosque, Kotku was able to 
institutionalize his community in many different areas.  
                                                 
171 When I was in Istanbul, I visited both mosques and met with members of Naqshbandi community. In 
one occasion, they told me two different stories why Kotku left Ummu Gulsum mosque and moved to 
Iskenderpasa. Some argued that, there was a road construction near the Mosque and Kotku was not 
comfortable in preaching in the construction zone, so he left for a more comfortable setting. More 
convincingly, others argued that due to the increasing number of followers, the smaller Ummu Gulsum 
mosque was not large enough for the bigger congregation and it was not close to the community who lived 
in the central town. 
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their secular friends, were against the authoritarian policies of the Republican People’s 
Party.172
After the multiparty era, the Republican People’s Party was never able to get the 
majority vote in the elections. On the other side of the political spectrum, the DP and its 
successors capitalized on disaffected Muslim voters by addressing the religious concerns 
of the Muslim population.
  
173 In this era, a new but relatively marginal generation of 
young Muslims emerged. They were mainly from the countryside where the 
secularization reforms enacted by previous governments were not able to take root as 
they did in the city centers. Back home these immigrant populations had the opportunity 
to learn and practice their religion in their homes or via underground religious 
organizations led by local religious orders. When these young Muslims moved to the 
major cities to pursue higher education they began to deal with the contradictions 
between their cultural roots and the requirements of modern life. Particularly important 
were students from the engineering departments of schools like Istanbul Technical 
University. They attended the university during the day and at night they were in the 
Iskenderpasa mosque or in the Imam’s house listening to religious sermons (sohbet) to 
purify their hearts.174
                                                 
172 The DP is famous for reinstating the Arabic call for prayers (Ezan in Turkish and Azan in Arabic) in the 
mosques. Until then the preceding CHP forcefully imposed a ban on Arabic Ezan. For Turkish Muslims 
Arabic Ezan was a religious symbol, which should be practiced only in its original Arabic form. 
173 Other religious parties in Turkey were all shortlived. For more see Jenkins 2008. 
174 Naqshbandis believe that sohbet polishes (or paints) the heart. In Turkish “Sohbette insibag (sibgha) 
vardir.” Sibgha in Arabic means paint. 
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The most prominent products of this generation were Necmettin Erbakan, who 
established Turkey’s first Islamic political party, and the Özal family which produced 
major politicians over the next forty years. Korkut and Yusuf Bozkurt Özal became 
ministers in different cabinets while Turgut Özal became  prime minister two consequtive 
terms and the president. Korkut Özal began to meet with Muhammed Zahit Kotku and 
the Naqshbandi movement at a time when he was spiritually challenged. 175 His story is 
representative of the lives of other students, workers, and professionals who tried to fill 
the void of a secular life style with religious practice. Kotku had a successful career as a 
civil engineer and government employee. His experience in the USA in the late 1950s for 
language and professional training was very interesting. It was the first time he became 
aware of the place of religion in public life. The uses of religious symbolism in public life 
or the first amendment right to practice religion made Korkut more conscious of his own 
religion.176
When Korkut Özal returned to Turkey, he consciously sought to lead a more 
religious life. He read many books on a variety of aspects of Islam and began to socialize 
with Muslims at the mosque. One individual who he met helped him to focus his spiritual 
energy in ways he could not have figured out on his own. Korkut became one of Mehmed 
  
                                                 
175 Özal 1999, 159-176. 
176 This happened, although, at a time when famous Sayyid Qutb visited the USA where he became irritated 
by the life style in American society while Korkut Özal found ways that made him more religious. Qutb’s 
American visit often times is represented as the source of his radical transformation  and an important 
example of the inability of an Islamic identity to live side by side with a non-Islamic identity. In the similar 
case of Korkut Özal as a prominent Islamic figure in Turkey, however, the impact of meeting with the 
“other” is opposite. In his article Korkut explains how Americans were able to keep religious symbols in 
their lives, this ability influenced him positively. For more see Özal 1999. 
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Zahid Kotku’s pupils in 1960, and their friendship lasted over 20 years.177 His brother 
and many other professionals from Istanbul Technical University (ITU) and other 
government institutions followed the same path. Ersin Gurdogan, a graduate of ITU, calls 
this an Invisible University (Görünmeyen Üniversite) where students from prestigious 
secular government schools seek spiritual guidance and religious instruction from Islamic 
leaders.178
Kotku did support the political party of Erbakan, however, the nature of the 
relationship between his tariqah and Erbakan’s political party is unclear. Existing studies 
portray a direct connection between the Naqshbandi tradition and the rise of the Islamic 
party. However, though they both pursue the interests of Islam, the relationship between 
the Naqshbandi leader (Kotku) and the leader of the political party (Erbakan) has been 
 Weekly meetings, which lasted only a couple of hours, helped to develop 
group solidarity and personal relationships that later re-invented the Islamic movement 
and gave birth to grass-roots social-political institutions in the country.  
Zahid Kotku was the most influential proponent of Islam in modern Turkish 
politics. Among his students were the charismatic leader, Necmettin Erbakan, who later 
became prime minister. Erbakan met Zahid Kotku while he was in college. Erbakan later 
became a successful professor and an active member of the political community. He 
subsequently became the general secretary of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce. 
However, he was later ousted from that position. In the 1960s, with the support of 
Naqshbandi community, Erbakan began to establish the foundations of a religious 
opposition movement that would challenge the secular elites in the government.  
                                                 
177 Özal 1999. 
178 Gürdoğan’s book on the ‘invisible university’ of Kotku is one of the rare sources. Gürdoğan 2008. 
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rather ambiguous.179 When they began engagement in politics it appears that Kotku and 
Erbakan had different expectations. For Kotku the political process was only one  method 
among many for the pursuit of Islamic interests. Erbakan viewed the state as the agent of 
religious reform, or at least an integral part of it. Kotku always warned his students 
against the inherent corruption of politics, where human self (nafs) is vulnerable to 
temptation; similar views were put forward by traditional scholars like Said Nursi. Kotku 
recognizing the importance of participation in electoral politics to serve religion, and was 
supportive activities of Erbakan, but he never directly engaged in political campaigns or 
recommend one party over another. Kotku viewed politics as a modern social club that 
could be used to reach out to the community.180
It appears that as a religious leader Kotku underestimated the power of politics 
vis-à-vis traditional means of social mobilization. Erbakan was a young and energetic 
leader who was able to achieve some political success and attract large sectors of the 
electorate who thought that controlling the political sphere would be a more viable way to 
servereligion. Shortly before Kotku’s death he became annoyed with Erbakan’s activities. 
In the late 1970s protests were occurring all over the country. Erbakan wanted to 
capitalize on the discontent of young Muslims but this opportunism was not welcomed by 
Kotku. Yasar argues that Kotku first asked Erbakan to close the youth organizations 
which were involved in the street protests. After a while Kotku took a more radical step 
and asked Erbakan to close the party entirely. He realized that the party and its regional 
  
                                                 
179 I obtained this information in November 2006 in Istanbul from one of the weekly lectures given by the 
followers of Kotku in a student hostel where they tried to continue the sohbet (informal lecture) tradition of 
Kotku.  
180 Yasar 2004, 329. 
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organizations had become part of the problem rather than offering an Islamic solution to 
social discontent. 181
Naqshbandi tariqah, therefore, returned to emphasize the social agency of the 
individual believer more than the party. This means that the social group must focus on 
influencing each individual through inter-personal communication, something the state 
could not do without being coercive. Kotku thought that Erbakan, because he came from 
the same social milieu in the Istanbul mosque network, would not initiate policies that 
contradicted the principles of the order. However he overestimated the strength of 
Erbakan’s commitment to Naqshbandi principles.. Erbakan wanted to be an independent 
politician who did not want to be constrained by the ‘limited’ vision of the order. 
  
Kotku had a balanced approach to politics: he kept in contact with the Islamist 
party of Erbakan but consistently warned his followers against the dangers of directly 
engaging in politics. We can argue that his Islamic background detracted him from 
getting involved too much with politics. The political option was a novel approach 
because of the democratic context but Kotku feared from the negative impact of it in the 
polarization of the society. The society that he wanted to transform was not the same one 
that his predecessor Khalid al-Bagdadi dealth with. The newly rising generation of the 
ordinary Turks most of the times saw Kotku’s method as unaaceptable. Kotku lacked the 
ability to form an institutional structure (schools, newspapers, civil society organizations) 
to reach out to his opponents and inform them about his message. The tariqah method 
simply lacked that ability. 
                                                 
181 For more see Yasar 2004. 
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Moreover, he was riding a wave of popular support that would eventually make him a 
Turkish Prime Minister. Eventually unrest in the streets led to the coup d’état of 1980. 
Kotku also passed away in the same year so there was no authoritative leader capable of 
challenging Erbakan. 
The Turkish Naqshbandis were single-mindedly focused on bringing nominal 
Muslims into their mosque networks and teaching them the basics of Islamic doctrine and 
prayer. In this sense, they were unprepared to deal with intricate delicacies of the political 
process. Erbakan’s emergence in the political arena and weakening of Naqshbandi 
support for him highlights the differences between shariah-based Islamic activism and 
Iman, or faith-based activity. Erbakan was a shariah-based actor motivated by the 
prospect of bringing his brand of Islam to influence state institutions. The Sufi orders, 
going back to Khalid al-Baghdadi, were interested in politics only to the extent that they 
themselves could propagate Islam directly to state officials. Erbakan was closer to 
Islamic movements throughout the rest of the Middle East who sought political success 
than to the traditional orders. He, therefore, tried to establish his own community through 
the party members that followed him.  
Like Erbakan, Kotku’s other students had engineering backgrounds. They did not 
receive formal religious education from Kotku, whose lectures were informal question 
and answer sessions without a developed curriculum. Kotku picked the topics himself for 
the benefit of the students. Few if any of them pursued religious training.182
                                                 
182 In November 2006, during my visits to Naqshbandi  circles in the Fatih district of Istanbul, where Kotku 
lived, some from the earlier generation of Kotku’s followers, a few of whom later became successful 
businessmen and politicians, told me that they were not satisfied with Kotku’s style due to its unstructured 
nature. Because they were already in an active political or business life, they wanted more concrete gains 
which they couldn’t get from Kotku. Most of them later preferred Erbakan to Kotku. 
 Tension 
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increased after Kotku passed away. Before his death, Kotku informally appointed his son-
in-law Muhammed Esad Cosan to his place by making him the formal lecturer in the 
weekly lecture series. Within the community, especially among those with secular 
degrees, Cosan was not welcomed. These professionals took a mechanical approach to 
Islam similar to the vision of Erbakan. Cosan was a soft-spoken, learned Islamic 
professor who was well versed in Arabic, Persian and Hadith tradition; but he did not 
possess political acumen. Nor was he a formal madrasah graduate with a traditional 
Islamic education like his predecessors. As a result, the political wing was able to 
discredit him. Cosan then became a small community leader position until his retirement 
while Erbakan’s followers devoted their time excitedly to political activities. This 
division empowered the politically oriented shariah approach of Erbakan’s and 
irrevocably limited the power and influence of the traditional tariqahs in Turkish politics.  
Many Muslims associated with the Naqshbandis and Erbakan began to consider 
Erbakan’s method more relevant to the political situation in the country. Only after his 
retirement from his teaching position, did Cosan become more active in community 
activities by publishing magazines and establishing a national radio station, which 
eventually became AK TV. However, Erbakan was at the height of his influence among 
Turkish Muslims. Even those who listened to Cosan’s teachings considered him relevant 
only to spiritual and not political affairs. His TV and radio programs were later barred by 
the government in the wake of the 1997 military coup d’état, and he left Turkey to live in 
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self-imposed exile in Australia.183
This chapter tried show that the strategies employed by the Naqshbandi 
movement to influence the state from the outside backfired during the republican era. 
Previously they were respected and sought out for guidance in religious matters. After the 
institutionalization of the secular state their political position became irreparably 
marginalized. Tariqah approach was unable to accommodate to the new social and 
political arrangement where the public sphere was cleansed from any religious 
representation by the Kemalist revolution. In such an alien setting, Tariqah approach did 
not effectively answer the dominant questions of modern life. As they wanted to adapt to 
 After his death in a tragic car accident, the unity within 
the tariqah movement was lost for good. 
The major problem with the Naqshbandi movement of contemporary Turkey has 
been its inability to revive Islam with the kind of energy and effectiveness characteristic 
of Sirhindi, Khalid al-Baghdadi, and later Said Nursi. Ubeydullah Ahrar, Imam Rabbani, 
Khalid al-Baghdadi and to a lesser extent Gümüşhanevi and Kotku were effective within 
the contexts of their times and provided relevant religious motivation that increased the 
dedication of many of their lay followers. However, the process of urbanization and state-
administered modernization in contemporary Turkey made it impossible for the 
traditional methods to survive. The superiority of secular ideologies and institutions in 
the country created a number of significant obstacles for tariqahs. They were not able to 
mobilize people politically and their religious message became subsumed in the identity 
politics of Erbakan. 
                                                 
183 See Bacik 2002. 
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the new political system they tried to initiate a new political party controlled by the social 
movement. However, it appears that the leaders of Naqshbandi tariqah underestimated 
the power of political process and politicians, even the Naqshbandi influenced ones, who 
attribute autonomy of space to it.  
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Chapter IV: THE NATIONAL VIEW MOVEMENT: SHARIAH  
This chapter is about the Shariah approach as outlined in the Hadith of Gabriel as 
Islam. It is the most basic level because it only requires the acceptance and practice of the 
main tenet of Islam whereas iman and ihsan are an internalization of these fundamental 
principles. The Shariah approach is exclusively interested in occupying institutional 
positions of power. It interprets the problems of modernity as an absence of divine 
directive in society. While all of the major Islamists in Turkey agree on this point, the 
Shariah based actors, in this case Necmettin Erbakan, believe that the problems 
associated with modernity will be solved by merely institutionalizing Islamic Law.  
Necmettin Erbakan’s National View Movement was originally a political branch 
of Kotku’s Naqshbandi movement. Erbakan began to establish political parties in the 
early 1970s under the auspices of the Naqshbandi tariqah.184
For the National View Movement, controlling the state via democratic elections 
has been the primary goal. Inspired by Islamic movements in the Middle East, Erbakan 
sought to implement religious law.
 Later, the National View 
Movement distanced itself from the tariqah network and immersed itself in the political 
process. Erbakan disagreed with the Naqshbandi method of influencing the state through 
social activity and religious propagation and embraced political involvement. His earlier 
connection with the Naqshbandi tariqah caused observers to associate the National View 
Movement’s Shariah approach with the Naqshbandi movement.  
185
                                                 
184 Özal 1994. 
 The National View Movement tried to 
185 Dagi 1998 explains the connection between the National View Movement and Islamic movements in the 
Middle East which created the anti-EU identity of National View Movement. Gareth Jenkins states that “In 
his public statements, Erbakan made no secret of his nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire, although he usually 
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institutionalize Islam as a structural factor in the state’s law-making and enforcing body. 
The ideas of Sayyid Qutb were the intellectual foundations upon which the National 
View Movement based its design for an Islamic revolution. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the success of the Iranian revolution eventually led to the popularization 
of Islamic causes and the Shariah approach. By capitalizing on the sufferings of Muslims 
abroad, the National View Movement was able to channel the dissident and discontent 
voices to the political arena in which they were the primary representatives of Turkish 
Islamic identity. As a product of 20th century democratic politics, the National View 
Movement has managed to become a popular Islamic movement, however, overall 
solidarity of the movement is only a few decades old. 
In a secular state such as Turkey, where the military has sponsored coups in 
defense of the secular establishment, Erbakan’s prominence among both political and 
religious circles merits the attention of serious scholars of Islam and democracy. He was 
the first politician to bring the message of Islam to the parliament. Other Muslim 
politicians preferred to blend their ideas with conservative186 and centrist ideas, but 
Erbakan was explicit that the political platform of his party was “Islamic”. In contrast to 
other traditional religious leaders, Erbakan did not receive formal religious training.187
                                                                                                                                                 
stopped short of explicitly calling for the restoration of the Shari’a.” Jenkins, 2008, 131. Emphasis in the 
original. 
186 In Turkish context, conservative “muhafazakar” means “respecting religion” and resisting abrupt 
changes. 
187 Interestingly enough, in Turkey non-Islamic fields like engineering or science are producing Islamist 
political actors rather than traditional Islamic institutions. 
 
Erbakan was born in a more or less secular environment. His father was a judge in his 
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hometown of Sinop. Sinop was a secular city in a relatively conservative region. 
Throughout his early life, he received a good secular education and was quite successful 
in it. His family later moved to Kayseri and then to Istanbul where Erbakan attended the 
prestigious Istanbul Erkek Lisesi (Istanbul Boys High School). Later, he attended the 
Istanbul Technical University (ITU)188
One campus of Istanbul Technical University was located in the district of 
Besiktas which was very close to the center of Naqshbandi activism in the neighboring 
district of Fatih. Fatih was named after Mehmed II (Muhammad the Conqueror) who 
conquered Constantinople in 1453; after the conquest, he was nicknamed “Fatih,” 
meaning conqueror. The famous mosque, the Fatih Mosque, on the historic peninsula of 
Istanbul is also named after him.
. Among his classmates were Korkut Özal (former 
minister), Suleyman Demirel (former Prime minister and 10th president) and Turgut Özal 
(former Prime minister and 9th President). He became involved with the Naqshbandi 
order while he was in college.  
189
Some famous Muslim figures whose funeral services were done in Fatih Mosque 
are Naqshbandi Sheikh Esad Cosan, famous Muslim poet of Naqshbandi origin Necip 
Fazil Kisakurek, former prime minister and President Turgut Özal (whom we later 
 Today the Fatih Mosque is not only famous for 
prayer services but also for its funeral ceremonies. Out of a symbolic gesture, funeral 
services of famous Muslims are usually done in the Fatih Mosque. This has been the case 
for especially for the Naqshbandis.  
                                                 
188 At the time, ITU as the leading engineering university in secular Turkey was becoming a hub for the 
religious Naqshbandi movement. 
189 The difference of Fatih from rest of the city and its European quarters (i.e. Harbiye) were also portrayed 
in Peyami Safa’s famous Fatih-Harbiye novel. For more see Safa 1995. 
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learned that was also linked to Necip Fazıl and Naqshbandi Sheikh Zahit Kotku).190 After 
the building of the mosque, the city became known as Fatih. Most of the conservative 
students who attended Istanbul Technical University during 1960s and 1970s used to live 
in Fatih. They were easily able to commute to college in the neighboring town while 
living close to their Sheikh in Fatih. During his college years, Erbakan practiced Islam 
and associated with the students and Sheikhs.191 In 1953, he became associate professor 
and was also active in business life. In 1956, together with friends from the Naqshbandi 
community, Erbakan established the legendary ‘Gümüş Motor’ company in Konya.192
After the failure of Gümüş Motor, Erbakan entered the Turkish Chamber of 
Commerce (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB) in 1965. He later became its 
general secretary. He was trying to be the voice of small business owners on the 
periphery against the big corporate elite centered in Istanbul. In an attempt to widen his 
sphere of influence, he ran for the presidency of the Chamber which was the biggest trade 
chamber in the country. In May 25, 1969, he won the presidency of the Chamber at the 
expense of the corporate elite. Süleyman Demirel, who was both the leader of the ruling 
 
Gümüş Motor was the single most important business venture by Erbakan and his 
associates. Although Gümüş Motor eventually failed, Erbakan’s followers used it as a 
model of indigenous industrialization.  
                                                 
190 In my research trip to Turkey in late 2006, some Muslim residents of Fatih told me that it is now a 
common understanding among the residents of Fatih that, to have a funeral ceremony in Fatih Mosque is an 
expression of Muslim identity. For many Muslims, this is probably another way of developing a language 
in a secular country to convey a religious message. 
191 He graduated in 1948. 
192 A company that manufactured car engines. 
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Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) and the Prime Minister opposed Erbakan’s election 
arguing that Erbakan as the General Secretary of the Chamber could not run for 
president. The case was taken to the court where the court decided in favor of Demirel. In 
August 8, Erbakan lost his position but did not want to leave. Erbakan locked himself 
into the president’s office leaving the office only after police broke the door in.  
Consequently, what brought Erbakan to the forefront of the political arena was his 
rivalry with Suleyman Demirel. Often Erbakan’s “us against them” discourse found its 
utmost representation in Demirel’s personality. As a result, with the support of his closest 
friends from Demirel’s party, Erbakan started his political activity through which he 
managed to be elected to parliament as an independent candidate from Turkey’s most 
conservative city, Konya. In Turkey, major political party leaders have always chosen 
either their hometowns or Istanbul as their preferred place to pursue political office. 
Erbakan broke from this tradition in a highly symbolic and successful maneuver to base 
himself and his ideology in a traditional setting. Erbakan became an exception in Turkish 
politics because of his ability to go beyond traditional family ties. His Islamic message 
enabled him to establish the political movement within the Muslim community, 
successfully using his Islamic identity in a highly secular political environment.193
Erbakan began to use religious identity as a political tactic; he criticized his 
opponents for their lack of Islamic morals. His main, yet most radical, tactic was to label 
  
                                                 
193 The appeal of Islamic has always been a natural reaction of discontent with Kemalism. The process did 
not necessarily emerge with the National View Movement. However, Erbakan was able to speed up the 
process. The National View Movement was channeling Islamic sentiment rather than creating one. For 
more see, Yavuz 1997a, 71. 
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his political opponents “freemasons” or “servants of Zionism.”194 On May 15, 1970 in his 
first year in parliament Erbakan gave a speech on Turkey’s entry into the (then called) 
Common Market. He argued that the Common Market was a Zionist project.195
Increasingly, these activities became the base of a separate movement, National 
View, which Erbakan centralized under his leadership. Erbakan established the National 
Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) in 1970, and in each successive decade he would 
establish and act as leader for political parties that were extremely influential players in 
Turkish politics.
 He was 
aware of the effectiveness of these images in uniting people behind him. This tactic was 
especially important for him because it gave him quick results, which motivated his party 
more than the religious messages grounded in Naqshbandi teachings. After becoming an 
independent lawmaker in 1969, he was able to mobilize people from within political 
networks and among ordinary citizens which were dissatisfied with the failed policies 
promoted and institutionalized by the business and political elites.  
196
Dedicated to being the voice of the Muslims in the parliament, Erbakan’s party 
later alienated the Muslim constituency, which he had helped build around a political 
 For example, after the 1971 military intervention, the MNP was 
banned from politics so the next year Erbakan established National Salvation Party (Milli 
Selamet Partisi, MSP). Erbakan’s movement was beginning to be called Selametciler 
(Salvationists) because the MSP became influential when it got 12% of the general vote 
in the 1973 elections.  
                                                 
194 Landau 1996, 298.  
195 He expressed his ideas later in a book. For more see Erbakan 1971. 
196 Dagi 1998. 
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project. Muslim constituency did not identify with Erbakan’s constant appeals to the "us-
them" dichotomy. Especially, leading Members of the Nur community who originally 
were active members of the National Salvation Party began to have problems with 
Erbakan’s political methods.197
After Nurcu members left the National Salvation Party, they began to support 
Demirel’s center right Justice Party.
 For example, Erbakan’s relations with parties on the 
other side of the political spectrum were unacceptable to the Nurcu bases. After the 1973 
elections, Erbakan formed a coalition government with the Republican People’s Party, 
the most secular party in Turkey and long-time representatives of Kemalism. The 
coalition with the Republican People’s Party, however, was not intended to be a 
rapprochement between the seculars and the Islamists. It was simply a short-term 
political maneuvering. Later the coalition became a point of contention between the 
Republican People’s Party and the National Salvation Party when the parties accused 
each other for the failure of the government.  
198 Demirel was a charismatic figure and was also 
able to get support from another major religious order, the Süleymancis.199
                                                 
197 The open letter that Nurcu members wrote to Erbakan shows how leading members of an Islamic 
community react to another Islamic leader on religious grounds.  
198 The support of the Nur leaders for Demirel in the absence of Said Nursi created tension between the 
‘elder brothers’ and Fethullah Gülen a new representative of the younger generation. Fethullah Gülen was a 
minimal figure within the Nur movement at the time however his reaction to political manoeveirng was so 
harsh that he left the Nur movement and initiated his own community which was later named after him.  
Gülen wanted Nur community politically independent from influence of any political party including. 
199 Founded by Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, the Süleymancis were a major offshoot of Naqshbandi tariqah. 
The highly knitted community of Süleymancis has been constantly supporting Demirel’s parties or parties 
favoured by Demirel. 
 The 
competition for support of Islamic movements caused a stir of competition among 
political parties for its electoral power. Erbakan mainly stuck to his Naqshbandi wing, 
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however, when he claimed to exclusively represent Islam in the political arena, his claim 
became a rather dividing factor within the overall Islamic community.  
The most important question surrounding Erbakan’s movement was the nature of 
his relationship with the Naqshbandi order of Mehmed Zahid Kotku. Because Erbakan’s 
political involvement began with Kotku’s direct confirmation and support200, many 
assumed Erbakan’s parties was representative of Islam. Kotku’s aims were similar to any 
other major social religious movement in Turkey. He aspired to contribute to the creation 
of a religious society headed by a political leadership more respectful to the religion. Like 
his predecessors,201 Kotku wanted the state to coexist with the society without directly 
interfering in the religious realm. As a leader of a tariqah, Kotku felt that the state 
apparatus was completely incapable of developing a pious believing Muslim through 
social policy. For him only an incremental evolution towards higher levels of religious 
belief, as promoted by the tariqah system could make a person true believer. Initially, his 
goal was to form a political party that will be the voice of Muslims in the parliament in 
order to make the state respectful to the Muslim rights. Like many, he was aware of the 
fact that the state’s tolerance towards Islamic movements would create the social context 
necessary for active Islamists to teach and guide the believers. Kotku’s ideas in this sense 
aresimilar to Said Nursi’s.202
                                                 
200 A close student of Kotku, Korkut Özal was highly involved with the party process. In his book, he 
explained the support of Kotku to Erbakan. Before 1980’s with the dissatisfaction of Erbakan, Korkut Özal 
ran against Erbakan. For more see Özal 1994.  
201 Especially Khalid al-Baghdadi. 
202 In his autobiography, Said Nursi argues that state and its officials are “servants of the society.” 
Therefore he argues that although a Muslim/Islamic state is desirable a non-Muslim state is acceptable too. 
See Nursi 1996, 79.  
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There was another difference between Erbakan and the Naqshbandi movement. 
The political identity of the Naqshbandi movement was not formulated in contrast to an 
alien ideology, political party or institution. The Naqshbandi order has always articulated 
its teachings on the basis of a conservative reading of the Quran and hadith. Moreover, 
Kotku maintained contact with the leaders of all major political parties, including centrist 
Demirel, who happened to be the major political rival of Erbakan, and Alpaslan Türkeş, 
who was an ultra-nationalist ideologue who mixed ideology with religious symbolism.203
In the 1977 elections, Erbakan’s vote declined from 12% to 9%.
 
The semi-openness of the proselytizing activities of the Naqshbandis contradicted 
Erbakan’s exclusive concern with political power through electoral victory. As a result, 
the Naqshbandis began to be dissatisfied with Erbakan. His short-term coalitions with 
hard-line secularists for short-term political gains were also unacceptable in their eyes. 
They were open to political parties on the right; however, leftist parties like Republican 
People’s Party were constantly anti-religious, which made it unacceptable for 
Naqshbandis to associate with them. Basically, the Naqshbandis wanted political activism 
to be an extension of social consciousness and not the creator and controller of society. 
Therefore, they wanted self-professed Islamic parties to act in accordance with Islam, and 
make their commitment to the parliament or other political institutions secondary. 
204
                                                 
203 Yasar 2004. 
204 See Jenkins 2008. 
 On one hand, 
this shows that Erbakan was already beginning to alienate his religious constituency by 
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being overly aggressive.205 On the other hand it shows that Erbakan’s movement was 
able to mobilize 10% of the population on a consistent basis. Because of this Erbakan 
was able to gradually become more or less independent from the social movement that 
had been his initial base for his early business and political activity. Eventually he 
alienated Kotku and began to distance himself from Erbakan’s party in public, and in 
private he spoke critically of Erbakan, but was never taken seriously. Erbakan allowed 
Kotku to be discontent in private as long as he was able to rely on his religious followers 
for easy votes. Therefore, he maintained a low profile, and following a “wait and see” 
approach that worked to his benefit. Erbakan kept his position in the movement while the 
old charismatic religious leader, Kotku, passed away leaving in his place a lesser figure 
his son-in-law Esad Cosan.206
                                                 
205 The first major division in the party happened when M. Gündüz Sevilgen representing the Nur 
community left the party with his sixteen friends, right before the 1977 election.  
206 Yasar 2004. 
 
After the 1980 military coup, Erbakan and his party were banned from politics 
once again but this time by the military rule. However it did not diminish the popularity 
of Islamist political parties. After the military government, Erbakan established the 
Welfare Party. It became a major player in the post 1980 political arena. Until 1987, due 
to the ban on Erbakan, his close associates took control of the organization of the party. 
Traditional Islamic communities during the military's rule preferred to continue their low 
profile religious activities on the societal level. This factor was emblematic of the 
differences between the traditional tariqah and the newer, younger National View 
Movement founded by Erbakan. 
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With Erbakan in sole control of the political party, their official rhetoric became 
more anti-state and anti-western, similar to Islamist movements in the Middle East.207 
There are two major reasons for this surge in spiteful political language. First, Erbakan 
started to become aware in the early 1970s that his method was successful in uniting the 
discontent masses behind his leadership against corrupt parties who “imitate the west”.208
After the military rule, civilian authority was resumed and Turgut Özal
 
If he had moderated his language, his party would not have been able to distinguish itself 
from centrist moderates. With strong religious and anti-western rhetoric Erbakan 
presented himself as an alternative to the prevailing centrist parties who had been 
ineffective and corrupt. A second factor might be found in the Iranian revolution and 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan. In Turkey Erbakan was the first to bring Islam into 
mainstream politics; he had no local precursors, so he imitated Middle Eastern countries 
where political movements gained more power than the Naqshbandi grass root Islamic 
movement. In order to save the ummah he envisioned a religious movement led by 
populist political leadership. After 1980s, the influence of the Middle Eastern Islamist 
literature and the Iranian revolution added to his desire for strict control of the general 
Islamic movement. 
209
                                                 
207 Dagi 1998. 
208 Erbakan’s same discourse go back to as early as 1970. For more see Erbakan 1970. 
209 At the time, Turgut Özal’s previous links with the Naqshbandi community were not well known. 
 came to 
office in 1983. Due to the ban on his leftist opponents, Özal was able to unite the center 
right and Muslim votes under the banner of his newly founded Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi, ANAP). His ban on certain parties that were initially banned during 
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military rule could not remain in place because people wanted the freedom to form 
parties true to their desires. He approved the referendum which lifted the ban on Erbakan 
and many other major figures in 1987. From 1987 until the mid 1990s Erbakan’s new 
Welfare Party was able to show only small signs of success in local and national 
elections. However, it was in the local administrations that the Welfare Party gained 
popularity throughout the country. In 1994, the party won an overwhelming percentage of 
votes in town, city and county elections. The Welfare Party garnered a major political 
achievement in the municipal election of March 1994 when the Refah party won the 
mayoral elections of Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. Its electoral 
success in 1994 was followed in December of 1995 in the general election. Between 
these two elections the Welfare Party’s image among the public changed from a 
“marginal” political party to become a nationally recognized political movement.210
Welfare Party was able to get the most votes in the 1995 general elections, with 
over 21% of the general vote. Itwon 158 seats in the 550-seat parliament. Welfare Party 
tried to form a coalition government with other centrist secular parties, the Motherland 
 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the future Prime Minister of Turkey, won the Istanbul 
County elections and became the new, young and energetic face of the Welfare Party as a 
pseudo-Islamic party. Erdoğan’s success was both a result of prior success and a cause of 
the Welfare Party’s future accomplishments. His election was initially a result of Welfare 
Party’s name recognition. Later his skill and aptitude in solving Istanbul’s chronic water 
and environmental problems solidified the Welfare Party among the electorate.  
                                                 
210 Önis 1997, 743. 
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Party211 and the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi, DYP), but they opted out of a 
coalition with Erbakan and built a coalition with each other. Historically rival parties 
Motherland Party and True Path Party formed the coalition under Motherland Party’s 
leader Mesut Yilmaz, as Prime Minister, and True Path Party’s leader Tansu Ciller as his 
deputy. This coalition later disintegrated amidst corruption charges. Ciller left the ANA-
YOL212
Ciller was suspected by many of corruption and bribery because of her 
unaccounted and conspicuous wealth. Also during the previous election campaigns, she 
attacked some conservative Muslim politicians with the terrorist label. Though she was 
an unlikely partner, Erbakan used her seats in the parliament to form a coalition 
government. His policy, since 1973, was based on political pragmatism and bridge 
building. This was not welcomed by the Naqshbandis and those who voted on the basis of 
Islamic identity. With the support of Ciller, secular Turkey had its first islamically 
oriented party since the founding of the republic. Ciller was subjected to harsh criticism 
from secular circles for this alliance, but this was the only way for her to protect herself 
from prosecution.
 coalition and formed a new coalition government in June 1996 with Erbakan in 
exchange for pardoning the charges against her in the parliament.  
213 Erbakan became the Prime Minister and Ciller Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister. With the support of Erbakan’s party corruption 
charges against her were dropped in the parliament.214
                                                 
211 Yavuz 1997. 
212 The coalition of ANAP and DYP is called ANA-YOL taken from the acronyms of the party names. 
213 Candar 1999, 135. 
 Abdullah Gül who later became 
214 Kamrava 1998, 275. 
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the President on the Justice and Development Party ticket in 2007 became, speaker of the 
cabinet while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, outside of the cabinet, was the mayor of Istanbul. 
Erbakan's foreign policy was, at least symbolically, directed towards the Middle 
East and Muslim countries. Contrary to established foreign policy, he made his first 
foreign visit to Tehran to meet with then President Muhammad Khatemi.215 The result of 
his trip was a $20 billion deal with Iran to import natural gas.216 Erbakan used other 
occasions to promote his agenda in foreign relations and initiated the D-8 summit in his 
first year. D-8 stands for the union of eight developing countries. All the members are 
Muslim majority countries, which made Erbakan’s project, at least for the opponents, an 
islamic union. The members of D-8 are Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladash, Nigeria, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Egypt; they are already members of Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC). Some of the party members supported D-8 as an alternative to EU.217
Erbakan considered it risky to align solely with the trans-Atlantic countries. His 
visit to oil rich Iran and establishing D-8 were attempts to diversify the foreign policy 
options available to Turkey. However, he was never able to explain the benefits of these 
policies in terms of Turkey’s national interests. Erbakan’s policies appeared to be a 
useless deviation from mainstream thinking rather than an improvement of it. His foreign 
policy choices did not leave a positive impression on domestic or international observers. 
An example of this failure was his visit to Libya. The visit was a total fiasco. In front of 
the press, Muammar Gaddafi publicly humiliated the Turkish government because of its 
 
                                                 
215 Robins 1997.  
216 Bozdaglioglu 2003, 134. 
217 Aral 2005. 
98 
 
treatment of Kurdish people. Erbakan’s silence turned the majority of the public opinion 
against him. The Libya trip was a major problem for the members of Erbakan’s own 
party too.218 In an attempt to balance Erbakan’s pro-Islamic policies, the Turkish 
military, unilaterally, began to establish relations with Israel in an unprecedented way.219 
As a result, during Erbakan’s tenure, military involvement in politics increased. Cevik 
Bir, Deputy Chief of Genenral Staff, openly called Iran and Syria the main threats to 
Turkish security. He argued that it is the Turkish-Israeli cooperation that stabilizes the 
region against the terrorist threats (of these countries).220
An event organized by one of Erbakan’s mayors in the city of Sincan in the 
suburbs of Ankara caused a major problem for Islamists. It was organized around an 
important foreign policy issue for Muslims. With the help of the Iranian Embassy in 
Turkey the Mayor of Sincan organized “Kudus Gecesi” (Jerusalem Night) to show 
solidarity with the Palestinians. During the program pro-Hamas slogans were chanted and 
the Iranian Ambassador gave a speech. Secularists saw this as an Islamist threat to the 
secular state. A few days later local tank divisions rolled into the streets of Sincan, 
making a direct warning to the Islamists. Tensions between the military and the Islamist 
government were at their highest during the monthly National Security Council  
meetings. These meetings were constitutionally arranged and semi-binding events held 
between the Government and the Army. The meetings are organized by the secretariat 
  
                                                 
218 Feroz Ahmad stated that disastrous Libya visit marked the beginning of a possible coup. See Ahmad 
2005, 170. 
219 Bacik 2001. 
220 Bir later gave a lecture in the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on October 26 1999 and 
published his ideas in the same line. See Bir and Sherman 2002. 
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which is held by an Army general and headed by the President. In the February 28, 1997 
meeting, the National Security Council advised the government by means of a binding 
resolution that took very harsh measures against religious practice.221
The National Security Council resolution included both symbolic and practical 
measures. During this era Islamism was declared, by the military, a greater threat than the 
PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), which is a terrorist group who is responsible for killing 
over twenty thousand civilians.
  
222
                                                 
221 Yavuz 2000.  
222 Jacoby 2004, 150. This has been an important example of securitization. See Buzan et al. 1998. 
 The NSC asked the government to enforce a secular 
dress code in government buildings and universities. This was the beginning of what has 
transformed into a controversy over the headscarf in Turkey. Secondly, and most 
importantly, the February 28 resolutions transformed the educational system in Turkey in 
its entirety. Primary school education was extended from five years to eight years. From 
the outset this was an educational reform program that in its essence sought to limit the 
influence of religion in the public schools. This decision resulted in the closure of general 
vocational high schools as well as Imam-Hatip schools (for imams and preachers; they 
are the leading institutions for religious education in Turkey). The military junta of 1997 
curtailed all and more of the religious freedom introduced after the 1980 military 
intervention. Throughout his political career, Erbakan was open and supportive of the 
Imam-Hatip schools and religious education. However, the pressure put on him by the 
military establishment forced him to act out of character. 
100 
 
The ban on religious education was not limited to public Imam Hatip schools; it 
applied to Quranic schools as well. Quranic schools were not part of the mainstream 
education system in Turkey. Religious foundations responsible for educating hafiz 
(preservers: those who memorize the entire Quran by heart) usually ran the Quranic 
schools. Like Imam Hatip schools, Quranic schools were the main centres where 
Islamists had strong control. Their students were able to pursue both secular and religious 
educations. For instance, students at these schools generally did not attend the regular 
schools but were able to obtain a diploma by taking the standardized exams at the end of 
the school term. In this way, Islamists were able to isolate their kids from the influence of 
the government curriculum which due to a measure passed during February 28 
processprohibited religious education to children before they entered high school. On the 
other hand, Quranic education was limited to government-controlled courses which were 
only offered during the summer term.  
Though Erbakan attempted to placate the army and the secular bureaucracy his 
passivity had the opposite effect. In May 21, 1997, the state prosecutor filed a motion to 
close the Welfare Party; it was accused of anti-secular activities. Erbakan and his 
coalition partner, Ciller, began to discuss whether they should change positions, Erbakan 
becoming deputy Prime Minister and Ciller taking over the Prime Minister’s office. 
However, there was a growing dissatisfaction within the Muslim community, including 
Erbakan’s National View, over the new anti-religious laws and the fact that Erbakan had 
compromised the interests of his constituency in order to maintain power. They 
considered the secular bureaucratic campaign against them as a serious threat to their 
identity. Erbakan had assumed that the threat was only to his position in office.  
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His constituency was more concerned with preserving some of the gains in 
religious freedom made over the past few decades than with the position of the party’s 
leader. For example Abdullah Gül, who later left Erbakan’s movement and formed a new 
party,223 in an interview said that he warned Erbakan and his associates not to sign the 28 
February resolutions. Gül and others would have preferred for them to resign their 
government positions in protest of military coercion.224
This moment marks the beginning of changes for Islamic parties in Turkey. The 
Virtue Party replaced the Welfare Party but at the time it was not clear who should lead 
the party because Erbakan was banned from politics. The general tendency in the 
movement was to follow Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership. Erbakan, who unwillingly 
approved Erdoğan’s earlier bid for Istanbul Mayor, rejected this option. He did not want 
the party to have a charismatic successor capable of overshadowing him. Erdoğan's 
record in Istanbul as an independent leader, rather than a loyal follower of Erbakan, 
threatened to marginalize the party ideologue. Erbakan had earlier disapproved the 
candidacy of Erdoğan for the Istanbul Mayoral position; it was only as a result of the 
 However, Erbakan did not want 
to leave office until the very last moment. Eventually Erbakan’s government resigned 
from the office in June 18, 1997. Confronting the possibility of the party’s closure, 
Erbakan’s attorney Ismail Alptekin established a new party, Virtue Party in December 17, 
1997. In January 16 1998, the Welfare Party was closed and its leadership banned from 
politics for 5 years. The Welfare Party was the third party associated with the Islamic 
National View Movement that was closed by the constitutional court. 
                                                 
223 He later became the Prime Minister and is currently the President. 
224 Selim 2002, 68. 
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appeals from the Istanbul branch of the party that Erbakan accepted Erdoğan’s candidacy. 
This time Erbakan did not bow to pressure. Eventually an old associate of his, Recai 
Kutan, became the leader of the party. The party fell into chaos again.225
Due to his mayoral responsibilities Erdoğan was not involved in the party 
management, but his influence was beginning to surpass his official position. Many 
scholars overemphasize Erdoğan’s leading role in the opposition movement against 
Erbakan. However, it can be argued that Abdullah Gül was the main oppositional figure. 
Immediately after the establishment of the Virtue Party, Abdullah Gül started to assert his 
personal style within the party and among the discontented members of the party. Some 
critical issues increased the division between Erbakan and Gül’s supporters. Although 
Erbakan was banned from politics he did not want to lose his control of the party.
  
226
This frustrated the younger generation who wanted to change the party’s 
confrontational tactics. This new generation, who wanted to reform the ideological 
content of the movement's message, are known as the “reformists” (yenilikciler).
  
227
                                                 
225 Selim 2002, 74. 
226 Selim 2002, 81. 
227 The old generation who wanted to stick to the essentials under the unquestioned leadership of Erbakan is 
called the “traditionalists” (gelenekciler). 
 The 
revivalists within the party were fond of and respectful towards Abdullah Gül; he had 
always been known as a soft spoken, polite and respectful of the ‘establishment.’ But 
after the military coup and the co-optation of Erbakan, Gül began to voice the discontent 
of the younger generation. At the time nobody ever imagined Gül would one day be the 
Prime Minister or President of Turkey. 
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Gül was born in 1950 in the city of Kayseri in Central Turkey. Kayseri is famous 
for its flamboyant business environment, rich businessmen and Muslim culture.228 He 
went to college in Istanbul and majored in Economics. He did his MA and PhD work 
under Sabahattin Zaim, a famous Muslim professor of labor economics. Zaim was a 
scholar whose students later played major roles in Turkish politics. For example, with his 
support Gül went to London to pursue graduate research.229 Although Gül entered his 
political life in Erbakan’s party, his earlier life was dedicated to the mainstream Muslim 
communities. However in the case of Abdullah Gül and many other members of new 
political elite who established Justice and Development Party, its is an understudied fact 
that these people do not come from one ideological block.230
After finishing graduate studies, Gül returned to Turkey and began teaching 
economics in a newly founded state university in Sakarya, near Istanbul. After 1983, 
Abdullah Gül left academia and joined the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) located in 
Saudi Arabia. IDB is organized under the Organization of Islamic Conference which 
represents Muslim countries in the UN. In 1991, Abdullah Gül joined the Welfare Party 
and promoted their policies in his hometown Kayseri. He held important positions both in 
  
                                                 
228 Selim 2002. 
229 He was sent to Great Britain with a scholarship from a Muslim foundation that aimed to send Muslim 
students abroad to pursue graduate studies. The activities of foundations like this were not connected with 
Erbakan’s Islamist National View Movement. 
230 More than anybody else it was famous Turkish poet Necip Fazil Kisakurek (d. 1983) who was the major 
source of inspiration for many like Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. One major detail is also 
important about Kisakurek’s life: he has never been part of Erbakan’s movement. Kisakurek was an ardent 
supporter of grassroot Islamic movements that aimed educating the people. Besides writing, Kisakurek 
spent his life by giving lectures throughout Turkey. His works, which are considered now as the best 
examples of Turkish literature, became available in public school curriculum only after Turgut Özal 
became Turkey’s Prime Minister in the 1980’s when Kisakurek had already passed away.  
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the party and the government. Due to his European and Middle Eastern experiences, he 
came to represent the party in the international arena. His image as a soft spoken 
moderate Muslim leader was an asset to the Welfare Party. Before he became the rising 
voice of the opposition in the party, Gül articulated the National View Movement's 
foreign policy. 
In the April 18, 1999 elections, the Virtue Party received only 15% of the general 
vote, an almost 30% decrease. Abdullah Gül and his friends blamed the party 
administration for the failure in the elections. In the first party congress Abdullah Gül, 
who was forty years younger than Erbakan, challenged one of his candidates and openly 
declared his candidacy for the party leadership. It was unheard of within the Welfare 
Party to contradict Erbakan; party members had become accustomed to Erbakan dictating 
policy by fiat rather than consultation. Erbakan and his close associates had become 
elitist, viewing themselves as the leaders of the Islamic community. Erbakan identified 
the interests of the nation and of Islam in general with his personal rise to power. His 
previous term in office demonstrates the danger of identity politics and an excessive 
reliance on the state.  
Erbakan, although, came from a traditional, mosque-based Tariqah approach 
when he was forced to make a choice between the needs of religious Muslims and his 
own position he chose the latter.231
                                                 
231 Famous Islamic poet Necip Fazil has similar ideas. Kisakurek 1998. 
 However, the reformist generation within the party 
gave primacy to the needs of the masses, used milder language and strategies, and 
actually promoted Islamic identity. Abdullah Gül rose as a leading figure among the 
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dissatisfied within the party while Erdoğan supported him from outside. Apparently, 
ordinary members of the party welcomed Gül’s method. However, Abdullah Gül still lost 
the election to Recai Kutan by a count of 633 votes to 521 votes.  
After the elections in the party congress, the divide between so-called 
traditionalists and reformists increased. The traditionalists tried to marginalize the 
reformists from influence in any post. No reformist, or non-loyalist of Erbakan and his 
allies, was given any administrative positions. The unexpected success of the reformists 
was a major threat to the party elites who tried to clean the reformists from the party 
ranks before the next election so that these dissidents could not join the parliament. It was 
the first time the National View Movement had such large scale opposition within the 
party.232
However, in June 2001 the Constitutional Court closed the Virtue Party, the 
fourth political party of the National View Movement. After the closure of Welfare Party, 
nobody expected a ban on the Virtue Party, which appeared to be substantively different 
from its predecessors. The reason for this legal action by the state was that Erbakan, 
though legally banned from politics, was involved in inner party disputes on behalf of his 
associates. Right after its closure, under the auspices of Erbakan, members of the 
National View Movement established the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP). At this 
point, the question remained whether the reformers who had lost the party congress to the 
traditionalists would join the new party? But tensions among the parliamentarians of the 
former Virtue Party was increasing. Consequently, in August 2001 Erdoğan and his 
  
                                                 
232 See Murat Mercan’s ideas in Robins 2003a, 550; Robins 2007a, 300. 
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followers established the Justice and Development Party and fifty-two lawmakers of the 
banned Virtue Party joined the Justice and Development Party.  
In the party meetings in and around city of Fatih, which was traditionally 
Naqshbandi and pro-Erbakan, many previous National View Movement members who 
had just joined Justice and Development Party needed to give an explanation because, 
until then there were no major public signs of dissatisfaction among party members 
against Erbakan. It was the first time many members learned the inner workings of the 
party. Some began to debate about how Erbakan was able to create a base of loyal 
followers. In one of the meetings, one Justice and Development Party member 
specifically told the audience how the myth of “mujahid” Erbakan was created within the 
National View Movement. He said that all the party members thought Erbakan was 
involved in a sacred struggle. This idea gave Erbakan unquestioned legitimacy in the face 
of criticism. Just like other charismatic leaders Erbakan became autocratic. The negative 
tactic of formulating identity in contrast to an imaginary "other" was the essence of his 
political style. Within the discourse of party members Erbakan directed his criticism and 
anger at the west, the United States, or Israel. This tactic gradually socialized National 
View Movement members into the politics of fear and identity. When members from 
within the party questioned his decisions, such as the anti-religious laws he supported, he 
had them branded as traitors and enemies.  
Erbakan’s method was more appealing than the Naqshbandi method which was 
losing its influence especially among the new generation of young Muslims. Those who 
were fed up with the Kemalist system wanted a quick revolution. Traditional tariqahs 
emphasized gradual change, first of the individual, and then of his environment. 
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Erbakan’s method was typical of mass movements under strict control by an elitist cadre. 
The unquestioned nature of shariah is blended with political issues so that the holders of 
sacred positions who serve shariah could deflect criticism onto a constructed foe or just 
claim authority based on the cause.  
Four former members of National View Movement mainly led the Justice and 
Development Party: Abdullatif Sener, a successful finance professor and long time 
activist; Abdullah Gül; Bulent Arinc, a leading figure in the movement and friend of 
Erbakan; and, Erdoğan, former mayor of Istanbul, who had just finished a prison sentence 
for political reasons. Erdoğan was mainly active in the Istanbul branch. The other three 
major figures were active in National View Movement party headquarters, close to 
Erbakan. Although Erdoğan was famous within the National View Movement, his name 
became well known publicly only after he came to the office as the mayor of Istanbul. 
Istanbul, with its 14 million residents and major businesses, has been the heart of the 
Turkish economy.  
When Erdoğan began to successfully address the major issues of this metropolis, 
his popularity soared and he became a household name. Erdoğan was distinguished on 
the basis of his ability and merit. Turkish voters, especially the younger generation, 
wanted a leader that was capable of solving problems and not self-absorbed, like 
Erbakan, or corrupt, like his predecessors. Although the other three leaders were well 
regarded within the party, they all came to an agreement on Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership. 
With his charisma, Erdoğan was able to win the support of the new party members and a 
significant portion of the electorate in the next election campaign. Six months after its 
108 
 
establishment, in the November 2002 general elections, Justice and Development Party 
came to power with over 34% of the popular vote.  
For many scholars there are not many differences between Erbakan and his 
former students. In one of his old speeches Tayyip Erdoğan said “Our mission is not one 
simple-minded fight or world conquest; it is to spread and promote the rule of the religion 
of Allah. The first condition of this mission is peace and concord.” Serif Mardin 
interprets this speech as “cautiousness related to the banning of Islamist organizations by 
the military regime established after the 1980 coup.”233
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born in 1954 in Istanbul. His father was a devout 
Muslim. Erdoğan was born in the Islamic month of Recep (Rajab). Therefore, his father 
named him after this holy month.
 The Justice and Development 
Party has had to deal with these types of suspicion since the day it was established. 
Opponents asked the same critical question: is Justice and Development Party different 
from Islamist National View or is it practicing taqiyya (dissimulation)? Will Erdoğan, as 
in Algeria and Iran cases, pose a threat to the democratic system? Will he turn Turkey 
into a fundamentalist theocratic state? To answer this question we need to focus on his 
personal and political Erdoğan. 
234
                                                 
233 Mardin 2006. 
234 Among the practicing Muslims of Turkey, it is a common practice to name children after the holy 
months and nights. Islamic holy months of Rajab, Shaban, Ramadan, Shawwal and Muharram are 
commonly used names together with holy nights like Qadr and Baraat. 
 Erdoğan’s family was from Rize, a black sea region 
town known for its conservative-Muslim population. Financially, Erdoğan’s family was 
underprivileged; therefore, until his college years, Erdoğan worked for street vendor 
selling water or traditional Turkish donuts. He went to the Imam Hatip Schools. Many 
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practicing Muslim families preferred Imam Hatip schools which are funded by the 
government. These schools are originally intended to educate prayer leaders in the 
mosques in line with government interests. Erdoğan’s political life began in high school, 
where he was involved passionately in the National View Movement activities. He was 
the head of the High School branch of the National Turkish Students Union (Milli Turk 
Talebe Birligi in Turkish, MTTB).235
The rising star in politics at the time, however, was Turgut Özal, another 
Naqshbandi turned politician. Previously, Özal was a successful undersecretary of the 
Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs. Coming from the Naqshbandi background 
 MTTB has widely known for its Muslim student 
activities. 
Although he attended Islamic school, in college he did not pursue a career in 
theology. In college, he attended to the Management department of Marmara University 
in Istanbul. In his college years, he was active in party politics. Right after college, he 
entered into business life with a prestigious company while continuing his political 
activities in the National View Movement. He had a successful tenure in city and county 
offices of the National View Movement. In the 1980s he helped to increase the influence 
of National View Movement’s Welfare Party among different segments of society. 
Istanbul was his political arena and he managed his conduct and professional life in such 
a way that he became appealing to all segments of society, not just those who practiced 
Islam or embraced identity politics. He was a major reason for the success of the National 
View Movement in the 1990s. 
                                                 
235 Interestingly enough Abdullah Gül who is slightly older than Erdogan and was the head of the college 
branch of MTTB.  
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he and his brother Korkut were active in political life. Because of their religious 
background, the Özal brothers were known as “brothers wearing takunya” (takunyali 
biraderler). Takunya, a traditional wooden sandal, is mostly used in mosques to get 
ablution before the daily prayers. The Özal brothers openly practicing their religion, used 
to wear these sandals and noisily walk through the hallways of the government offices 
making everybody hear that they are getting ready for the daily prayers.  
The military was aware of his religious character, the international and financial 
expertise of Özal made him indispensible to the military government of the 1980. As a 
result, he continued to work as the top bureaucrat in charge of economic affairs. A few 
years later, Özal left the government and decided to run for Prime Minister. With years of 
government employment and international experience, the Özal brothers were more 
pragmatic than the ideologically committed Erdoğan at the time. Later, Turgut Özal’s 
younger brother Korkut played an advisory role to Erdoğan after Erdoğan established 
Justice and Development Party. 236 During the 1980s, Erdoğan and Erbakan contrast 
sharply with the Özal brothers, though both of them come from the same Naqshbandi 
background.237
Neither of these conflicting political lines, however, was monolithic either. 
Earlier, Tayyip Erdoğan who was also politically strict had differed from Erbakan in 
 The Özal brothers had more government experience than the Erbakan and 
Erdoğan. As a result, the pragmatic Naqshbandi members supported Turgut Özal’s 
Motherland Party.  
                                                 
236 For more on Özal see Barlas 2000. Barlas was a leftist-communist turned liberal who became 
sympathetic to Muslims due to his relationship with Özal.  
237 Cornell 1999, 213. 
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many areas. This was especially noticeable when he became the party president in a 
highly cosmopolitan district of Beyoglu in Istanbul. Beyoglu has traditionally been the 
“French Quarter” of the city. It hosted the Consulate of France, semi-private French High 
schools and more importantly historic churches and synagogues with their congregations. 
On the other hand, Beyoglu has been a hub for not only the religious minorities but also 
the entertainment center for the secular Turks with pubs and bars spread throughout the 
historic neighborhood.  
When Tayyip Erdoğan began working in Beyoglu, his party base was literally 
nonexistent among the residents. After successful campaigning by paying visits to bars 
and pubs and getting in contact with the religious minorities, Tayyip Erdoğan was able to 
make his party one of the most appealing ones. He lost the Beyoglu city election with a 
slim margin and was able to popularize his name among his supporters and party officials 
as a successful leader who could win votes from a variety of voting blocks. This was the 
primary difference between him and Erbakan. He continued as the president of the 
Welfare Party in Istanbul and prepared for the coming local elections. 
As stated before, after long discussions within the party ranks, in 1994 Erdoğan 
became a candidate for mayor of Istanbul, but Erbakan did not want him to be the 
candidate from the National View Movement because Erbakan doubted his personal 
loyalty. With the backing of prominent party members, Erbakan unwillingly made 
Erdoğan the candidate for Istanbul County. The secular media attacked Erdoğan on 
religious grounds; the Muslim community supported him because he was their ‘fellow 
Muslim brother’. Islamic communities such as the Nur and Gülen movements, which did 
not vote for the National View Movement for a long time, openly supported Erdoğan. 
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Erdoğan was also able to mobilize the female vote. Contrary to many political parties 
including his own Erdoğan paid great attention to the women’s branch. As long as the 
new techniques were in line with his moral vision Erdoğan accepted their use on the basis 
of pragmatism. He revolutionized the role of women in the party; they, in turn, 
voluntarily visited many underdeveloped sections of the city to ask for support of 
Erdoğan. As a result, many segments of society, including conservative Muslim families, 
and others from center right ideologies voted for Erdoğan. With a slight margin, he won 
the election.  
Erdoğan's success helped him win his election campaign. The key to his success 
was that he managed the administrative tasks of mayor as well as all the public services 
very efficiently. Before his term in office, there were major problems with air pollution, 
traffic, water distribution, and garbage collection. As his name became the public 
recognition for his party, even Erbakan mentioned him to show how successful the party 
was. However, Erdoğan’s relations with Erbakan were not good. Although Erbakan was 
his leader, Erdoğan wanted to maintain control over his office. He did not let other party 
members get involved in his job. As he became more independent his relations with 
Erbakan deteriorated. Erbakan’s involvement from above was destabilizing Erdoğan’s 
coordination where he was used to being the sole decision maker. 
His popularity increased to such an extent that he soon became a popular public 
speaker throughout the country. He was invited to party events in the cities where local 
party officials wanted to attract non-affiliated voters. In one of these events he went to a 
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southeastern Anatolian city named Siirt.238 The reason Erdoğan attended a rally in Siirt 
was because his wife's family was from there and he wanted to win the support of the 
citizens. In the rally, Erdoğan gave a motivational speech where he quoted a poem of the 
Turkish Poet Ziya Gokalp. Ziya Gokalp was the intellectual father of Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, the founder of Turkey.239
The Believers our soldiers”
 The poem later became a part of a major controversy 
that transformed Erdoğan’s political life. The most controversial part of the poem was the 
following part. 
“The mosques are our barracks, 
The domes our helmets 
The minarets are our bayonets 
240
For Erdoğan it was an ordinary speaking engagement. As usual, he quoted many 
other poems throughout his speech. For Erdoğan the main connection uniting the people 
of Siirt and rest of the nation was Islamic identity. However, prosecutors felt that his 
reference to believers and religious symbols was provocative. They filed a lawsuit against 
him in 1997, and in accordance with the article 312 of the penal code, in April 1998 he 
was charged with openly inciting enmity among the people by referring to differences 
pertaining religion, language and race. For many, this was an attempt by the secular 
establishment to sabotage Erdoğan’s political future. He was sentenced to a term of six 
months prisonwhich constitutionally barred him from seeking elected office. 
 
 
                                                 
238 Siirt is in the southeast Turkey but contrary to most other cities in the region it is not a Kurdish majority 
city. Arabic descent Turkish citizens make up the majority of the population in Siirt. As the boundaries 
between Turkey and Syria were drawn by the Allies right after the WWI, the geo-cultural realities often 
times were disregarded.  
239 On Gokalp’s ideology see Yavuz 1993. 
240 Mecham 2004, 345. 
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Rather than ending his political career, the prison sentence increased Erdoğan’s 
appeal in the eyes of Turks who often sympathize with the victims of injustice. People 
with centrist leanings began to think positively about Erdoğan because the poem he used 
was originally published in official school textbooks and widely known among them. The 
political sentence also heightened Erdoğan’s status within the National View Movement; 
he appealed to a wider audience than the traditional National View Movement 
constituency. After his prison sentence ended, Erdoğan began to organize with a diverse 
group of people from different social backgrounds, but mainly former National View 
Movement members. He called his movement Movement of the Righteous (Erdemliler 
Hareketi) which later became the Justice and Development Party in July 2001. Forty-
eight lawmakers of the Virtue Party joined the Justice and Development Party.241
Together with former National View Movement members, the Justice and 
Development Party organized a coalition of politicians from centrist parties like the True 
Path Party, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, MHP) and the 
Motherland Party. It was difficult for Erdoğan to keep the party together in the beginning 
years. Erdoğan was known as a micromanager and insisted on handpicking each party 
official. His absolute control caused some early departures, especially from the members 
who joined the party from other political parties.
  
242
                                                 
241 Although the founding members of the Justice and Development Party were critical of the National 
View Movement establishment, among the public, in the media, and by their political opponents, they were 
still associated with Erbakan. For more see Heper and Toktas 2003. 
242 Meral Aksener, former Ministry of Interior, who joined the party from the rival Nationalist Action Party, 
was first to leave the Justice and Develeopment Party arguing that even the city presidents of the party 
branches were already chosen without consultation or election. 
 Due to the political ban Erdoğan 
himself was not a member of the parliament. Legally he was allowed to become a party 
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member but not a prime Minister or a lawmaker; yet, he was leading the party during the 
elections to decide who would rule the country. Under these circumstances, Justice and 
Development Party attended its first election and won 34.3% of the popular vote, 
becoming the first majority party government in almost two decades. Only the 
Republican People’s Party passed the 10% national threshold.  
Due to Erdoğan’s political ban Abdullah Gül became the Prime Minister. Gül  and 
Erdoğan were able to cooperate within a party system where authority is generally 
centralized, though both of them have autocratic temperaments. It was a suprising 
situation for Turkish political history because charismatic leaders, like Erbakan, never let 
other charismatic leaders overshadow them. Previously, there were debates about whether 
Erdoğan would let Gül to be the Prime Minister. Contrary to Erbakan’s method of 
choosing loyal members over competent ones, Erdoğan and Gül proved that they were 
different from Erbakan where they were able to overcome selfish political desires.  
Abdullah Gül’s appointment to Prime Minister caused two problems, for the party 
and the political system. For the party it created a dual leadership between the Prime 
Minister and the powerful party president. This had the effect of creating double 
loyalties. The most important problem was for the political system. The main opposition 
leader was Deniz Baykal, an ardent secularist and opponent of Erdoğan. He declared that 
he did not want to see the leader of the winning party banned from politics. With the 
support of Baykal, the parliament amended the constitution and Erdoğan’s ban was 
removed. He was able to run for office again. Six months after the elections Erdoğan was 
elected to the parliament from the city of Siirt. As soon as Erdoğan was elected Abdullah 
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Gül resigned, allowing Erdoğan to become Prime Minister; Gül became Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and deputy Prime Minister.  
After the election, Erdoğan began to visit the capitals of European countries. After 
he established personal contacts with his counterparts in Europe, he began implementing 
reforms to democratize the country opening order to help Turkey gain EU membership. 
The Penal code was changed, legal aspects of human rights problems were improved, and 
democratic reforms began to be implemented.243 Erdoğan’s relations with Muslim 
countries were balanced. For example, he developed Turkey’s relations with Greece 
while also engaging more proactively with Muslim Middle East countries. However, he 
never used Islam as political message in his foreign policy rhetoric. Contrary to Erbakan, 
Erdoğan’s main priority has always been EU membership.244 Erbakan paid his first visit 
to Iran to symbolize the orientation of his foreign policy. Erdoğan did the opposite, going 
to Europe to push for EU membership for Turkey. This era marks the highest level of 
Europeanization and democratization, more so than the Kemalists.245
In this chapter, I tried to demonstrate that the rise of Erbakan does not necessarily 
correspond in any substantial way with the gradual Islamization of Turkish society. The 
division within the party when Nur community and Qadiri tariqah members left 
 However, during 
Erdoğan’s tenure the debates continued whether he was sincere in the reforms or secretly 
wanting to pursue Islamic agenda.  
                                                 
243 Later on, the leaders of EU claimed that they found Erdoğan as the most determinant leader the Turkey 
in the way to EU. For more on Turkish political parties and their relationship with EU see Parslow 2007. 
244 For more on the EU- National View Movement relations see Taniyici 2003. 
245 The bearers of the torch of civilization in the country left empty-handed and transformed into more 
radical and closed groups that were anti-western if not anti democratic. 
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Erbakan’s party shows how different Islamic communities did have different opinions 
about the so called Islamic methods utilized in the political arena. Erbakan’s success is 
more representative of a broad public discontent with the other political parties on issues 
of efficiency, ethics, and corruption. Especially after 1990s, the success of the city 
mayors (Tayyip Erdogan being the most important one) in local governments contributed 
to Erbakan’s rise as the first Islamist prime minister. His ideological appeal was only a 
secondary factor in his electoral success in 1995. As his rhetoric became increasingly 
inflammatory, he lost the political support of the Nakshbendi tariqah and later the non-
religious vote. This eventually contributed to the rise of the Justice and Development 
Party, who learned from Erbakan the limits of rhetoric in maintaining public confidence.  
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Chapter V: NUR AND GULEN MOVEMENTS: HAQIQAH  
In this chapter, I argue that, the Nur and Gülen movements are modernist as well 
as traditionalists; they seek a middle-way to address problems endemic to modernity. 
Their traditionalism is based on the belief that the Quran is the last and most complete 
form of revelation, and as such can guide Muslim. They are modernists in the sense that 
they engage the changes inherent in modernity and are positive toward scientific 
advancements; i.e. they do not dismiss modernity in its scientific aspect, but they strongly 
criticize secularism as a self-professed universal ideology. Nursi wanted to contain the 
radical intrusion of modernity on Islam by returning to the primary sources of religious 
knowledge and making them relevant to the modern condition.  
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi inspired the most influential Islamic social movement in 
Turkey.246 The movement that has gathered around his ideas has overshadowed the 
historically dominant Naqshbandi order. There are different variants of this movement. 
This section will focus on the ideas of Said Nursi and Fethullah Gülen. Although the 
Gülen community is not recognized by the “Nur” title, both of these movements are 
commonly referred to as “the Nur community” or “Nurculuk”. The Nur community is a 
spiritual legacy of Said Nursi’s interpretation (tafseer) of the Quran; Nursi taught that the 
Quran is a source of divine light (Nur) that has the power to enlighten humanity.247
                                                 
246 Nursi is known as Bediuzzaman which means ‘non-pareil of the time’. See Mardin 1989, 23. After the 
‘Surname Law’, Nursi was given ‘Unlükul’ last name. Unlükul means famous servant [of God]. According 
to the official records, therefore, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi is called Said Unlükul. Said Nursi, however, has 
never used Unlükul name.  
247Vahide 2005b. 
 The 
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books he authored are known as Risale-i Nur (Epistles of Light)248
Said Nursi was born in southeastern Turkey 
, which later became 
the name of the community: Risale-i Nur community or simply Nur community.  
Said Nursi deserves attention because he was able to inspire a movement 
grounded on purely Islamic values without creating an “other”. To understand the 
development and transformation of Nursi’s approach to Islam we need to study the 
different stages in his life. His life has three important epochs. In the first phase, he was 
actively involved in politics until his visit to the National Parliament of Ankara in 1922 
which was established by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) and his friends. This phase is called 
Old Said (Eski Said). The second era began at the end of the Ottoman Empire and with 
the rise of the new republic. After he returned to Ankara from Istanbul, Nursi retired from 
his political activities and began to live a semi-secluded life in the city of Van, while the 
country was steadily being secularized from the top down. This era is called the New 
Said (Yeni Said). The “Third Said” Era (Ucuncu Said) more or less corresponds to the 
beginning of the multi-party era when the Democrat Party (Demokrat Party, DP) won the 
majority vote against the Republican People’s Party in 1950 until Nursi’s death in 1960. 
The Democrat Party promoted tolerant policies towards Muslims and Islam; Nursi openly 
supported them against the Republican People’s Party.  
Old Said Era (until 1920s): 
249
                                                 
248 Initially, Nursi named his books “Kelimat.” A Turkish word of Arabic origin Kelimat, means the Words. 
 during the turbulent years of the late 
Ottoman era. His hometown, Bitlis, was a major center for Islamic scholarly research. 
249 There are different accounts of when Said Nursi was born. Conversion problems between three different 
calendars caused this confusion. Two calendars used during the Ottoman era were Hicri (Islamic Lunar) 
calendar which was used for religious issues and Rumi (Ottoman Solar) calendar for administrative and 
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This Kurdish city was second only to Istanbul in the training of religious sciences.250 This 
region was officially named Kurdistan because the majority of the population was 
Kurdish Muslims.251 Nursi was Kurdish and learned Turkish in his late teens long after 
he mastered in Arabic and Persian, the two major languages taught in the traditional 
madrasa system in the Ottoman era. Majority of his writings either were originally in 
Arabic or penned down Turkish by his students. Nursi was born into a Sayyid family that 
was descendants of the prophet Muhammad.252 Being a descendant of prophet 
Muhammad has been a source of legitimacy for the ulema in the Islamic world in general 
and the Ottomans in particular.253 Vahide states that Nursi’s family was members of the 
Khalid al-Baghdadi branch of the Naqshbandi order.254
                                                                                                                                                 
economic issues. After 1926, Miladi (Gregorian) calendar began to be used. By interpreting some 
information in Nursi’s own books, Mardin, Kosoglu and many others argue that Nursi was born in 1873. 
Sahiner, the most famous biographer of Nursi, argues that Nursi was born in 1876. However, Nursi’s 
autobiography states that Nursi was born in 1877. Most recently, after a detailed analysis, an editorial 
article in Koprü (a journal published by young generation Nur scholars in Istanbul) argued that Nursi was 
born in 1878. I take 1878 as the most accurate account. For more see Mardin 1989; Kosoglu 2004, 25; 
Sahiner 2006, 40; Nursi 1996, 2122; Risale-i Nur Enstitusu 2000. 
250 Mardin argues that students of Khalid al-Bagdadadi branch of Naqshbandi order were instrumental in 
making the region a hub of Islamic studies. Mardin 2005 [1991]. See also Mardin’s book on Nursi where 
he describes the religious life in and around Bitlis; Mardin 1989. 
251 Bruinessen 1992, 247.  
252 Although it is a widely accepted issue among his followers, Hamid Algar contradicts with the 
“Sayyed”ness of Said Nursi. See Algar 2001. 
253 In one of his famous Hadith (sayings) Muhammad said that his family will descent from his daughter 
Fatima (wife of Ali and mothers of Husayn and Hasan). For Muslims in general and Muslims in Turkey in 
particular it is a traditional honor to establish a lineage to the “house of the prophet” known as Al-i Bayt 
(Ehli Beyt in Turkish). Initially it was an informal declaration however since the later periods of the 
Ottoman Empire Husayni and Hasani Muslims were officially recorded in government records due to their 
special tax exempt status.  
254 Vahide 2005b, 3. 
 Therefore Naqshbandi scholars 
gave him his first informal training in the Islamic sciences, especially the study of 
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jurisprudence255. However, Nursi never became a formal member of a Naqshbandi 
tariqah.256 In spite of the dominance of the Naqshbandi tariqah in the region, he instead 
insisted on his self-proclaimed spiritual adherence to the teachings of Abdulkadir 
Geylani.257 Nursi often showed a mastery over the traditional curriculum, despite his 
somewhat attenuated educational career.258
In the following years, Nursi pursued a career as a local master teaching while 
also acting as an arbitrator between the rival tribes in the region. Due to his independent 
resistance to influence from the religious and political authorities, he was named Mullah 
Said the Famous (Molla Said-i Meşhur). Because of this reputation, he was able to 
establish relationships with the local and regional authorities, i.e., governors. Sometime 
after 1896, Nursi met with Tahir Pasha, the governor of the city of Van. Tahir Pasha’s 
political and official activities informed Nursi about contemporary debates in Europe. He 
became Nursi’s gateway to the political and philosophical discussions in Europe 
concerning the future of Islam and the Ottoman Empire.
  
259
                                                 
255 Mardin 1994, 121. 
256 Vahide 2005a, 6-7.  
257 Geylani or Jilani is the founder of the Qadiri tariqah, a relatively less popular, but still highly esteemed 
order in Turkey. For more on Nursi’s emphasis on Geylani see Nursi 1996, 2083-2092. 
258 Said’s education only lasted three months. Serif Mardin says that because he was much younger than his 
peers were, Said’s educational career ended with a controversial graduation ceremony in 1888. Mardin 
1982, 68. 
259 Mardin 1982, 70. 
 One day Tahir Pasha 
informed Nursi that the secretary of the British House of Commons made remarks 
insulting to Muslims, their faith and the place of the Qur’an in their lives. From 
newspaper clippings that Tahir Pasha showed to Nursi, it became clear that Britain and 
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other regional players from Europe would disunite the Muslim world by demeaning Islam 
and Qur’an as its unifying factor.260 Nursi was motivated by the threat that hegemonic 
powers would attack Islam as a source of identity and empowerment among believers, to 
study Islam and make the promotion of the faith his life's work.261
Despite living in isolation from the large cosmopolitan cities, Nursi was following 
events both inside and outside of the country. He was informed about the major 
developments in the world. However, his focus was mainly on the changes within the 
Islamic world and the activity and perspective of reformist groups. In his book Divan-i 
Harbi Örfi Nursi states that “my predecessors in this matter (Islamic Unity –Ittihad) are 
Sheikh Cemaleddin-i Efgani (Afghani), the late Mufti of Egypt [Muhammad] Abduh, 
from the extremist [Turkish] scholars Ali Suavi, Hoca Tahsin and those who took Islamic 
Unity as their goals like Namik Kemal and Sultan Selim.”
 
262 Similar to Namik Kemal, 
one of the major figures of Ottomanist thought, Nursi wanted constitutionalism which 
will bring rule of law, freedom and and most importantly consultation263
                                                 
260 This event happened in the Islamic calendar year 1316 which corresponds roughly to May 1898-April 
1899. Necmeddin Şahiner argues that the British Secretary was (William Evart) Gladstone). Şahiner is the 
main source of this information. For more see Şahiner 2006, 80. However, Vahide, missing almost two 
years in calendar conversion, argues that 1316 corresponds to the turn of the century which is roughly two 
years after Gladstone died Vahide 2005b, 358. In line with Vahide’s explanation, Nursi probably learned of 
the remarks of Gladstone sometime after the latter made them.  
261 Vahide 2005a, 9; Vahide 2005b, 359. 
262 Nursi 1996, 1922. Nursi’s reference to Sultan Selim is to the Ottoman (Yavuz) Sultan Selim I not Selim 
III as many other scholars argued. 
263 Vahide 2005b, 59-62. 
 which he 
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considered as an Islamic requirement. Sultan Selim, on the other hand, wanted to bring 
all Muslims under a loosely connected administrative body.264
At this time, he realized that the traditional form of Islamic theology (kalam) was 
incapable of providing guidance and solutions to the challenges facing Islam.
 
265 Nursi’s 
followers argue that he did extensive readings in modern sciences at the residence of the 
governor. For traditional scholars (ulema) of the Ottoman madrasa system this was a 
challenging reform.266 Displeased by the progressive deterioration of the social and 
economic well being of the people, he began to look for new ways of reforming society 
via the educational system. In one of his later works, he proposes three primary reasons 
for the decay of the Islamic world: poverty (fakirlik), ignorance (cehalet) and (civil) 
unrest-conflicts (ihtilaf). In addition, he proposed three solutions to these problems: 
science (marifet), art (san’at) and unity (ittifak).267
The instrument Nursi intended to use to mediate and solve these problems was an 
educational institution, a university that could study and enact changes based on modern 
sciences and religion.
  
268
                                                 
264 During his eight-year sultanate, Sultan Selim fought series of wars with neighbouring Muslims countries 
who held the Islamic caliphate at the time. After winning the wars with Mamluks, Selim became the first 
Ottoman Caliph who left the administrative responsibilities of the newly conqurred lands to local nobles.  
265 Vahide 2005a, 8. 
266 Vahide 2005b, 27. 
267  Nursi 1996, 1964. 
268 Nursi said, “The enlightenment of the soul comes from religious sciences. The light of the mind comes 
from  modern sciences”. Therefore, he said, “We need to unite [modern] new sciences with the [religious] 
sciences of madrasas”. For more see Nursi 1996, 1955-1957. 
 In order to overcome the obstacles in the Muslim world in 
general and Eastern Turkey in particular he wanted to utilize the positive role of Islam in 
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society via education.269 The problems of ignorance and turmoil in the Muslim world, for 
Nursi, could only be resolved if people followed religious principles. Nursi wanted to 
unite regional communities from different backgrounds through the Medresetu’z-Zehra 
project. Therefore in the new university (in Nursi’s words house of sciences, darul funun) 
education would be in Arabic (vacip, meaning obligatory); Kurdish would be the second 
language (caiz, meaning permitted) and Turkish would be electives (lazim, meaning 
necessary).270 Although Nursi was in a highly Naqshbandi setting his university project 
was beyond Naqshbandi imagination which was limited to local madrasas.271 The 
university project was unorthodox, unusually modern flavored272 but necessary for Nursi. 
The reason Nursi produced a “modern flavored” project, however, was because the 
problems faced by his society were the products of modernity. He was flexible enough to 
accommodate global challenges within his own educational and cultural boundaries. As a 
result, after long years of establishing himself as a respected scholar in the eastern parts 
of the Empire, he left for Istanbul, the capital city of the Ottoman Empire, hoping to meet 
the Sultan in order to receive funding for his university project. It was late 1907 and 
Nursi was around 30 years old.273
                                                 
269 Although he considers the importance of a science university valid for all Muslims he specifically 
mentions Eastern Turkey as the main area for his project. Nursi says “Sark bir darulfununa muhtac” 
(East[ern Turkey] needs a science university). For more see Sahiner 2006, 152-158. 
270 Nursi 1996, 1956.  
271 Mardin argues that the influential Naqshbandi schools were not able to compete with missionary schools 
opened in the region by the Protestant missionaries. These schools were intended to support the local 
Armenian minority who at the time made up slightly less than one third of Bitlis’s 400,000 residents. 
Mardin 1982, 72. 
272 Mardin, 1989, 35. 
 
273 Vahide 2005a, 4-10. 
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When Nursi came to Istanbul, he found himself in the midst of debates regarding 
new ideas of constitutionalism, freedom and westernization. During these years, Nursi 
was heavily involved in political debates. After the proclamation of the Second 
Constitution (Ikinci Mesrutiyet)274 in July 1908, he gave lectures in support of the 
declaration of the constitution and the importance of freedom [of thought] for the well-
being of the Islamic community.275 The Second Constitution toppled the famous Ottoman 
Sultan, Abdulhamid II. Due to his pious life and strong support for Jerusalem and 
Palestine, he was a hero for many Islamists. However, in the opinion of Nursi, 
Abdulhamid’s authoritarian character precluded him from being considered heroic 
because his management style was ultimately counterproductive.276
He discussed the applicability of constitutionalism and its role in strengthening 
Islamic unity, and made the additional argument for a renewed focus on education as the 
most important way of promoting Islam in Turkish society. These discussions resulted in 
two important books: The Reasonings (Muhakemat) and The Debates (Munazarat), 
published in 1911 and 1913, respectively.
  
277
                                                 
274 Widely known as proclamation of freedom (Hurriyetin Ilani).  
275 In Turkish “Mesrutiyet her sahada bir hurriyeti uyandiracakti” (Constitutinalism will awaken freedom 
in all areas). Nursi 1996, 31. See also Vahide 2005b, 59-64; Nursi 1996, 55-60. 
276 Abdulhamid II came to power after the murder of the previous Ottoman Sultan. His life was surrounded 
by insecurity and strict control. As soon as he took the control of power, he established an intelligence 
organization and closed the parliament ending Turkey’s first parliamentary monarchy regime in 1878. See 
Beyhan 2002. Contrary to the conventional scholarship which see Islamists as a concrete block in support 
of the Ottoman State, many Abdulhamid-era Muslim scholars were against Abdulhamid’s “tyranny.” For 
example, Ismail Kara explains in detail the opposition sermons of Tunali Hilmi Bey. See Kara 1999.  
277 In the beginning of a recent edition of The Debates, the publisher’s note states that the book was first 
published in Islamic Calendar 1329 (Hicri) which is 1911 Common Era. However, Vahide and some other 
scholars argue that that the book was published in 1913. Şahiner argues that The Debates was published in 
1910. Şahiner probably confused the book with The Reasoning. See Vahide 2005b, 21; Şahiner 2006. 
 As a result of his publications and public 
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appearences, coming from the periphery of power center in Turkey, Said Nursi was quite 
successful in winning the recognition and respect of two major classes in Istanbul; the 
scholars and the soldiers/politicians. For Nursi the center of gravity was not necessarily 
the Ottoman state but the influential players within the state, the scholars and politicians. 
If he could influence these two classes, he felt, he would ultimately be able to influence 
the entire society.  
His aim was to link developments like constitutionalism, and other specifically 
modern issues, with the future of Islam. In 1911, he went to Damascus and gave one of 
his most memorable speeches in the Umayyad Mosque. This famous sermon is called the 
Sermon of Damascus (Hutbe-i Şamiye).278 In the sermon, Nursi explained the reasons for 
underdevelopment in the Islamic world and offered six solutions to what he defined as six 
moral and spiritual diseases then widespread in the Muslim world. The six diseases, 
according to Nursi, were the prevalence of hopelessness or despair in social life (Ye’s) , 
the absence of truthfulness in social and political life (Sidkin … Olmesi), the love of 
hostility (Adavate Muhabbet), ignoring the bonds that unite and strengthen the believers 
(Rabitalari bilmemek), pervasive despotism in the lives of people either at home or with 
other members of society (Istibdat), and the exclusive focus of people on personal 
aggrandizement (Menfaat-i Sahsiye, egocentricity).279
Nursi is distinct from many of his contemporaries in locating the problems of his 
time atomistically in the misbehaviors of individual human beings as actors rather than 
the environmental factors like foreign influence. He argued that hederived his cures for 
 
                                                 
278 Nursi 1996. 1961. 
279 Nursi 1996, 1961-1962. 
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these social ills from the [pharmacy of] Quran (eczahane-i Kur’aniye), for these diseases 
first effect the individual Muslim and then become pervasive in society.280 The cures 
Nursi offered are hope (Emel)281, truthfulness and trustworthiness (Sidk)282, mutual love 
among Muslims (Muhabbet),283 consultation (Mesveret),284 solidarity (Rabita)285, and 
freedom (Hurriyet-i Ser’iye).286
Until the outbreak of the World War I, Nursi traveled back and forth between 
Istanbul and Eastern Anatolia. While in eastern Anatolia, he defended and explained the 
inevitability of the developments taking place in Istanbul; while in Istanbul he lobbied for 
the university project for eastern Anatolia. Before being able to finish his University 
project WWI began, he became a commander in the army and fought on the Eastern 
Front against Russian and Armenian forces.
 The explanations he articulates target individual actors as 
agents capable of changing the future of the Islamic world. Although Said Nursi preferred 
a political method to cure society’s problems, it is noteworthy to see how even in the Old 
Said era, Nursi’s cures for the diseases in the society are also unit level explanations. 
287
                                                 
280 Şahiner 2006, 144-150; Nursi 1996, 1962. 
281 Nursi 1996, 1962-1965.  
282 Nursi 1996, 1966-1967. 
283 Nursi 1996, 1967-1968. 
284 Nursi 1996, 1968-1969. Here Nursi specifically mentions Mesveret-i Seriye meaning Colsultation as a 
requirement of the religion. 
285 Nursi 1996, 1969-1970 
286 By Hurriyet-i Ser’iye Nursi means that Islam supports freedom. Nursi 1996, 1970-1971. 
287 Nursi 1996, 2134-2135. 
 He was captured by the Russians in 1916, 
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and was only able to return to Istanbul after the Bolshevik Revolution. Afterwards, he 
lived in Istanbul on and off until the end of 1922.  
During his years in Istanbul, Nursi began to perceive at a deep level the almost 
unalterable changes in the religious character of society. As the Ottoman state declined in 
power, the educated elite preferred a western lifestyle to an Islamic one. Nursi warned his 
pupils about the impact of these changes in his publications and lectures.288 He had a 
productive life in Istanbul. He published books and became an active member in social 
organizations.289
He was not satisfied with the situation of the Muslim World. After WWI different 
independence movements emerged throughout Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), who 
left Istanbul for Anatolia after the invasion of Izmir in May 1919, led the most prominent 
and ultimately the most successful independence movement. Under coercion by the 
invading powers, the office of the Sheikh ul Islam (the highest religious authority) of the 
Istanbul Government issued a fatwa (Islamic legal opinion) against Mustafa Kemal’s 
independence movement in Anatolia.  However, Said Nursi supported the independence 
movement, and issued a counter fatwa.
 His actions were intended to promote an awareness and identification of 
the Islamic notion of all believers belonging to one Ummah. 
290
                                                 
288 Said Nursi was displeased with the developments of his age. He was one of the earliest scholars to 
recognize the impact of globalization in transforming the world in to a village. His revivalist predecessors, 
like Imam Rabbani and Khalid al-Baghdadi, were aware of the changing environment during their lives; 
however, none of the transformations taking place in their era was as far-reaching as the effect of 
secularism and modernization. 
289 He published 19 books. Vahide 2005a, 15. 
290 Vahide 2005a, 16. 
 He lost his faith in the Istanbul government’s 
ability to save the empire or promote the teachings of the religion. Apparantly, in these 
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days, he began to lose hope in politics as a method of serving the interests of religion. 
This feeling had been with him for some time but it only began to solidify at this time due 
to his age.291
From his own writings known as the Risale-i Nur collection , it is obvious that 
Nursi was comfortable with the idea of citizens becoming active in the political process; 
however, at the same time he retained a cautious attitude against the possible damages of 
politics. Nursi says that the purpose of writing Risale-i Nur is to serve God by teaching 
the necessity and benefits of faith (iman).
  
292 In this respect, Risale-i Nur’s main strength 
comes from the principle of sincerity (ikhlas or ihlas in Turkish).293 It does not pay 
attention to politics, but instead deals extensively with the issue of faith, purpose in life 
based on faith, and sincerity towards God in all one does. His intellectual focus was 
balanced between the promise of political power and the grave peril of possibly being 
overcome and corrupted by that power. When he finally realized the futility of pursuing 
positions in state institutions as a means to advance the cause of Islam, he ended his 
active political activity. He coined a famous saying: “I seek refuge in God from the Devil 
and Politics”.294
                                                 
291 For more on Nursi’s own account of transformation due to his age see Nursi 1996, 701-726. 
292 Nursi’s “20th Letter” specifically addresses Iman issue. For more Nursi 1996, 448. 
293 “Twentieth Flash” is about sincerity (ikhlas). See Nursi 1996, 662. 
294 In its Arabic origin (written in Turkish as in Risale-i Nur) “Euzu billahi min es Seytan ves Siyaset” This 
saying is in one of Nursi’s book called Sunuhat. It was written before 1920 and is not necessarily part of the 
core of the Risale-i Nur. Said Nursi also discussed the same issue in other places like his book Letters 
(Mektubat) which was written after 1926. For Sunuhat see Nursi 1996, 2050. 
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The end of Nursi’s active political life coincides with the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire.295 His change of attitude predates the Republican period and corresponds to the 
general failure of Islamists in gaining access to state power in a moral way. This was a 
direct result of the deterioration of the office of Sheikh al-Islam and the rise of the 
secularized bureaucracy which intensified an atomistic approach to the salvation of 
Muslims rather than an institutional one. In late 1922, Nursi accepted an invitation by the 
governmental body that represented the independence movement in Anatolia and went to 
Ankara.296 He attended a welcoming ceremony organized for him and gave a speech in 
the parliament. His visit to Ankara, where he met with the influential members of the 
parliament, increased his discontent with the materialism of the secular elite, and their 
blatant disregard for Islam as a legitimate point of reference in developing a national 
culture and identity. He tried to call the lawmakers to practice Islam by calling them to 
pray daily and perform other acts of worship for the sake of God. He even published a 
booklet about the importance of the five daily prayers.297
From the perspective of the secular elite in Ankara it must have been strange to 
listen to a scholar talking to them about the importance of belief in God and practicing 
religion while they themselves considered Islam to be the main cause of decline in the 
country. His experiences in Ankara might be considered as a peak of his transformation 
  
                                                 
295 Among other places, Nursi repeats his anti-political stance in “Lahikalar” (Addendum) which is a part 
of the Twentyseventh Letter (27. Mektub) published separately in Emirdag Lahikasi. Nursi 1996, 1797. 
296 In his sympathetic account of Nursi’s life, Akar argues that Nursi was invited to Ankara more than 
fifteen times some of which by Mustafa Kemal himself. See Akar 2008. 
297 Nursi stated this in different parts of his book. See Nursi 1996, 677 and 2138.  
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into a rather apolitical position.298 Nursi readily admitted that his efforts did not pay.299 
Although he was offered a government position Nursi rejected it and went back to Van, 
the city he left decades ago with a dream to study, teach, and live by the Quran. He 
decided to devote his life to the study of Quran one more time. He was perhaps willing to 
spend rest of his life in that cave.300
The Ankara Parliament declared the Turkish republic in October 29, 1923. By then the 
Ankara government had established its authority as the sole legitimate representative of 
the Turkish people. The early years of the republic witnessed one of the most 
comprehensive reforms in Turkish history. On March 3, 1924, the parliament enacted a 
major law named Unification of Education Law (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu). The 
unification of education law brought all educational institutions under governmental 
control. This resulted in the closure of all religious madrasa schools throughout the 
 Nursi stayed in the Cave-Madrasa where he only 
devoted his life to his students and the study of Quran.  
New Said Era (1920s – 1950): 
                                                 
298  Akbulut-Kuru and Kuru 2008. 
299 Nursi argues that in Ankara he saw a group of people in disbelief in God. Therefore he tried to refute the 
ideas of positivists (Naturalists, Tabiiyyun) by publishing some booklets on Nature. However, he admits 
that it did not work (tesirini gostermedi in Turkish). For more see the Epistle on Naure (Tabiat Risalesi) in 
Nursi 1996, 677. 
300 Nursi 1996, 2139. The cave famously known as Horhor Medresesi was mostly used by Sufi tariqah 
teachers as an informal and later an underground school. 
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country. On the same day, the office of Sheikh ul-Islam301 was closed and the Islamic 
caliphate was abolished.302
In 1925, the leading Kurdish groups, frustrated with the republican reforms in 
addition to not receiving the official promises of autonomy, rose up against the Ankara 
government. The groups led by the famous Kurdish religious figure, Sheikh Said. Sheikh 
Said asked for Said Nursi’s support. Nursi presented a quasi-Ottomanist argument and 
argued that the Turkish children of the Ottoman Empire should be respected because they 
served the cause of Islam for centuries. His principle concern was to ensure that Muslims 
did not engage in fighting with other Muslims.
  
303
Still, Sheikh Said and his followers began the uprising and declared a war against 
the Ankara government. The Sheikh Said Revolt, which is famous in Turkish as the 
“Seyh Said Isyani”, led to a series of events that subsequently undermined the position of 
Islam in modern Turkish history. Sheikh Said lost the war but the government backlash 
was directed at all sectors of state and society. First the moderate government of Fethi 
Okyar-Celal Bayar was forced by Mustafa Kemal’s closest associate, Colonel (Albay) 
Ismet, to resign. Ismet Pasa then formed a government and imposed martial law on the 
entire country. The Independence Tribunals (Istiklal Mahkemeleri) were established with 
 Other Kurdish groups responded with 
dissatisfaction; they argued that the new government and its policies were anti-Islam and 
should not be tolerated. Nursi still declined to legitimize inner conflict.  
                                                 
301 Sheikh ul Islam as the utmost religious authority was the head of the Ministry of Sharia and Religious 
Foundations (Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti) and oversaw the compatibility of the actions of the state with the 
Sharia constitution. 
302 Ahmad 1993, 80. 
303 For Nursi’s conversation with Kurdish commanders who ask for his support, see Şahiner 2006, 278-282. 
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the aim of officially indicting, prosecuting, and executing dissident voices. The Sheikh 
Said revolt gave the newly established government an opportunity to consolidate its 
power over state institutions and unite its forces against the dissident voices in order to 
forestall opposition to modernization reforms.304
Because of the Sheikh Said rebellion, Said Nursi was accused of sedition, taken 
by government officials, and sent to exile to Western Anatolia. His arrest caused great 
unrest in the region. According to Abdulkadir Badilli, one of Nursi's Kurdish students, 
the people of the Eastern region were shocked upon learning that Nursi was apprehended 
and exiled by the state. Despite newly drawn borders, these people had relatives and 
friends in the other newly partitioned countries of the region.
 The Independence Tribunals were 
instrumental in suppressing opposition through targeted, thorough, and widespread 
executions. 
305 His exile lasted over 30 
years until his death in 1960.306
The beginning of exile was the peak of the transformation of Nursi that began 
with his disillusionment in Istanbul. Nursi has always searched for new ways and 
methods to promote his ideals. He was never afraid of speaking truth to power. However, 
in his secluded years before the period of exile he was already beginning to become 
 
                                                 
304 Kosoglu 2004, 159. 
305 The locals offered him to take him away from the government officials and escape him to either Syria or 
Iran. Said rejected the offers and said that he had a mission to accomplish for this very Muslim society, 
children of a great nation that served to the religion of Islam. For more see Akar 2008, Sahiner 2006, 279-
280 and Nursi’s biography in Nursi 1996.  
306 According to a newspaper article published by followers of Nursi, Nursi answered a question on why he 
lived all his life in prisons. To him it is a result of his disagreements with Mustafa Kemal. When Nursi 
criticized, Mustafa Kemal for the excessive nature of his reforms Mustafa Kemal reportedly responded in 
an angry tone “You will live rest of your life in exile!” The article is cited in Erdagi 2007, 190. This is one 
of the rare sources that confirms the open disaggrement between Mustafa Kemal and Nursi.  
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softer. In his view, saving Islam meant not saving the Ottoman Empire but saving 
individual Muslims from straying from the guidance and spiritual nourishment offered by 
their religion. From this perspective, he was against any kind of rebellion or armed 
struggle against the authorities.  
In the early republican era, the closure of traditional religious schools, sufi orders 
and bans on all kinds of religious education made Muslims more alienated from their 
environment. In this situation, Nursi pushed for seclusion and reconstruction of the faith 
from inside out rather from the periphery. Nursi was not an armchair theoretician or 
speculator; he experienced and perceived his future project as an isolated endeavor for 
sincere believers.307
Comparing Nursi with Abduh and Qutb, Haddad says, “All three reformers 
focused on reinterpreting Islam for modern life. While Abduh struggles to modernize 
Islam and Qutb sought to Islamize modernity, Nursi’s program at the end of his life 
sought to contain modernity, to devise a course of life that proves the sufficiency of Islam 
whatever its environment.”
 On the other hand, he was not the only thinker to recognize the 
challenges and threats to his faith from changing environmental factors. There were 
influential figures who dealt with the same problems in the rest of the Middle East: 
Muhammad Abduh and Sayyid Qutb. 
308
                                                 
307 Haddad 2003, 238. 
308 Haddad 2003, 240. 
 His main aim was to establish an Islamic identity 
regardless of the environment. He called it “Haqiqah” (Truth). Haqiqah Islam gives 
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primacy to the belief in God.309 Faith in God (Iman), as all Muslims believe in, is the first 
principle in Islamic thought. However, Nursi’s interpretation of belief is distinct from 
Shariah and Tariqah-Islam in some major ways.310 First, contrary to Shariah Islam, Nursi 
does not think that there is only one level of belief. Those who have a strict interpretation 
of Islam overemphasize the differences between a believer and a disbeliever. For them if 
a person is a believer they automatically become superior to disbelievers, who are 
portrayed negatively. This stance acknowledges nominal Muslims as part of the ummah 
regardless of personal commitment to the ummah. One could be a Muslim but also 
aggressively secular and through a commitment to secularism they could undermine the 
needs of the ummah. Second, Nursi argues that belief is much more important than the 
spiritual pursuits such as spiritual pleasure, spiritual ecstasy, and keramat (supernatural 
actions).”311
In Nursi’s Haqiqah interpretation, there are two levels of belief, belief by 
imitation (taklidi iman) and belief by exploration (tahkiki iman).
  
312
                                                 
309 For Nursi, Haqiqah is a new method: a marriage of hearts and minds of the people. For more see Vahide 
2005a, 15-16. 
310 Vahide 2005a, 7. 
311 Nursi 1996, 355. 
312 Nursi 1996, 670. 
 Nursi argues that 
when tariqah members give excessive emphasis to spiritual pleasure limits the quality of 
the spiritual life of the entire community. It makes them weak and vulnerable to divisive 
internal and external factors. Among others, Nursi’s “fifth letter” in his book Letters is 
devoted entirely to this issue. This work functions to explain why Nursi differs from 
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Tariqah Islam and justifies why the bond between man and God should be more 
important than personal spiritual pleasures.313
Often times, members of Tariqah escape from the negative impact of society and 
prefer to live in seclusion seeking spiritual peace. Nursi, on the other hand, argued that 
the dire condition of the humanity in general and Muslims in particular necessitates 
believers to sacrifice and struggle in order to reconnect human beings with their spiritual 
nature. Nursi argued that the loss of faith in God had become a major impediment in 
interpersonal relations. He stated that to believe in God individuals should rely on the 
power of God rather than their limited personal will.
  
314
For Nursi, a chaotic and brutal portrayal of the world is only possible if human 
beings de-sacralize the world. This is a product of the bifurcation of reality into secular 
and sacred realms. Nursi argues that the fundamental principle of this kind of a world  is 
constant fight (jedal or cidal in Turkish). Jedal means conflict or chaos in a disorderly 
world.
 For Nursi, relying on God’s 
power makes people more just while ego-centric life leads to selfishness and injustice. He 
was giving spiritual solutions to temporal and material problems. 
315
                                                 
313 Nursi 1996, 6. 
314 Nursi 1996, 7. 
315 According to Nursi, the modern world “accepts ‘power’ as its point of reference in the life of society. It 
considers its aim to be ‘self interest’. The principle of its life is ‘conflict’ (cidal)”. Nursi 1996, 50. A similar 
version of this statement is also available, among others, in Said’s Words book. For more see Nursi 1996, 
183. 
We can argue that although they come from different perspectives those who 
escape from society for religious purposes and those who accept an atomized modern 
lifestyle are all divorced from the reality of God. They all fear that their environment will 
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have a negative impact on them. Usually both of these understandings lead to 
authoritarian state understandings, be it a leviathan or theocracy. 
This is evident in Nursi’s dissatisfaction with Abdulhamid II and early republican 
era policies. Said Nursi was unhappy with Abdulhamid II’s authoritarian policies 
intended to improve the position of Islam. That is why he supported the secular 
Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, ITC) because they 
promised freedom.316 However, after gaining power CUP continued authoritarian 
policies; eventually, its ideology gave birth to the Republican Peoples Party’s single party 
regime which did not keep its promises. Eventually Nursi realized that structural reforms 
were insufficient to bring about change, so he returned to his roots. The atomistic 
approach as a societal project is the main difference between the revivalist and political 
Islamists; the revivalists give primacy to human beings one by one while for political 
Islamists it is the state apparatus that might help them to reach out to other human beings 
to shape and reform them. As Haddad states, “despite these similarities in experience” 
Nursi and his contemporaries “developed a radically different idea about the means of 
saving the Muslim ummah”.317
In Barla Nursi began to develop his project one person at a time. He was living in 
a very remote and underdeveloped part of the country. Western Turkey, with its 
  
                                                 
316 Committee of Union and Progress was very popular not only within the bureaucracy but also among the 
religious scholars. The main commonality was their strong opposition to Abdulhamit II’s Islamist but 
authoritarian regime, As Kara informs us, Tunali Hilmi Bey, major bureaucrat, often times published 
religious sermons embedded with Quranic verses and Muhamad’s sayings which were outside of an 
ordinary bureaucrats expertise area. As Kara states, this was probably a result of ulema support to the 
bureaucracy in their fight against Abdulhamid. For more see Kara 1999, 66.  
317 Haddad 2003. 
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somewhat secular residents have been quite distant from religion, although not entirely 
against it. This was a perfect opportunity for Nursi to achieve his goals from scratch. The 
elements of human agency according to Nursi are all related to religion as a faith rather 
than to worldly pursuits or the state.318
His writings were less scholarly and more symbolic. Compared to his previous 
abstract works Nursi was becoming practical, trying to relate God to the practical aspect 
of people’s lives. He reminded his students of Allah as the cause of all causes 
(Musebbibul Esbab), all-powerful (Kadir) and shaper of everything (Rabb).
 Focusing on scripture gave Nursi the means to 
reconstruct an Islamic identity that relied on the power of Allah.  
319
                                                 
318 Zubaida makes the distinction that religion as a faith involves elements related to the belief system 
rather than to religion as an ideology of the state. For more see Zubaida 2005. 
319 Nursi 1996, 76. 
 His idea 
was to call Muslims to the omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient God. Often his 
explanations were filled with stories that he gathered from the people of Barla. In stories 
recounted by local residents, they recognized Nursi through his continuous meditation 
(zikir) at night. His humble life, founded on strong religious practices, influenced the 
local residents and caused the people to come to him for advice and guidance. Barla was 
a small village whose residents were poor, just like Nursi. He may have intentionally 
begun his dawah activities in this environment because of the familiarity of it. The first 
piece Nursi wrote as part of his newly emerging magnum opus Risale was on resurrection 
and the life after death (Haşir Risalesi). It appears that Nursi directly targeted 
strengthening the faith of the believers, which was totally a contradictionto his previous 
political stance. 
139 
 
The demographic characteristics of Nursi's followers changed as his message 
developed over time. He attracted a number of students (Risale-i Nur Talebesi) from all 
over the country who were interested in his teachings after having read Risale-i Nur. 
Nursi was able to author most of his major works in Barla, and, although he was in exile, 
he was attracting followers from the rest of the country who either read his short risale 
(letters), heard stories about him and were interested in meeting him, and other visitors 
who found his message relevant to their personal lives. The most important aspect of this 
newly forming movement was that it was connecting the people to the main textual 
sources of Islam. Traditionally Turkish society was socialized into Islam through the 
interpretive teachings of different tariqahs. Often these teachings contradicted the actual 
interpretation of the Quran by the prophet and the earliest Muslim community. However, 
in Barla there was neither established tariqah nor secular institutions to compete with 
Nursi’s message.  
His audience was, on the other hand, illiterate, at least in religious sciences. Until 
1926, the official alphabet in Turkey was a slightly different form of Arabic that was 
called Ottoman. However, there was a problem: Nursi was not good at writing in Turkish. 
He learned to speak Turkish in his teenage years, but did not write. Nursi, therefore, 
sought the help of his expanding student body to record his ideas and print them in 
Turkish.320
                                                 
320 In some cases, Nursi dictated some of his books when he was in jail. His followers used to write what he 
said to the cigarette papers and then take these draft copies to the villages where the entire village 
reproduced the books late at night secretly. This and many other stories are told by the sympathizers of 
Nursi’s followers in Erdagi 2007, 168. 
 He used to edit these works afterwards to check for errors and discrepancies. 
Student would reproduce these letters by hand because they did not have access to 
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printing presses. His followers in their native towns and cities later secretly disseminated 
these works.321
After the Oneness of Allah, as the sole creator and 'owner’ of the Day of 
Judgment, where all human beings will be resurrected, Nursi focused on issues like the 
role and normative example of Prophet Muhammad in Islam. His famous work on the 
importance of Prophet Muhammad is called Miracles of Muhammad (Mucizat-i 
Ahmediye).
 
322
Rising dominance of Western values, therefore, was an important issue for Nursi. 
He “categorically rejected the concept of the West as normative or of its values as 
universal.”
 In 19th Letter, Nursi commented on the importance of Prophet Muhammad 
and his tradition (Sunna) as the second pillar of religious knowledge. For him 
prophethood was the link between the divine and worldly. This was an identity 
construction based on the sources of Islam rather than outside references.  
323 For him, Muslim society had to be based on the sources of Islam itself. 
Nursi’s ideas on the West and its degenerating impact on Turkish society are not different 
from that of Tariqah or Shariah Islam. Similarly, Erbakan was also critical of the West. 
Major difference in Nursi’s ideas from these approaches and its impact on his followers 
has been the absence of a view based on constant conflict (or clash in Huntingtonian 
sense).324
                                                 
321 This method became so widespread that it even became a branch of Nur movement later on who 
opposed the printing of the Risale in Latin alphabet. This group was called the scribers (Yazicilar). 
Yazicilar who is now a small group within the Nur community argued that copying and distributing Risale 
in Arabic alphabet also kept the people connected with the Arabic scripture. 
322 In a long section of the Mektubat chapter see Nursi 1996, 387-447. 
323 Haddad 2003, 242. 
 His notion of self-reliance was instrumental to the process of identity 
324 Mardin 2005 [1991], 105. 
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formation; and, his harsh criticism of western dominance pinpointed Nursi’s account of 
the false dichotomies used within secular discourses and identity formation.325
His criticisms of western influence, however, were not essentialist because he did 
not view the West as a monolithic entity. He blended a detailed criticism of the 
anthropocentric tenets of modern thought with an appreciation of the progress and 
freedom of European society.
  
326 He had a twofold view of European culture: Christian 
Europe, which was based on the message of Jesus327 and the events of his life; and, 
secular materialism and positivism that is responsible for the general moral and spiritual 
corruption of modern societies, from notions of the state based on the security dilemma to 
the materialistic culture of modern capitalism.328
In Nursi’s terms, this is the “decadent” nature of the European Civilization.
 
329
                                                 
325 Haddad 2003. 
326 For somewhat critical analysis on Nursi’s view on “two Europe’s” see Brodeur 2005, 89-107, 
327 Nursi says “It shouldn’t be misunderstood, Europe is two. One that follows sciences that serve justice 
and rights that are beneficial for the social life through the inspiration it has received from the true religion 
of Christianity.” Nursi 1996, 643. 
328 “[I criticize] the second Europe, corrupted through the darkness of the philosophy of Naturalism, that 
took the humanity to vice and misguidance by supposing the evils of civilization to be virtuous.” Nursi 
1996, 643. See also Aydin 2005. 
329 Aydin 2005, 157. 
 
This decadent nature is apparent to Muslims who have faith and can easily recognize 
human constructs that lead one to deviate from faith. Moreover, in the pre-Istanbul and 
Istanbul periods of his life, he was skeptical of learning from the West or apologetic 
approaches to secularism. Because modern Europe was alienated from its Christian origin 
through the influence of secularism, Nursi was apprehensive about modernizing Islam 
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along the same lines: the bifurcation of the secular and sacred spheres. Nursi did not think 
that there was any need to reform or modernize Islam. He only attempts to ground people 
in the long forgotten principles of Islam. To counter the negative, centrifugal effects of 
modernity Nursi felt “that it was necessary to fashion a cadre of Muslims whose lives are 
centered on the Quran.”330
When Said Nursi emerged, the problem the Islamic world was encountering was 
not about the content of itiqad or its application. The problem was how these were 
perceived by the scholars and by the masses. In short, there was a need to articulate the 
values of Islam accessible to the modern mind. Supporters of Nursi claim that the 
movement is authentically traditionalist and is principally intended to rejuvenate the way 
Muslims think and practice.
 
331
For Nursi, belief required recognition of the oneness of God, His messengers, the 
Scriptures, angels, the day of Judgment, and predestination. Fiqh deals with how the 
belief system is applied in the social setting. In The Words, Nursi addresses the role of 
tradition, calling for a return to the original practice of the earliest Muslim community 
and identifying with the cumulative tradition that had developed throughout the Muslim 
world for centuries. In that regard, there is no fundamental difference between Nursi and 
 Disregarding the regional differences in its application, 
this issue involves the belief system (itiqad) and the jurisprudence (fiqh) of the Sunni 
Muslim world. In that regard, the Nur movement is a continuation of the 
mujaddidi/khalidi branch of the Naqshbandi movement.  
                                                 
330 Haddad 2003, 242. 
331 For more see Markham and Ozdemir 2005. 
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Qutb. The major difference however lies in his ability to create a message embedded in 
the tradition, critical of the West but not conflict-prone. 
Gülen Movement 
The personality of Said Nursi and his message to his followers was deeply rooted in the 
modern Muslim experience, but at the same time connected to and invigorated by 
tradition. This is also evident in the Gülen movement. The Gülen movement is an 
offshoot of the Nur movement. It is inspired by the ideas of the prominent Turkish 
Islamic scholar M. Fethullah Gülen. He deserves attention because of his support for 
Turkish democracy within a more complex domestic and international setting than his 
predecessors do.  
Gülen inspired the most prominent Islamic movement in contemporary Turkey. 
The movement inspired by his ideas has established over 200 private schools 
(elementary, secondary and high schools), over 100 university preparation courses, 3 
national newspaper companies— one directly controlled by the movement— hundreds of 
radio stations, international TV broadcasting companies and banks. Outside of Turkey, 
the movement is active in over 100 countries operating schools and educational 
institutions which are estimated to number around 500.332
                                                 
332 Different scholars give different numbers. See Agai 2003, 48. 
 It has been highly successful in 
mobilizing people from Turkey to volunteer in these activities. Fethullah Gülen’s success 
shows how inspirational his message is in the eyes of the volunteers, many of whom have 
never met with him.  
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There are mainly two factors contributing to this process. First, Gülen has 
consistently educated students in a systematic way since the early days of his tenure as a 
preacher. From his writings and lectures we learn that he was a man of self-sacrifice in 
educating a young and loyal student body that would disseminate his message throughout 
the world. He was active in promoting projects for the benefit of his community and he 
was an effective organizer who tried to lead his studebts by example (temsil in 
Turkish).333 Gülen’s immediate students who received their religious education directly 
from him accomplished many of the projects simply by following Gülen’s role model. 
Many of the projects in different parts of the world have been undertaken directly or 
indirectly by the studebts inspired by Gülen’s teachings. In order to reconstruct the ‘true 
message of Islam,’ Gülen chose loyal students to whom taught traditional Islamic 
sciences such as fiqh, Hadith, Arabic etc which required sacrifice.334
The second factor that made Gülen’s ideas so widespread in the country and 
abroad was his ability to convey his message in a way that is appealing to a younger 
audience. Since the early days of his preaching years, as a long-term project, Gülen was 
able to influence the many young students to sacrifice for a bigger cause; the wellbeing of 
the society. His main argument was, which proved successful, that the sacrifices they 
 To accomplish his 
demanding teaching responsibilities, like his predecessor Said Nursi, Gülen has never 
married.  
                                                 
333 For more on Gülen’s method see Gülen 1998a and Gülen 1991.  
334 For more about the life styles of Gülen’s students, his education method and curriculum see Canan 
2007. Gülen, on the other hand, has been criticized by many for not following the marriage tradition of 
Muhammad who strongly suggested marriage to Muslims. The idea of late marriage or nor marrying at all 
is promoted in a book published by Gülen community. The title of the book is “famous singles.” It has 
become a tradition in Gülen movement for his students to get married relatively later in their lives. 
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were making were commensurate with thoseof the earliest Islamic communities of 
Islam.335
The frequent and strong references given to the early years of Prophet 
Muhammad’s time have been the backbone of Gülen’s message. He would frequently tell 
the story of Mus’ab bin Umayr, one of the earliest Muslims and close companions of 
Prophet Muhammad. Mus'ab left his wealthy family and immigrated to Medina to 
support the cause of Prophet Muhammad. He did not know much about the religion 
except for couple of verses he heard from the prophet. However, this young man was able 
to convince the entire city of Medina and make it the home of Prophet Muhammad. Many 
of Gülen’s young followers took Musab as a nickname or named their male children after 
him. When the Cold War ended, Gülen was able to call upon “contemporary Mus'abs” to 
make the same sacrifice. The young generation of Gülen supporters embraced the idea of 
becoming agents of change for the message they got from Gülen’s teachings. The 
dynamic relationship between the structural and spiritual factors led to the unprecedented 
 For example, in the eyes of Gülen’s followers, prophet Muhammad’s journey 
from Mecca to Medina to seek asylum and security to spread his message resembles the 
current case of Fethullah Gülen's movement. At the end of the Cold War, he urged his 
followers to go Central Asia to establish institutions to help the people of the region with 
education and development. Gülen argued that the sacred immigration (Hijra) is a duty 
on their shoulders to help their brethren in Central Asia who suffered “eighty years of 
communist oppression.”  
                                                 
335 While Gülen’s immediate students are religious scholars with Islamic degrees, the followers who are 
inspired by Gülen and his students are mostly lay people with degrees other than Islamic studies.  
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success of Gülen (including his immediate students)  and increased its appeal among the 
younger generation.  
There are three major eras in the life of Gülen (and his movement). First, the local 
life which lasted from his birth until 1960s when he left his hometown. Second, national 
appeal from 1960s to 1990s. Gülen began his activities in the 1960s and when he got to 
1990s, his movement has become the most influential Islamic movement in the country. 
The third era from 1990s until present which corresponds to the internationalization of 
the movement. Beginning with 1990s Gülen ‘s students reached first to Central Asian 
Turkic Republics and as of today almost every country in the world has an interfaith 
dialogue or Turkish cultural center inspired by Gülen’s ideas. His life story will be used 
in order to further explain these stages. 
Local Life: Formative Years (1940s-1960s) 
He was born in 1938 in eastern Turkey into a Turkish family. The region is known for its 
religious-nationalist culture which produced a handful of religious scholars and 
nationalist politicians.336 Gülen’s family is originally from the city where Said Nursi was 
born (Ahlat town of Bitlis).337
                                                 
336 Hakan Yavuz describes the common culture as Dadas culture. Dadas people are known to be nationalist 
but not necessarily racist. See Yavuz 1999. However, within Dadas community Turkish nationalism still 
prevails strongly. 
337 Cities of Bitlis and neighbouring Siirt were, at the time, the religious centers of the Southeastern Turkey. 
 The population in this region is a diverse blend of Turks, 
Kurds and Arabs. Like his predecessor Said Nursi, Fethullah Gülen's family is also 
descended from Prophet Muhammad. According to his own records, Gülen's birth caused 
a tension between his family and the early republican state officials. Right after the birth 
of Gülen, his father, Ramiz wanted to name him ‘Muhammed Fethullah’ after the prophet 
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Muhammad. However, the government official who was in charge of registering the birth 
certificates rejected this name due to its religious connotations.  
It was secularism's heyday in Turkey. Angry with the registry officer, Gülen’s 
father left without registering his son. After a while, Ramiz was elected to the village 
administration and established friendship with the military sergeant in the town. Three 
years after Gülen’s birth, his father had another child. He took his military sergeant friend 
to the registry office with him. The Military sergeant ordered the officer to name the 
children the way Ramiz wanted. However, after the sergeant left, the registry officer 
named Fethullah without Muhammed and the other child Seyfullah (sword of God) 
instead of Sibghatullah (Paint of God) as the father originally wanted. That’s why 
Gülen’s official birthday is April 27, 1941, roughly 3 years later than the actual one. This 
event and how Gülen’s father dealt with it are remarkable examples of how Muslims deal 
with the state and its policies. Instead of direct confrontation, they find a 
nonconfrontational way within the state bureaucracy. It still looks like, however, at the 
end of this process Muslims get only some part of what they want. This give and take and 
mutual accommodations make up the journey of Islam within the secular state. 
In Gülen’s ideals, the influence of his teacher, Alvar Imami, is obvious.338 As a 
Sufi master, Alvar Imami’s message to Gülen was a classical Sufi principle that personal 
perfection is complete only if one serves to his/her God.339
                                                 
338 Erdogan 1995, 27-29. 
 In one of his famous poems, 
Alvar Imami shows how a Sufi should think and act contrary to whatever happens in a 
person’s life.  
339 Ersöz 1991. Fethullah Gülen wrote the foreword of this book.  
148 
 
Mevla Bizi Affede (May God forgive us) 
Bayram ol Bayram Olur (Festivals become real celebration) 
Curm-u Hatalar gide (May our sins go away) 
Bayram ol Bayram Olur (Festivals become real celebration) 
Gor ne guzel Iyd Olur (See how Festivals become real celebration) 
For his entire life, Alvar Imami lived in the same village and educated students. 
Therefore, in a more personal manner, he states that the most important time to cherish 
happiness would be the time when God forgives the sins. In Fethullah Gülen’s views, 
however, a more social devotion by serving God via helping people without thinking or 
expecting a return is praised. The social altruism that is based on his contacts with sufis 
in his early life marks a one step ahead in Sufism that becomes the main tenets of his life 
to come. In one of his recent writings Gülen mentions importance of people “who will 
feel the [pain] in their hearts about an oppressed child in so,e forgotten part of the 
world.”340
For the first time, Gülen met with the members of the Nur community in 1957. 
The lecture of one of Nursi’s student inspired Gülen to pursue dawah method of Nursi.
 Gülen’s preference of social action or sacrifice to Sufi seclusion is probably 
due to his early acquaintance with Said Nursi’s ideas. 
341 
He saw the ideal of self-sacrifice of the companions of prophet Muhammad (Sahaba ) in 
Said Nursi and his students. The companions of prophet Muhammad are important role 
models for Gülen342
                                                 
340 Cited in Gokcek 2007, p. 193 
341 For more see Fethullah Gülen Web Sitesi 2008a. Although Gülen was not able to meet with Said Nursi 
in his lifetime, he met with his students. Later Said Nursi’s books have become a source of inspiration for 
him. 
342 His book on the life of Muhammad is originally from his lectures Gülen delivered until 1980. See Gülen 
1997b. 
 because they emerged at a time when Arabian society was in a state 
of chaos. Yet, the companions of prophet Muhammad constantly struggled to fulfill the 
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message brought to them by prophet Muhammad. An objective assessment of their lives 
and accomplishments served to inspire Gülen and his students that the effort (jihad) they 
made on behalf of Islam would be successful, regardless of structural constraints.343
Gülen’s argument was simple. Outside social and economic pressure along with 
inner conflicts created by a wholly materialistic worldview create many problems in the 
lives of modern people. Gülen argued that modern life creates internal tensions within 
people between the material circumstances and the belief systems of faith. In this era, the 
role model for ordinary people cannot be saintly, but must come from the same 
environment. The example Gülen wanted to show to people was of ordinary Muslims 
who could live in the world and be successful and happy, but not be dominated, 
affectively, by the material aspects of modern life. They serve as examples of how a 
religious life uniquely leads to personal happiness and inner peace.
 
344
From the beginning, contrary to many Islamic movements in Turkey, Gülen was 
against a “saint-centered” religious approach. Many tariqahs, religious orders and 
religious communities establish their movements around the stories of saints and other 
charismatic figures who claim to have extraordinary spiritual qualities. Their followers 
believe that these self-proclaimed saints can see the future or cure illnesses.
 
345
                                                 
343 The reconstruction of the idea of jihad as a personal struggle rather than a wholly war has been dealt 
extensively in Gülen 1997a, 186-219. 
344 Kuru calls this a middle way. For more see Kuru 2003. 
345 Latif Erdogan’s interview with Gülen has highly detailed and first hand information on Gülen’s methods 
and critique of saint-centered Islam. For more see Erdogan 1995.  
 In Gülen’s 
view, this kind of elitist religious understanding alienates the masses from the message of 
God and instead elevates certain Sufi mystics above even the prophet, because they have 
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authoritative status among the uneducated population. Therefore, for Gülen any Islamic 
movement for reform must renew the faith based on prophetic tradition’s semi-
individualistic approach where each individual has the right and authority to claim 
responsibility rather than deferring it to saints who have supernatural qualities.  
In line with this reasoning, Richard Bulliet explains the importance of 
companions of prophet Muhammad as individual agents in Islam. Contrary to the 
established reading of Islamic history in the Muslim world and in Orientalist scholarship, 
Bulliet argues that we need to have a view from the edge, rather than the center, to be 
able to grasp the development of an Islamic society in the ages of turmoil and progress. 
Bulliet’s view from the edge is important because it directs scholarship to the peripheries 
of society to understand the religious transformation in Turkey by movements that had 
quietly gained momentum. As Bulliet states, “the view from the edge is not that from a 
geographical (or political) periphery. The edge in Islamic history exists wherever people 
make the decision to … rededicating themselves to Islam as the touchstone of their social 
identity, or recasting their Muslim identities in a modern urban context.”346
                                                 
346 Bulliet 1994, 9. 
  
The view from the edge recognizes that edge is the source that creates the center: 
it is a centripetal force. The centrifugal paradigms that prevail in scholarship on Islamic 
movements in general limit them from recognizing the fact that it is the periphery that is 
ultimately creating the center. Unfortunately, the centripetal forces are the least studied 
aspect of the Islamic movements in the world, and this applies equally to the Gülen 
movement. Bulliet argues that: 
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Muhammad and virtually all of the companions were Arabs who 
shared a common language, culture etc. These companions, 
particularly after the death of Muhammad became revered as 
repositories of knowledge about the prophet [and his tradition].347
Bulliet’s reading is accurate and just as relevant to the contemporary Muslim 
world as it was to the earliest period. In an age full of uncertainties and confusion the 
interpretation of the Qur’an and traditions of prophet Muhammad is plagued by 
reactionary and anachronistic interpretations by Islamic movements. Particularly 
noteworthy was the inability or unwillingness of the Islamic caliphate to institutionalize 
alternative means of giving authoritative Islamic answers to specifically modern 
problems. In the absence of an Islamic caliphate, and both a real and symbolic institution 
capable of uniting Muslims, the history of the earliest companions provides guidance to 
the contemporary Muslims who experience the similar problems.
 
348
This issue is particularly relevant to the Turkish Islamic case. The republican era 
in Turkey imposed secularization on the nation as a necessary means towards 
modernization. However, it was unable to generate a nationalist mythology beyond the 
image of Kemal Ataturk. Moreover, while the secular authorities promised prosperity, 
peace, and security as a corollary of modernization, they eventually failed to improve the 
lives of the masses. In addition, the rampant corruption and self-indulgence of some of 
the bureaucratic elite undermined their credibility. Gülen was able to appeal to early 
Islamic history as an alternative Turkish-Muslim history. The example of the prophet and 
his followers were contrasted favorably to the degenerate elite in Istanbul and Ankara. 
  
                                                 
347 Bulliet 1994. 
348 The prophetic tradition is important because it represents a body of knowledge that can be accessed by 
Muslims at any time in order to renew the Islamic belief system in times of turmoil and confusion. 
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Since the early days of his life, Gülen’s view on Islamic renewal has been based 
on the implementation of the prophetic tradition “in a modern urban context”. Fethullah 
Gülen’s position has been consistent with other Islamic movements in that he legitimizes 
his ideas as a return to tradition. The most important aspect of his interpretation of the 
prophetic tradition included the idea of teaching and conveying the message to the 
coming generations via a small group of loyal followings, similar to the Ashab-i Suffa of 
Medina.349 According to Muhammad Hamidullah, after prophet Muhammad migrated to 
Medina the southern part of the mosque (the first religious institution) in Quba was given 
to a group of students who spent all their days studying religion directly from the 
prophet.350 These students are called People of Suffa (Ashab-i Suffa), and numbered 
around 400. Their close connection with the Prophet (who also lived in the Mosque) is a 
source of information on the teachings and life of the prophet. This led to the centrality of 
hadith literature transmitted by the companions. There were major companions of the 
Prophet who lived with the Suffa group: Mus'ab ibn 'Umayr, 'Abdullah b. Mas'ud and 
Abu Hurayra351, who narrated by far the most hadith from the prophet. The contributions 
of these close companions of prophet Muhammad became the source of Islamic 
tradition.”352
                                                 
349 Some recent works emphasize the similarity between both methods. See Atay 2007. 
350 Hamidullah 1990, 768. 
351 Abu Hurayra’s position in the Islamic tradition is contested both by Shi’a and some other Sunni 
scholarship. For example, the number of the hadith he narrated is questioned by many although he is well 
respected in the Turkish Sunni community and by Fethullah Gülen himself. 
352 Bulliet also mentions this issue without giving reference to any specific companion. Bulliet 1994, 16 
  
Nationwide Opening: Reaching out to a Bigger Audience (1960s – 1990s) 
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Fethullah Gülen established his Ashab-i Suffa first in Edirne, a secular border town in 
North-Western Turkey. It was the first city he officially worked in after he left his 
hometown. In 1964, right after he began his job as Imam in Dar al-Hadith mosque he 
prepared a room for a group of students in order to teach them Islamic sciences.353 He 
was a devoted teacher to his students. His own accounts present this method as a sacrifice 
on his part for a better future of the students. He argues that he sacrificed for their 
intellectual and spiritual nourishment, so that, when they were properly trained and ready 
to enter the world, they would be willing to make sacrifices of their own for the 
society.354 Later on, Gülen’s study circle took a more established form where initial 10 
students began to study traditional Islamic sciences.355
After Fethullah Gülen finished his military service, he began to give lectures 
about Mawlana Jalal al Din Rumi. While secular scholars portrayed Rumi as a humanist 
and pantheist rather than an orthodox Sunni scholar and mystic, Gülen delivered lectures 
on Rumi’s dedication to the Hadith tradition.
 
356
                                                 
353 In his memoirs, he mentions how it was difficult to find students in Edirne which was weak in terms of 
God-consciousness. Erdogan 1995, 84-85.  
354 Fethullah Gülen Web Sitesi 2008b.  
355 A close student of Gülen, Ahmet Kurucan, mentions the long list of books Gülen used in his curriculum. 
For more see Kurucan 1997, 14. 
356 In his biography, he states that because he spoke Rumi’s poems and ideas first in their original Persian 
and then translated them into Turkish it had more effect on the audience. For more see, Fethullah Gülen 
Web Sitesi 2008b. 
 The respect Gülen showed for the 
religious authenticity of Rumi was an attempt on his part to rescue Rumi’s religious 
character from secular readings of Sufism. Rumi is popularly known as a poet and 
mystic, yet, for Gülen, Rumi’s entire system of thought and action was based on the 
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Quran and Sunna of prophet Muhammad. By emphasizing Rumi's attachment to the 
normative practice of prophet Muhammad, Gülen was able to move the discussion from 
literary concerns with the style of Rumi's verse to the affective influences on Rumi. The 
primary influence on Rumi was the traditional material and the general Quranic discourse 
on God, His messengers, the unseen world, the various examples used in the Quran about 
communities that disobeyed God. The thought of someone like Rumi, who has been 
romanticized in secular circles as a carrier of spiritual teachings, divorced from the 
sources of Islam of course, was actually part of a revivalist movement in thirteenth 
century Anatolia.357
In 1966, Fethullah Gülen was assigned to work in Izmir. Izmir had always been 
known as a secular region, dismissive towards religion. An Aegean Sea port city near 
Greece, Izmir presented some very profound challenges for Gülen. Ordinary people in the 
Aegean Sea region had previously been in contact with Said Nursi due to his years in 
exile in the region as well as the popularity of his treatises. However, they were informed 
about Nursi’s message only to the extent of intellectual assent and agreement. They had 
not yet come to understand that Nursi was doing more than just writing in order to spread 
ideas about spirituality, outside the context of duty and sacrifice. Nursi wanted to train 
and create agents of Islamic revival in the face of the onslaught of secularism. He laid the 
intellectual foundations for such a project. When Fethullah Gülen arrived in Izmir, he 
worked to transform the intellectual assent with the ideas of Nursi into obedience to 
 
                                                 
357 Thirty years after Gülen gave his first lecture on Rumi, his sympathizers named their first major 
institution in the USA after Rumi. Rumi Forum is a leading pro-Gülen institution involved in interfaith 
dialogue activities. 
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tradition and social activism. For the coming thirty years, secular Izmir would become 
the backbone of the Islamic movement of Gülen. 
The 1960s corresponded to the post- Nursi era for the Nur community. After his 
death in 1960, Nursi’s devout followers formed various communities under the leadership 
of his immediate students. This group was known as “older brothers” (Agabeyler). They 
were de facto leaders of the religious community and legacy of Nursi, though the absence 
of a charismatic leader made their efforts difficult. They tried to preserve the teachings of 
Nursi by strictly following his representation of tradition. There was a vacuum of 
leadership among the followers and student of Nursi which would come to be filled by 
Fethullah Gülen. In addition, just as he was able to re-represent the teachings of Rumi as 
an extension of orthodox Islam, Gülen emphasized that the writings of Nursi were less 
doctrinal treatises and more a call to action by believing Muslims.  
The Nur community, however, would later alienate Gülen by attempting to enter 
into the political arena in an alliance with the centrist Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP). 
Gülen repudiated this attempt to politicize the movement, distanced himself from the 
members that were taking the movement in this direction and renewed his focus on the 
prophetic tradition and educational activity. He was in an advantageous position to carry 
on the message and work of Said Nursi because he was well trained in the Islamic 
sciences: jurisprudence, Quranic exegesis, and hadith. Most other leaders within the Nur 
movement were dependent on the writings of Nursi for their Islamic education. Like 
Nursi, Gülen was fluent in Arabic and Persian, at least in terms of reading and 
interpreting the texts. His language skills gave him access to the sources of religious 
scholarship in rest of the Islamic World. No other Nur student was fluent in as many 
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Islamic languages. This diminished their appeal among the ordinary members of the Nur 
community. This is reflected in the quality of their scholarship and its application.  
Fethullah Gülen dedicated his time to training his students as agents of change. 
He felt as though this was the best way of effecting change in Turkey and the Muslim 
world. This method exponentially increased his influence in the instruction of Islam. He 
would focus on the development of a few of his brightest students, preparing a 
curriculum specifically for them. Then they would mature intellectually and work under 
his supervision in the development of the next group of students. From the time he 
distanced himself from the mainstream followers of Nursi over their political activity he 
established his movement on two pillars: religious education at a high level and the 
development of a capable student body through direct instruction.358
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Fethullah Gülen was still trying to find his 
place as an Islamic leader. He was not able to bring the followers of Nursi under his 
direction easily. Gülen brought unique skills to the Nur movement. Gülen's leadership 
made his students more efficient and effective. He first began to promote his ideas in 
local cafes where people spent their leisure time playing cards, drinking tea, smoking and 
 
                                                 
358 In June 1997 during a research trip in Amman, Jordan, I met with some students of Gülen. According to 
what they told me, Hocaefendi (Gülen’s nickname among his followers) was sick and he could not continue 
teaching series for a while. Therefore, Gülen sent them to Jordan to practice Arabic to benefit better from 
the courses. The students were M.A. and Ph.D. level theology students led by Fethullah Gülen’s long time 
friends. Initially, method of educating students was dismissed by other Muslim groups in general and the 
National View Movement in particular, but after 40 years Gülen has managed to establish an educational 
empire that is continuing to expand globally. Fethullah Gülen also benefits from having a loyal following 
that is dedicated to the cause of Islam and is willing to sacrifice their own ambitions, ego (nafs), for the 
sake of ideals inculcated into them by Gülen. After all, he took a detailed interest in their training and 
inspired them to do the same with their students. In this respect, he has revived and popularized one of the 
distinct features of the teacher-pupil relationship in Islam, particularly in Sufism. Sufi masters demanded 
absolute obedience from their pupils because they had already walked the path and were able to guide their 
disciples. 
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chatting late into the night. In his memoirs, Gülen says that his aim was to go to reach out 
to people who did not regularly attend the mosque.359 He wanted to reach more people 
and inspire them to be more interested and educated in religion. His followers rented 
large pubs or concert halls during the weekends and Gülen lectured on the benefits of 
creationism over Darwinism and gathered “thousands of people from all parts of the 
society.”360
Some scholars argue that the repression of Islamists in general and Gülen in 
particular, produced a diaspora mentality and group mythology that came to dominate the 
Islamist discourse in Turkey.
 No other religious community, including the Nur community, had organized 
anything like this.  
In the late 1970s, however, there was turmoil in Turkey. Divisive fights among 
college students and government officials brought parliament to a halt. Members were 
unable to elect a President for over 100 sessions. On September 12, 1980, the military 
overthrew the government and declared martial law throughout the country. Due to his 
prominent religious position in the Aegean region, Gülen was among those suspected by 
the government of political radicalism. For the next 6 years, he went underground in 
hiding from the military scrutiny. 
361
                                                 
359 Coffee House visits began in 1969. Erdogan 1995, 94-98.  
360 Gülen states that this was his first public conference in Izmir where he was able to reach people outside 
of mosque circle. Fethullah Gülen Web Sitesi 2008b.  
361 Aktay 2003, 132. 
 According to Yasin Aktay the Turkish diaspora is not 
related to demographics and population movement, but rather a discursive one where 
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people felt “being stranger and pariahs” in their own homelands.362
Aktay argues that this feeling of inhabiting a discursive diaspora resulted in a 
search for stability in the hearts and minds of the Islamist intellectuals, notably Fethullah 
Gülen. This search for stability resulted in a search for legitimization at the state level 
which created a pro-state, somewhat nationalistic stance within Islamic movements. 
Fethullah Gülen was patriotic; according to Yavuz, the frontier conditions of his 
hometown (Dadas culture) caused him to support the state
 He analyzed the ideas 
and lives of prominent contemporary Islamic figures like Mehmet Akif Ersoy (the author 
of the Turkish national anthem), Mustafa Sabri Efendi (the last shaikh ul Islam of the 
Ottoman Empire), Necip Fazil Kisakurek (a prominent Islamist poet), and Elmalili 
Hamdi Yazir (a well known religious scholar who authored the first Turkish 
interpretation of Qur’an). 
363
                                                 
362 This is originally a statement from a poem of Necip Fazil Kisakurek, prominent Islamist poet, who is 
respected by many Muslims including the leadership of Justice and Development Party government. The 
poem is cited in Aktay 2003, 132. 
363  Yavuz 1999, 594. 
 because of the fact that state 
apparatus provides security for its citizens, a strategy that has long been followed by the 
Naksibendi order as well.. However, Yavuz’s Dadas culture thesis is limited by its 
implicit structural bias. Nationalist sentiments stemming from the Dadas culture might 
have affected Gülen’s ideas but they were at most secondary to his universalistic Islamic 
message. Gülen’s ideas where nationalism plays a secondary role to religion is more 
similar to Neo-Ottomanism than any other ideology. Nationalist Dadas culture is often 
times associated with intolerant reactions towards pluralism within the society, 
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particularly against Kurds, Communists and non-Muslims while Gülen tried to preserve a 
tolerant stance.364
Gülen, however, differs from many of his predecessors in his pragmatism in 
utilizing new methods. His community used every means to reach out mainly to the 
young generation and try to create its own “golden generation.” Gülen mainly, if not 
solely, focused on the importance of education more than institutional reforms preferred 
by his predecessors. The term “Golden Generation” (Altin Nesil) refers to the ideal 
posterity in the mind of Fethullah Gülen which was formulated during lectures and 
writings since 1970s. From these writings and lectures, he continuously described an 
ideal generation which, he argued, will “save us spiritually.”
  
Gülen, on the other hand, did not search for stability, in the Hobbesian sense, but 
the realization of renewal (Tajdid), purifying society from social problems. Tajdid 
recognizes the fact that the values of a society degenerate over time and human beings 
lose their connection with God. The presence of this decay creates a sense of alienation 
from the ideal Islamic imaginary. Therefore, rather than focusing on state apparatus, 
Gülen, as his predecessor Nursi, aimed to continue their renewalist tradition which 
required focusing on the self than the other. In that regard, Gülen shares the same ideas 
with many of his Ottomanist predecessors who initiated a self-critique process.  
365
                                                 
364 In Gülen’s hometown, one missionary has been murdered by local nationalists who argued that 
missionary activities were threatening Islam. Gülen, of course, has never resorted to violence nor approved. 
365 Gülen 1977.  
 Referring to Plato’s 
Republic, Al Farabi’s The Virtuous City (Al Madina al Fadila), and the City of the Sun of 
Tommaso Campanella, Gülen argued that his ideal generation is not a theoretical 
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construct like these scholars but an ideal based on the practices of the “Rose Age” (Gül 
Devri), meaning the age of prophet Muhammad.366
In one of this lectures he gave before the 1980 coup, Fethullah Gülen mentions 
three main qualities of his ideal generation.
  
367
The second quality of the golden generation is [positive] action (hamle). Fethullah 
Gülen says that a person should first act to conquer his own soul, then propagate the 
message to other members of society. This is a social aspect of the golden generation. In 
his teachings, Gülen mention Jesus as an example of a prophet who was constantly 
purifying himself. Love was the main component of Jesus’s message, one idealized by 
 First is Love (Muhabbet). Gülen argues 
that members of the golden generation love both their friends and enemies. In mainstream 
identity formation literature that is influenced by social identity theories, a sense of 
belonging or personal identity is dependent upon the construction of an anti-self, an 
'other'. Gülen was aware of this tendency to articulate personal identity in opposition to 
others. In addition, he wanted to eliminate this kind of behavior among his followers. 
Therefore, he used the example of the companions of the prophet as well as the 
messenger himself to teach the art of love. Love, or the ability to look towards others 
sympathetically, stops the ego from using the external image to produce ideas about the 
self. 
                                                 
366 Gül Devri involves a literary symbolism popular among Islamists in Turkey. Out of respect, Muslim 
literary artists refrained from using Muhammad’s name openly. Therefore, in their works Muhammad has 
been referred as “Gül” (Rose) which is the favorite flower of the bird nightingale (Bülbül). Poets 
considered themselves as the bird Bülbül which constantly sang love songs in the absence of the beloved 
“Gül.” In one of his poems Mehmet Akif, the author of Turkish national anthem and proponent of 
Ottomanist thought, said, “Had I seen the rose age, I would be its nightingale” (Gul devrini gorseydim, o 
devrin bulbulu olurdum.)  
367 Gülen 1977.  
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Gülen. Jesus looked at people with love and did not understand his own identity against a 
negative appreciation of them. Gülen always gives references to the mission of Jesus, and 
how the golden generation is the last bearer of this message. The appreciation of the Nur 
community for Jesus, something promoted by Nursi, has given their movement an aspect 
of spiritual humility. 
The third quality of the golden generation was self-criticism (murakabe). 
Considering the date of this lecture (1977) when conflicting sides of a polarized Turkish 
society were attacking one another, Gülen must have been calling upon people to be 
mindful of how they behave towards one another, and before acting, to be mindful of 
how they speak to one another, and before speaking, to be mindful of how they think 
about others. It is on the level of thought that the hatred of Turks for one another is 
formulated. They act out these generic identities upon one another. Again one can look to 
Jesus, the prophet Muhammad, or his companions as ideals of people who were self-
critical, not externalizing their judgmental faculties.368
After the 1980 coup, the military government shut down all student dormitories 
run by the Muslim communities. These dormitories were mostly non-profit organizations 
(vakif), so it was easy for the military administration to takeover these institutions and 
reallocate their resources. At this point Gülen’s community was operating some student 
dormitories for high school and college students. To keep the institutions safe from 
 
                                                 
368 Gülen shared similar ideas in his first religious lecture he gave in Yeni Cami of Istanbul on August 26, 
1977. The topic of the lecture was a call for Muslims to criticize themselves before blaming others.  
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government takeover, Gülen’s followers switched all the non-profit institutions to for-
profit private schools.369
These schools and institutions are now associated with high level science 
education in Turkey. The winners of national and international science olympiads are 
often from these schools. Why is science so important for Gülen? The answer goes back 
to Said Nursi, who saw the problems of the Muslim world as related to two issues; 
rejection of religion in scientific education and rejection of sciences in the religious life. 
Fethullah Gülen, by opening these schools, brought scientific education back into the 
lives of Muslims. In addition, in late 1979 Gülen's community began to publish Sizinti, a 
monthly popular magazine that focused on issues important to the Gülen community: 
proving Darwinism false and supporting creationism. The importance of creationism and 
  
The first known institution of the Gülen community would be Yamanlar Private 
High School located in Izmir where Gülen preached for years. It was established in 1982. 
Other major institutions which are now leading national private high schools are Fatih 
College - Istanbul (1982), Samanyolu College –Ankara (1983). Later, establishing private 
high schools became one of the main methods of the Gülen community. There are an 
estimated 300 private schools in Turkey. Due to the university entrance system, college 
preparation institutions are also popular in Turkey. The Gülen community has around 
hundreds of these institutions which serves as another venue to build relationships with 
students.  
                                                 
369 Traditionally private schools were businesses of elite secular Turks in big cities while student 
dormitories and Qur’anic schools were traditional Muslim organizations.  
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the existence of God were necessary because of the rise of communism and scientific 
atheism.  
In the media sector the most important accomplishment is the establishment of the 
Zaman newspaper in 1986, right when Fethullah Gülen’s underground life ended. Zaman, 
which is currently the bestselling newspaper in Turkey, was established together with 
different Muslims groups, and later solely controlled by the Gülen community.370
With the end of the Cold War came the internationalization of the Gülen community. It 
was the ability of the movement to forsee the transformation of the world politics and 
find the opportunity to develop a new phase in their dawah method.
 Until 
the 1990s Gülen movement's activities were given little media coverage. Due to its local 
and decentralized structure the movement was never adequately represented in the media, 
academia and in policy circles.  
End of the Cold War: Internationalisation of the Movement: (1990s- present) 
371
                                                 
370 The establishment and purchasing of the Zaman newspaper show the rising economic power of Gülen 
community and its loosely connected members. 
 These were the 
results of Gülen’s speeches beginning in late 1980s when he began to preach about the 
importance of re-connecting with the people of Central Asia. He knew that once his 
followers saw what the material and spiritual condition of the Central Asian peoples, after 
371 In one of his recent books, Ali Bulac explains the very first activities of Gülen movement. Bulac says 
that on January 11, 1990 almost two months after the collapse of the Berlin Wall 11 volunteers from Gülen 
movement went to Tblisi, Georgia. This was the very first step. Three months after that in May 28, 1990 
another group of volunteers (this time 37 businessmen) went to a long trip to visit Georgia, Azarbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgysystan and Tajikistan. However, Bulac, a major Muslim thinker in Turkey, 
seems critical of Gülen schools. He does not find these activities Islamic enough. For more see Bulac 2007, 
281-305.  
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coercive state secularism, they would be inspired in their activism and inspiring in their 
call to Islam. For Gülen this was a paypack to their ancestors.372
Initial support came from the newly elected President Turgut Özal. Özal saw the 
Gülen movement as a fulfillment of his vision. Originally a member of the Naqshbandi 
movement, Özal was able to rise to the highest ranking position in the country due to his 
ability to maneuver within bureaucratic circles. Özal was the person who began the 
liberalization of the economy and opening the country to the world market. His policy 
program intersected with the activities of the Gülen community, and Özal always helped 
the community during his short tenure in presidential office.
. 
Opening schools in Central Asia had a transformative effect on the movement. 
First, it made the community dynamic in terms of its cultural horizons and educational 
capacity. Students from the Gülen schools began graduating from college and working in 
these new institutions early 1990s. Second, this Central Asian expansion was the first 
step in internationalization of the community, transcending national borders and state 
allegiances.  
373
In Central Asia, the Gülen community opened schools similar to the ones in 
Turkey.
  
374
                                                 
372 The influence of Naqshbandi movements, was the agent for the Islamization of the Asia Minor. Some 
scholars argue that the Islamization of Anatolia was due to missionary activities as well as voluntary 
conversion on the part of the invading Turkish people inspired mainly by Naqshbandism coming from 
Central Asia. Koprulu and Lutfi Barkan argue that the mass movement of Turks from Central Asia 
inundated Anatolia with invading Turkish tribes, and that this influx of people is responsible for the 
Islamization of AnatoliaBarkan 1942; Koprulu 1992. Koprulu’s book was originally published in the early 
1920’s before the establishment of the Turkish republic. The Original text is written in Ottoman Turkish 
(with Arabic letters). 
373 He unexpectedly passed away in 1993.  
 From the early writings and speeches of Gülen it is not clear what the 
374 Demir, Cengiz and Akkok 2000. 
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movement exactly knew about the region. Considering the enmity between Turkey and 
the USSR during the Cold War there had been contact between Turkish people and their 
Central Asian brethren. Fethullah Gülen’s post-Cold War speeches were intended to 
create a sentimental connection between his followers and the newly independent states. 
For example, he mentioned that there was a place named Mengucistan that needed help. 
This place only existed in the region during the pre-Ottoman period. Aside from the 
material weakness of the arguments, Gülen had spiritual authority behind his claims. He 
was essentially asking his followers to sacrifice for a greater cause, a greater effort, a 
Jihad. His definition of jihad is based on spiritual principles of service to the community. 
It is struggle between the self and the soul through humanitarian work. Gülen’s specialty 
was education. This spiritual connection did not require material evidence and the 
members of the Gülen movement began to spread their message. 
For many in Turkey this was exporting "Turkish Model" to a region which was 
under Iranian and Wahhabi influence. In policy circles, especially with U.S. support, the 
Turkish model of a secular state with a moderate pro-western Islam was the most highly 
regarded alternative. The international support for the Turkish Model also contributed to 
the expansion of the Gülen community in the region without any impediment until 
suspicion and resistance replaced the “cautious acquiescence of Russia” and some other 
Central Asian states.375 At times the activities of the movement was considered too pro–
American, and schools run by Gülen community both in Russia and Uzbekistan were 
closed by the state in late 2000.376
                                                 
375 Mohiaddin Mesbahi explains the limits of the “Turkish Model” in the region. Mesbahi 1994, 217-224. 
  
376 The school closures in Russia were temporary while in Uzbekistan Gülen community’s schools closed 
permanently. 
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Gülen welcomed the image of himself and his movement as moderate 
representatives of Turkish Islam. Any analysis that views the expansion of the Gülen 
community’s activities as a regional pan-Turkish or pan-Islamist project would be valid 
in its understanding of certain particulars of the movement’s history and organization but 
would altogether misunderstand the inner dynamics of the movement. Their positions vis-
à-vis the major powers were not dependent on fear of punishment or hope for rewards 
because they were acting on ideas which were deeply grounded in the teachings of Islam. 
Gülen often times stated that fear, hope, and love should only be directed towards God, 
because only God is worthy of such attention.377
Gülen movement’s activities soon became so popular and well recognized that 
they had to justify their activity, on secular grounds, to the ruling regime. He met with 
politicians, party leaders and eventually with the Prime Minister Tansu Ciller
 
378 on 
November 11, 1994. Gülen was already known throughout society but this was the first 
time his community was given recognition on the governmental level.379 In 1994, 
Gülen’s close associates founded the Foundation for Journalists and Writers (Gazeteciler 
ve Yazarlar Vakfi) 380 which became the venue for his (interfaith) dialogue activities.381
                                                 
377 For more, see fear (havf), hope (reca) and love (ask) articles in Gülen 1994. 
378 Ciller is Turkey’s first female Prime Minister elected from center right TPP ticket. 
379 Fethullah Gülen began to give interviews to leading newspapers. For example, Sabah and Hurriyet 
published interviews with Gülen same day (January 23, 1995) due to his rising popularity. 
380 In the opening ceremony, Fethullah Gülen stated that Turkish democracy is so ingrained in the masses 
that in the future there could be no retreat from it. For more see Sevindi 2008. In his works Gülen deals 
with this issue in depth. Giving a moral perspective based on ihsan principle, he argued that a sacrifice of 
ethical values for temporal gains results in failure both in the world and in the hereafter. Those who inherit 
the world, he says, should not try to dominate it, but try to establish justice and wellbeing in it. For Gülen’s 
ideas on democracy, see Gülen 1998b.  
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However, these diaologue activities both inside and outside of the country did not save 
Gülen from Kemalist scrutiny. His movement’s rising power became the major sign of 
threat in the eyes of the secular establishment who saw the rise of religion in public 
sphere as a direct challenge to its very own security. On March 21, 1999, Gülen went to 
US for medical treatment amidst legal prosecutions.Since then Gülen was acquitted from 
all the charges placed against him. He still resides in the USA for over a decade without 
ever returning to Turkey.  
In this chapter, I argued that Nur and Gülen movements focused on the 
Islamization of the individual because Nursi was afraid of the corrupting influences of 
political power. They wanted to propagate the practice of Islam without however 
investing all their energy in gaining control of state institutions. For example, Fethullah 
Gülen dedicated his life to training student whom he knew would one day have the 
opportunity to work in powerful institutions. He had faith that individuals and not 
institutions were the agents of change in society. The method he use to accomplish his 
Islamic program, therefore, were educational: schools, media, and publications.  
Six years after Fethullah Gülen’s message, a former member of Necmettin 
Erbakan’s Islamist National View Movement, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, founded the 
Justice and Development Party, promoting democratic values, human rights and a new 
political agenda towards the EU. In blatant disregard of the Ottoman experiences of 
pluralism, constitutionalism or even the traditional millet system rooted in the Ottoman 
Empire, essentialist scholars argued that rather than a continuation of democracy, there is 
                                                                                                                                                 
381 He met with Greek Orthodox Patriarch Barthalemeos on April 4, 1996. Later On February 9, 1998 he 
met with Pope John Paul II in Vatican. On February 25, 1998 he met with Chief Rabbi of Israel in Istanbul.  
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an abrupt transformation in Turkish politics concerning the place of religion in politics. It 
is, therefore, difficult for this kind of scholarship to understand the democratic claims of 
the Islamic movements.  
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Chapter VI: AK PARTY AND NEO-OTTOMANISM 
This chapter analyzes how and to what extent the Justice and Development Party 
has been influenced by all three Islamic approaches. The different modes of the Islamic 
approaches examined in this work lead to different interests, goals, and strategies; these 
all have different political implications. So, what is the relationship between these Islamic 
approaches (their self-definitions and political aspirations) and Justice and Development 
Party’s ideology? A closer look at the ideas championed by AK Party and its major 
figures show that they are committed to transforming the country more than previous 
governments. Many secular leaders consider this to be a counter-revolution (karsi 
devrim).382
                                                 
382 In their columns, Taha Akyol and Mehmet Barslas criticized seculars who call AK Party policies as 
‘counter revolution’. For more see Milliyet newspaper March 24, 2006, Hurriyet newspaper September 28, 
2007. 
  
They argue that AK Party is a new version of Erbakan’s Islamist National View 
Movement. Others argue that Erdogan’s political ideology was shaped by his Naqshbandi 
background, which contradicted Erbakan’s ideology. Recently scholars suggested that 
Erdogan had close ties with Nur community’s Fethullah Gülen, who was seen as 
supportive of a US backed “Turkish Model” project favouring a moderate Islam in the 
Middle East. Since the AK Party came to office they have demonstrated similarities with 
the Islamic movements studied above. This chapter will argue that the similarity in policy 
making is incidental, a product of a common religious heritage and that the policies of 
AK Party have been sui generis, an authentic creation of its own decision makers. 
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Since the foundation of AK Party, they had one major obstacle: the entrenched 
Kemalist military posing as “guardians of the state.”383 As a result, some scholars argued 
that AK Pary deliberately tried to “avoid a head-on collision with the military.”384
The polarization between Kemalists and Islamists in the political arena had 
already widened before the Justice and Development Party’s electoral victories. Erbakan 
had previously been forced to resign from office because of a military coup. For some 
scholars this was indicative of Huntington’s ‘torn country’ thesis.
 This 
case is representative of how Islamic groups react to similar events in different ways. 
Contrary to AK Party’s predecessor Islamist National View Movement, which had 
deliberately popularized political slogans, the way AK Party handled its relations with the 
Kemalist Military was similar to the strategy pursued by the Gülen group. Naqshbandi 
groups, for their part, were vocal in their critique of the state, but mostly focused on their 
own internal social activities. 
385
From the very start, the JDP [Justice and Development Party] leaders 
contended that they are a mainstream party with conservative center-right 
 This was the first 
problem confronting the Justice and Development Party after its victory in the November 
2002 elections in Turkey. The question was what kind of a policy the Justice and 
Development Party would follow within the boundaries of the Kemalist regime? Ozcan, a 
prominent Turkish political scientist, summaries the new identity of the Justice and 
Development Party: 
                                                 
383 The idea of “guardians of the state” is appropriate in analyzing the role of the military in poitics. Its 
relevance to Turkey was studied by Tamkoc 1976. 
384 Ozcan 2002, 1. 
385 Robins 2007, 289. 
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credentials. Party leaders continually represented themselves as successors 
of liberal/conservative Democrat Party of the 1950s and the Motherland 
Party of the 1980s in contrast to the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) and its 
successor Virtue Party. Party documents and official statements suggest 
that JDP [Justice and Development Party] is determined to take a different 
approach in foreign affairs than the Islamist tradition from which the 
leaders have hailed.386
The major difference between the Justice and Development Party and its failed 
predecessors was the self-conscious and active attempt by the AK Party to be a centrist 
party sympathetic to the demands of both political left and right. Though mostly 
practicing Muslims, the Justice and Development Party party members publicly declared 
their acceptance of the secular system. The significance of Justice and Development 
Party’s challenge was to prove that it was not a marginal party coming from the periphery 
to challenge the political center but transform it from within while still holding on to 
centrist positions. The first major challenge to the traditional way of doing politics was 
Justice and Development Party’s handling of the Cyprus crisis. In 2003, Justice and 
Development Party took an enormous political risk and changed Turkey’s forty-year long 
policy towards Cyprus to be in line with EU recommendations.
  
387
The major shift from their previous position shows that AK Party leadership acted 
as an active agent of change rather than representing status quo in the country and within 
the overall Islamic community. Their policies were a result of calculated attempts that 
 This is representative 
of the differences between the new type of Islamist, Justice and Development Party, and 
the old Muslim parties. Justice and Development Party introduced new approaches to 
issues not ordinarily considered Islamic. 
                                                 
386 Ozcan 2003, 2. 
387 A Turkish magazine revealed that AK Party’s Cyprus policy almost caused a coup d’etat in 2004; it 
failed only due to a division within the army brass. Taspinar 2008, 29. 
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have historical relevance to conservative Muslim mindset or part of a deliberate project 
rooted in historical depth. AK Party leadership justified their new position by referring to 
the richness of Turkish history with special reference to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, 
AK Party’s references to historical depth and its transformative impact of their ideas on 
Turkish politics would be difficult to understand without referring to the Neo-Ottoman 
ideology of the late Ottoman era. This historical connection enables AK Party leaders to 
have a useful toolbox that they can use both for deep-rooted tradition based identity 
formation and flexibility it brings with its eclectic nature. Every new reading of history is 
remaking it according to the conditions of the today. Neo-Ottomanism, therefore, has 
been a strong and reliable reference for Turks who wanted to preserve their identities in a 
modern world. 
With special reference to the preservation of the Ottoman State, Ottomanism 
emerged in an eclectic way in order to incorporate Islamic principles like freedom, justice 
and consultation into a political arena that was increasingly dominated by the secular 
European concepts of the 19th century Europe. Interestingly, Ahmet Davutoğlu,388
                                                 
388 Ahmet Davutoglu is Justice and Development Party’s Minister of Foreign Affairs who is the man behind 
Turkey’s new foreign policy. Previously he was the chief advisor in the Justice and Development Party 
government. He articulated his ideas on Turkish Foreign Policy extensively in a number of seminal book. 
Davutoglu: 2002, 2004. Bilgin, 2008 compares Justice and Development Party policies with its Islamic 
predecessor where she argues that new foreign policy is not Islamist. Murinson 2006 specifically examines 
Davutoglu’s ‘zero problem’ and ‘strategic depth’ concepts. 
 the 
architect of Justice and Development Party’s foreign policy has written one of the most 
articulate treatments of Ottomanism and its relevance to contemporary Turkey. He gives 
important insight on the emergence of Ottomanism during the late Ottoman era and how 
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it represents similarities with today’s Neo-Ottomanism.389 For Davutoğlu there are two 
main factors contributing to the rise of Ottomanism. As a political ideology, it emerged at 
a time when late Ottoman era leaders wanted to limit the influence of post-French 
Revolution Europe’s nationalism on multi-cultural multi-ethnic Ottoman State.390
The second important factor was the emergence of the new European Order of 
1815 after the Vienna Congress and the Ottoman desire to have a place in it.
  
391 As a 
result, Ottomanism became an umbrella designation for the attempts to unite the 
Empire’s dissident nations with newly coined terms like Ottoman nationality 
(Osmanlilik) and homeland (Vatan) while at the same time trying to keep the Empire in 
line with the new developments in the European order.392
Major figures of the Ottomanist ideology were Sinasi, Namik Kemal and Ali 
Suavi who began to propogate their ideas actively in and around 1865.
 The most important result of 
this process was the Tanzimat reforms (1839) when the Ottoman leadership began to give 
equal rights to its citizens and initiate reforms that eventually limited Sultan’s power.  
393
                                                 
389 Davutoglu 2002. 
390 Nationalist movements were gaining among the Ottoman Empire’s Greek, Bulgarian, Albanian, Serbian, 
Croatian, Armenian people to the North, and its Arabic population in the South. Kurdish nationalism 
emerged much later.  
391 Davutoglu 2002, 85. 
392 In this period the Greek War of Independence lasted nine years between 1821 and 1829 ending with the 
major loss of land for the the Ottomans. 
393 Namik Kemal was the first Ottoman to formulate the idea of homeland that people can associate 
themselves with it as an ideal rather than a piece of land. Aksin 2007, 34-35; Shaw 1977, 131-132. 
 They were all 
products of Tanzimat reforms; they had secular educations in newly established European 
style schools where they learned western languages and concepts of governance. 
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However, they also had a deep-rooted respect for religion and tradition including the 
Sultan himself. In order to keep the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman State 
together in an era of rising nationalist sentiments, they tried to achieve Unity of 
Nationalities (Ittihad-i Anasir) regardless of their racial background. They believed that 
different nationalities and millets (people of different religions) could be unified under an 
Ottoman ideal which did not rely on religious allegiances but a new western concept of 
citizenship disseminated by a pro-Ottoman (though not Islamic) education system.394
Ottomanism argued for a free political system based on a constitution with a 
parliament, and limited power for the Sultan. They took their ideas about 
constitutionalism and parliamentary system from European thinkers (some of with whom 
they personally identified with)
 
395 but they were able to modify it into an overall Islamic 
tradition. Free democratic system was called Nizam-i Serbestane, Constitutionalism was 
called Nizam-i Esasi and Parliament was called Shura-yi Ummet (Consultation of the 
Umma) 396
The ideal of Ottomanism was to keep different ethnic groups and religions under 
one roof; it was one last attempt by the state to reassert its domination over territory 
which was quickly being liberated by nationalist movements. With the advance of the 
 which were all justified with the Islamic principles like hurriyet (freedom), 
adalet (justice) and mesveret (consultation). Ottomanists were instrumental, at least on 
the intellectual level, in bringing the Sultan Abdulhamid II to proclaim the first 
constitution and open the Ottoman Parliamnet in 1876. 
                                                 
394 For more see Aksin 2007, 82- 83. 
395 Shaw 1977, 130. 
396 Eris 2002, 597; Shaw 1977, 130. 
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Balkan War in 1912 and consequent independence of Balkan States from the Ottomans, 
Ottomanism became a bankrupt ideology. Following WWI (1914-1918), the War of 
Independence (1918-1922), and the establishment of the secular republic in 1923 
nationalism rather than Ottomanism became dominant. Ottomanism’s rise became visible 
only after the 1980s when Turgut Özal, a former Naqshbandi bureaucrat, came to power 
together with the support of a public which was aware of the Ottoman past. The gap 
between the decline of Ottomanism in the beginning of the century and its re-emergence 
at the last quarter of the century with the government of Özal can only be explained by 
the activities of Islamic movements examined in the previous chapters.  
Turgut Özal’s Prime Ministry, beginning in 1983, was a cornerstone in the 
liberalization policies that diversified the traditional business and bureaucratic elite in 
Turkey. During Özal's era Turkey began to see the rise of a new Muslim bourgeoisie.397 
Özal himself was a Naqshbandi. His mother and especially his brother Korkut were very 
close to the Naqshbandi shaikh Zahid Kotku.398 His liberal ideas in economic life 399
                                                 
397 Yavuz 2004, 224. 
398 When his mother died, with a special approval from the cabinet of Ministers she was buried right next to 
the Naqshbandi sheikh. For more on the relationship between Özal family and Naqshbandi sheikh see Özal 
1999. 
 and 
lavish life style of his family often times gave mixed signals about his orientation but 
Özal’s relationship with Islamic communities was not limited to Naqshbandi tariqah. He 
was also a member of Erbakan’s National Salvation. More recently, Özal had become an 
ardent supporter of the Gülen movement. During the Özal era all Islamic movements 
399 For a critical reading of Özal’s economic policies, see Önis 2004. 
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gained ground. This was already an ongoing trend but the late 1980s was better suited to 
the advancement of the political prestige of Islamist groups400
Turkey’s increasing involvement in the Balkans led to academic debates on Neo-
Ottomanism. Concurrently, famous Turkish historian Kemal Karpat argues that the term 
Neo-Ottomanism was first used by Greeks (not Turks) when Turkey landed its forces in 
Cyprus in 1974.
   
401 In its inception, Neo-Ottomanism reflected how Turks were viewed 
by their neighbors; the term then carried over into Turkish views of themselves. Therfore 
scholars like Tunander and Constantinides focus solely on Neo-Ottomanism’s foreign 
policy aspect mostly in terms of its involvement in the Balkans. They argue that any 
Islamic reference in foreign policy is a representation of its Ottoman aspirations in the 
region which they identify as Neo-Ottomanism.402
Scholars misread two major events during Özal’s tenure; these events both 
triggered debates on the rise of Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey. First, the 1986-1989 
Bulgaria crises. Because of their Muslim identity, over three hundred thousand Muslim 
Turks from Bulgaria were forced to either leave the country or assimilate. The Özal 
government accepted all the immigrants coming from Bulgaria. Besides handling the 
massive human movement into Turkey, an important part of the negotiations between 
Turkey and Bulgaria was about famous Bulgarian Heavy Weight lifter Naim 
 By focusing solely on Özal’s policies 
during his  tenure in the 1980s, these authors overestimated the direct link between the 
Turkish state’s decision makers and Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey. 
                                                 
400 Gungor 1996 [1981], 17-28. 
401 Karpat 2002, 524. 
402 For more see Tunander 1995; Constantinides 1996. 
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Suleymanoglu. Suleymanoglu was of Turkish origin and Özal reportedly paid between 
four to seven million dollars to the Bulgarian government for his release. Politicians and 
journalists at the time criticized Özal for his attempts. Özal thought that he was doing it 
for the image of Turks but many people around him did not share his ideas. 403
Neo-Ottomanism is a reconstruction of the Turkish identity together with two 
important factors. First, after Özal era Islamic movements were more able to influence 
and act in transforming the limited interpretation of Kemalist Turkish nationalism and 
bring forward the Ottoman heritage as a more inclusive framework. Neo-Ottomanism 
acknowledges the fact that religion has been an integral part of Turkish society and that 
Islam is not necessarily an anti-western ideology. This understanding of religion requires 
more space for religious expression than the relegating interpretation of the secular 
establishment in Turkey. Syncretistic notions of religion and state have also existed in 
 The 
second important event happened a few years after this ciris. The Bosnian war began in 
April 1992; Özal again tried to play an active role, this time he was President. To show 
the solidarity of the Turkish people with Bosnians, in February 13, 1993 Özal attended a 
famous protest in the heart of Istanbul. Although he was the highest-ranking politician in 
the state, his attendance in the protest did not find coverage even in the state run 
television. The commonaility of both of these events was that these events involved 
Muslim Turks in former Ottoman lands in the Balkans, and Özal tried to play an active 
role; most of the time he had to convince or force people around him to follow his 
policies.  
                                                 
403 For more on the details see the interview with Özal’s Minister of Economy in the Turkish newspaper 
Hurriyet December 5, 2009. 
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Turkey; the “Turkish Islamic synthesis” is one of the major examples.404 However 
contrary to “Turkish–Islamic Synthesis’s” nationalist vision,405
The inability of the Kemalist regime to co-opt religion into the governmental 
system and provide a widely accepted national identity led Muslim populations into Neo-
Ottomanist religious expression with stong elite and intellectual support. This intellectual 
background of Neo-Ottomanism is similar to Conservatism as a middle way between the 
changes of modernity and tradition. It is not totally against change; nor is it blindly 
accepting of westernization. By following such a conservative perspective Neo-
Ottomanswere able to practice their faith and still live happily in a Kemalist secular 
democracy.
 Neo-Ottomanism deals 
with issues current in the late Ottoman and contemporary period, though with a 
diminished emphasis on the state as the agent of change in Turkey. In fact, the most 
important aspect of Neo-Ottomanism is its unique treatment of the relationship of religion 
with the secular state. 
406
                                                 
404 Cetinsaya 1999. 
405 Savvides 2000, 65. 
406 Ömer Caha argued that in his field research in Anatolia he constantly saw houses and businesses where 
Muslim Turks voluntarily hanged the pictures of Ataturk on the walls next to pictures of Kaba or an Arabic 
verse. Caha categorically rejected the idea of Mulims in Turkey being against Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and 
argued that Muslims in Turkey were able to accommodate both allegiances in one identity. Personal 
communication with the author in November 22, 2006 Istanbul Fatih University. 
 Young Muslims were able to find in the Ottoman-Turkish experience an 
ideal of the past. It provided practicing Muslims with the tools necessary to reform the 
ideological bonds of Kemalism. In this sense, although Neo-Ottomanism is not statist or 
Nationalist, it still does not question the legacy of Ataturk. Rather, its proponents defend 
the possibility of reading Kemalism in a different way. As Taspinar states, therefore, 
179 
 
Neo-Ottomanism wanted the Kemalist republic to be at peace with its Ottoman past. This 
process is not an Islamization at the expense of Ataturk legacy but a sign of correction of 
excesses associated with high Kemalism.407
As a politician who lived during turbulent times, Ataturk left a legacy on almost 
all aspects of Turkish life.
 It is interesting to see that Neo-Ottomanism 
allowed Muslims in Turkey to co-opt Ataturk after it had become clear that Ataturk and 
the secular establishment he founded were unable to co-opt Islam. 
408 Kemalist elites envisioned a strictly controlled militaristic 
country409 that followed an exclusively westward looking foreign policy.410 Therefore, 
Turkey distanced itself from its Ottoman past in the Middle East and the Balkans,411 as 
well as from the Turkish speaking states of Central Asia.412 The post-Cold War 
emergence of Central Asian Muslim states and the Balkans gave Muslims in Turkey the 
means to reconnect with modern international developments. Kemalist ideology had 
failed to address these developments to the deep disappointment of the general public.413
                                                 
407 Taspinar 2008, 3. 
408 Ataturk’s seminal work Speech (Nutuk) is a prime example. Although Ataturk set his nationalist and 
secular manifesto in this auto-biographical statement he also mentioned that Turkish society has elements 
of Islam (Anasir-I Islamiye) rather than a pure Turkish Nation which has later become the main principle of 
Kemalism. Recep Tayyip Erdogan quoted Ataturk’s Speech when he initiated his the Kurdish Question 
reforms. 
409 The contribution of famous Kemalist Recep Peker in this process is undeniable.  
410 Taspinar 2008, 2. 
411 Constantinides 1996, 332. 
412 Rouleau 1996, 69. 
413 In the aftermath of the Cold War it was mainly the Gülen community that actively engaged with Bosnia 
and the Central Asian states while the secular elite distanced themselves from both of these areas, even 
Central Asia which has national ties. 
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The Justice and Development Party experience in Turkey becomes more 
significant than the Özal era because the Justice and Development Party leadership have 
more public and elite support from the Muslim bases. On the other hand, they seem more 
unified in their Neo-Ottomanist vision than the sporadic attempts of the Özal era. They 
were able to connect themselves to the late Ottoman era by showing that there are 
important similarities with contemporary Turkey. Justice and Development Party’s Neo-
Ottomanism is the result of independent Muslim intelligentia. These Muslim scholars 
were highly educated, did postgraduate work and were fluent in one or two foreign 
languages. The most important one is Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu.  
Justice and Development Party’s foreign Minister Davutoğlu is an independent 
scholar rather than a representative intellectual of any religious movement or ideological 
school of thought.414
                                                 
414 Davutoğlu graduated from Bosphorus University, receiving his Ph.D. under the supervision of Serif 
Mardin, the leading scholar on Religion and politics in Turkey. His initial focus was the Islamic 
Weltanschauung, its makeup and contribution to other civilizations which helped Davutoglu develop his 
ideas on Neo-Ottomanism. Early on Davutoğlu directed his scholarship to develop Islamic solutions to 
Turkish and modern problems. 
 Davutoğlu’s situation makes the relationship between Islamic 
movements and the Justice and Development Party government more interesting. Tayyip 
Erdoğan has always preferred to work with these types of intellectuals because of their 
scholarly credentials and independent characters. As a politician, Erdoğan did not want to 
have orthodox religious oversight over him. In that regard he is similar to Erbakan. 
However, Erdoğan’s main difference from Erbakan was that he gave close consideration 
to the analysis of his advisors rather than formulating positions based on personal 
prejudice and emotion.  
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Moreover, Erdoğan and the scholars around him are not bombastic or blatantly 
ideological like Erbakan, and this seems to suit the new brand of Turkish Islamist first 
seen during the Özal era. Interestingly enough the place of religion in the current Turkish 
case resembles Turkey’s Ottoman example where, as we have seen in the previous 
chapters, political elites have constantly been jealous of their position and tried to keep 
the religious elite under control. In Turkish history the place of religious elites in any 
setting, be it Ottoman or Neo-Ottoman, has been secondary to the political office. In that 
regard Neo-Ottomanism is direct continuation of its Ottoman predecessor.  
In his writings Davutoğlu viewed Islam as the backbone of the civilization it 
created and inspired rather than a religion understood restrictively. This enabled him to 
develop a language more open to an international audience. He was able to speak the 
civilizational language of Islam which could be recognized and respected across borders 
and cultures. After receiving his doctorate, Davutoğlu chose to teach in Malaysia, a 
Muslim country, rather than accepting a teaching position in the United States. His years 
in Malaysia helped him to understand the varieties of Islamic self-expression among 
contemporary Muslims. His main accomplishment was to develop an international 
curriculum intended for students from diverse backgrounds.415
After returning to Turkey he utilized his experiences mainly in the Foundation for 
Science and Art (Bilim ve Sanat Vakfi, BISAV), a non-profit think-tank. During his time 
there BISAV became the center of meaningful debates, where leading scholars attended 
public lectures and courses. BISAV acted like an informal university with a graduate 
 
                                                 
415 Author’s personal note from Davutoglus’s lecture in his foundation. February 2001. 
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level curriculum appealing to a young generation of mostly moderate Muslims. At the 
same time he taught International Relations at Marmara University and later, until 
entering the current Turkish government, he served as the head of the international 
relations department at Beykent University. His interests embrace not only politics and 
international relations, but also philosophy, history, geography, especially its specialized 
branch geopolitics, as well as cultural studies and economics.  
He mentions five major similarities: (i) reconfiguration of the state body in line 
with the international system; (ii) attempts to form new political identity and culture in 
order to respond to rising nationalist demands; (iii) trying to keep a balance between the 
new thinking and the traditional values; (iv) attempts to integrate into the European 
system (European System in the post-Vienna Settlement and EU, respectively); (v) 
harmony with the superpowers of the time (Britain and US, respectively).416
Davutoğlu’s most important contribution to the literature is his studies on the 
“self-conception of civilizations” which served as the philosophical foundation of his 
later writings on foreign policy.
 These issues 
and how AK Party handled them can best be understodd when we see how Davutoğlu 
defines his idea of self. 
417
The main factor of this universality of the Islamic civilization is an 
ontological consciousness which directly penetrates each individual 
 His works suggests that Islamic identity is ontological 
rather than social:  
                                                 
416 Davutoglu 2002, 85. For a selection of interviews with Davutoglu on Neo-Ottomanism see Davutoglu 
2006 [2002]. 
417 The nucleus of Davutoglu’s foreign policy approach appeared in an article titled “The Clash of Interests: 
An Explanation of the World (Dis) Order” in 1998. However, Davutoglu’s ideas on ‘self-concept,’ 
although not directly foreign policy pieces, were published before this article. 
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human mind regardless of his ethnic and regional origin. Common cultural 
and political responses to colonialism and modernity in different parts of 
the Muslim World are themselves the indicators of this consciousness. The 
rise of Islamic identity and its socio-cultural reflections in these lands 
which were recently governed by atheist Soviet authoritarianism serves to 
confirm the impact of this ontological consciousness.418
Davutoğlu argues that contrary to the majority of modernizing efforts, 
civilizations like Islam persisted due to a 'core' that they had which is not appreciated in 
current theoretical discussion. He argues that since the 1980s policy oriented studies 
began to follow structural explanations, focusing solely on external factors affecting 
Muslim communities rather than "internal dynamics based on mindset formation,” 
resembling what Serif Mardin calls the “internal spring” of Islamic identity.
 
419
Turkey is a self-referential international ‘visionary’ actor, an actor on the 
world stage purposefully and deliberately (not reactively) embracing the 
world, its challenges, and opportunities and a conscious agent with a 
particular set of ideas and positions worthy of playing on the world stage. 
This is a major ideational and temperamental/psycho-political change 
about what foreign policy actually is, what its functions and purposes are, 
and what Turkey actually means to the world polity; a change that only a 
 He has 
used this concept to analyze Muslim societies and has argued for its use among scholars 
of the Muslim world. His work is critical of the scholars who use structural explanations 
in analyzing the Islamic world. 
Davutoğlu’s discussion of self-concept makes up the core of Neo-Ottomanism 
and counters many scholarly formulations which give primacy to the construction of an 
external other in identity formation. Mesbahi explains this characteristic of the new 
Turkish Foreign Policy as follows:  
                                                 
418 Davutoglu 1997. 
419 Mardin 2005. 
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new elite, a new group of constructivist agents with a different self-
perception could introduce and construct.420
Davutoğlu argues that “identity is based on social recognition and requires two 
parties while self-concept represents individual consciousness that does not require/need 
social recognition.”
 
421
A theology professor and another member of the Justice and Development Party 
cabinet, Mehmet S. Aydin, had expressed a number of similar ideas. He argued that Islam 
does not need to construct values in opposition to other value systems. Islam is based on 
the idea of God as creator and Lord, and Islamic values come from this theological 
premise. For him Islam is the “inner core” of the Turkish cognitive map.
 He attempts to define the self-concept of the actor without 
referring to the inherent place of “other” in western identity formation. For him human 
nature has, by definition, qualities that resist social forces and resurface back, even after 
long periods of suppression where the self-concept was not able to accomplish its self-
referential qualities. This is the modern equivalent of Ihsan as expressed in the hadith of 
Gabriel. Living with God-consciousness, actors should act according to certain criteria 
even during hostile environments. In his formulation of Islamic self-concept he is not 
alone.  
422
                                                 
420 Mesbahi 2010. 
421 Davutoglu 1997, 11.  
422 Aydin 2002. 
 Due to the 
difficulty in formulating a “metaphysical” ontological position in secular scientific 
language, in his formulation of the self-concept Davutoğlu stops short of saying that the 
ontology of the self-concept comes from Islam.  
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Ottoman-Turkish experience has become a valuable reference tool for Davutoğlu 
in understanding the behavior of Muslims in Turkey. Ottoman references to justice, 
freedom and its treatment of religious minorities (mainly Orthodox Christians and Jews) 
under the Ottoman Millet system (which was derived from classical Islamic laws 
concerning religious minorities) have become the major points in his re-construction of 
Self-Concept and its policy implications. Similarly, Hakan Yavuz argued that religions 
are integral parts of human societies, providing the model of how to live.423
For Davutoğlu self concept is not culture specific. Therefore, what he calls Neo-
Ottomanism is only Turkish implementation of a universal set of values. This brings the 
question of whether he tries to ‘export’ his ideas to other Muslim countries with common 
Islamic backgrounds. “Turkish Model” explanations that have emphasized the strict 
secular control of the public sphere
 His treatment 
of the emergence of religious identities is shaped primarily by structural factors, 
contradicting Davutoğlu’s claim. Yavuz's perspective subordinates the ontological 
approach to structural considerations. There would then be no need for a foundational 
base upon which identity and action spring; structural approaches analyze identity with 
exclusive reference to external developments. 
424 are at odds with Davutoğlu’s pluralist reading of 
the Neo-Ottoman legacy. Because Davutoğlu sees the self-concept as an ontological 
position it can only be remodeled by ready recipient actors rather than exported by the 
conveyors.425
                                                 
423 Yavuz 2004, 213. 
424 Kitfield 2002 
  
425 The so called export of the Iranian Revolution is an example of this. 
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Neo-Ottomanism is not only a foreign policy making principle but also the core 
component of the Turkish State’s new identity during the Justice and Development Party 
era. Davutoğlu and his Neo-Ottoman policy came to the center of political power in 
Turkey. As stated in the party program, the Justice and Development Party is cognizant 
of globalization and post cold war developments.426 The first major issue in the party is 
regional cooperation, followed closely by relations with the EU, Islamic countries and 
strategic and defense relations with the USA. These policy preferences were the product 
of Ahmet Davutoğlu. Although Justice and Development Party and Davutoğlu have faith 
in a dedicated EU path they are cautiously optimistic. In a statement before his 
ministerial post, Davutoğlu argued that the EU will not accept Turkey’s membership but 
will try to keep it at its gates (probably with a special membership). Davutoğlu argues 
that Turkey cannot wait forever at the EU door, and needs to develop a genuinely 
multidirectional foreign policy by utilizing its geostrategic advantages.” 427
Euro-scepticism is the main factor inducing Turkey to improve its relations with 
its neighbors. Davutoğlu’s “‘strategic depth’ doctrine calls for an active engagement with 
all regional systems in Turkey’s neighborhood. Turkey needs to rediscover its historic 
and geographic identity and reassess its own position vis-à-vis regional and global 
issues.”
  
428
                                                 
426 AK Parti 2002.  
427 Murinson 2006, 952. 
428 Murinson 2006, 953. 
 “Davutoğlu called for a re-engagement with the Middle Eastern region, in 
particular with Iran, Syria and the Gulf States. In the Balkan region he stressed the 
importance of Greece and Bulgaria, while in Caucasus he pointed to the robustness of 
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Georgian–Turkish relations.”429 Turkey’s economic and foreign relations with regional 
countries have experienced their peak during the tenure of the Justice and Development 
Party government. This regional and international orientation that the Justice and 
Development Party government aspired to develop is a major break from Erbakan’s 
foreign policy of Islamic identity. Erbakan stressed the importance of regional relations 
with Islamic countries and his policy choices were strictly anti-western rather than 
diverse. During his career Erbakan spoke against Turkey’s relations with the US and 
EU;430
According to Davutoğlu’s primary foreign policy principle, due to its historical 
and cultural background Turkey is a “Pivot Country.”
 he never supported relations with regional countries other than Muslim ones.  
431
The major turning point in Turkey’s new foreign policy under Davutoğlu was 
with the US. From the start of their tenure in office Justice and Development Party tried 
 For him the cultural and political 
legacy of the Ottoman Empire makes Turkey both Western and Islamic geographically 
and culturally. Turkey borders many of the key regional players such as Iraq, Syria, and 
the Central Asian republics, so it has a responsibility in these areas, together with Balkans 
and Caucasus and Eurasia region, to be engaged in many controversial issues. The Justice 
and Development Party was able to successfully engage in and address the important 
metropolitan issues in Istanbul. They feel confident that they could have the same kind of 
success on the international stage.  
                                                 
429 Vatan news cited in Murinson 2006, 953. 
430 Robins  2003, 145-146. 
431 Davutoğlu 2002. 
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to maintain good relations with the US, despite critical policy issues affecting bilateral 
relations. It was quite symbolic that Erdoğan’s first international debut was staged in the 
White House. However, Turkey’s direct involvement in Iraqi problems put itat odds with 
the US on many issues. Post 9/11 US foreign policy emerged as unilateral and 
hegemonic. Bush’s uncompromising policy was a major challenge to those who dared to 
qualify their involvement in America’s war on terror. The war on terror emerged at a very 
critical juncture in Turkish domestic politics. When the Bush administration began to 
toughen its diplomatic language against Iraq, Turkey’s new government began to worry 
about instability in the region and future problems. In order to seek a westward looking 
foreign policy Turkey needed predictability, security and regional stability.  
Based on the experience of the first Gulf war an instable Iraq meant an instable 
Turkey, if not the entire Middle East. Turkey did not support direct military involvement 
in Iraq but was asked by the US to allow troops to enter Turkish territory in expectation 
of an invasion. Erdoğan specifically expressed his willingness to support the bill 
authorizing US forces to deploy in Turkey in order to invade Iraq from the northern front. 
However, he was caught in the political crossfire in the parliament, both from the 
opposition and his own party's MPs alike.432
                                                 
432 Ozcan 2003, 4. 
 All Islamic communities were against the 
bill as well. Fresh from the election civil society groups from all strands of the society 
lobbied to have the bill rejected. As a result, on March 1, 2003 the bill was rejected in the 
parliament. The rejection of the bill in the parliament was a shock not only for the US but 
for Erdoğan himself, who at the initial statges of his Prime Ministry did not know what 
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kind of a policy to follow. Scholars give two different explanations of this situation. First 
Erdogan either wanted to support the US initiative to be part of the operation and have a 
say over US policies in Iraq.  
One major long-term, unresolved issue has been Turkey’s relations with EU. The 
Justice and Development Party came into power with the specific goal of improving 
Turkey’s prospects for EU membership.433 They "enthusiastically worked to implement 
the National Program drawn up by the previous government in 2001. The Program 
required Turkey to comply with the EU's Copenhagen Criteria, namely, the rule of law, 
respect for human rights and advocacy of a free market economy. Major packages of 
reforms were passed through parliament in an effort to bring the legal system in line with 
the EU policy.” 434 The Justice and Development Party government has shown its 
commitment to democratization and Turkey’s EU membership process from the 
beginning of its tenure in office. This is both a continuation of previous policy and a  
dedication of Justice and Development Party’s decision makers.435
Before he became Prime Minister Erdoğan began visiting European capitals in 
order to urge EU leaders to set a definite date for the commencement of accession 
negotiations at the December 2002 European summit in Copenhagen. His attempt to 
secure a date failed but it established him as a leader wedded to the idea of Turkey’s EU 
bid in the eyes of European leaders such as Schroder, Berlusconi and Blair.
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433 Ozcan 2003, 2. 
434 Ozcan 2003, 5. 
435 Yavuz 2006; Duran 2006. 
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436 Robins 2007a, 292. 
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helped the Justice and Development Party on other fronts. First, it enhanced the 
relationship between the EU and the Justice and Development Party where the Justice 
and Development Party was able to establish a positive image in the eyes of western 
political circles where political Islamists had previously had a negative image. This 
young generation of Islamists demonstrated that EU membership was not antithetical to 
being an activist Muslim in both a democratic and pluralistic world. Secondly, EU began 
to function as a shield against the antidemocratic forces in the country in Justice and 
Development Party’s favor.437
In line with the Neo-Ottoman foreign policy, the Justice and Development Party 
leadership demonstrated its commitment to EU ideals by completing at least seven 
harmonization packages by 2003.
  
438 On 6 October 2004, the EU Commission in its 
annual Regular Report on Turkey indicated that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen 
political criteria and recommended that the Council open accession negotiations with 
Turkey. After tough negotiations at the EU Council Summit on 17 December 2004, the 
Council decided to start the accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005.439
                                                 
437 Robins  states that “the Justice and Development Party had come to see the EU as ‘a shield’ behind 
which to shelter. Post-Islamists and Kemalists had come to face in the same direction as far as foreign 
policy priorities and the EU was concerned.” Robins 2007a, 292. 
438 Robins 2007a, 292. 
439 Murinson 2006, 945. 
 
However, after 2005 AK Party’s commitment to the accession waned. After 2006 AK 
Party members began to voice their dissatisfaction with the process by criticizing the EU 
for not being honest with Turkey’s membership. Often times the rhetoric brought back 
memories of the reactions of nationalist parties in the country to whom AK Party itself 
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was opposed. The mixed messages coming from AK Party elite showed cautious 
commitment which came from its Neo-Ottoman background. It is apparent that AK Party 
does not want to link itself to EU at the expense of its other objectives in the rest of the 
region; the AK party wants to extend its regional alliances beyond the specific confines 
of EU membership. 
One of the major foreign policy issues faced by the Justice and Development 
Party government has been its relations with Israel. Turkey’s relations with Israel are 
linked to the state of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Turkish-Israeli relations are an issue 
of religious conscience, with most Turks strongly sympathetic towards the Palestinians. 
The main premise of a social identity analysis is that religious and cultural links propel 
Turkish people to support the Arab cause against Israel.440 As a result, it has been argued 
that a foreign policy issue like the Palestinian problem is an extension of the domestic 
divide between the secular rulers and the Muslim population.441 With regards to anti-
Semitism, the Justice and Development Party has displayed a different attitude than 
former Islamist parties. From the beginning, it has not resorted to anti-Semitic discourses 
and has liberated itself from the ideological burdens it inherited. Addressing the 
Organization of Islamic Countries in Malaysia in October 2003, then Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Gul denounced anti-Semitism.442
The question of Palestine became a major issue during the Justice and 
Development Party era, a result of greater visibility of Islamic sentiments in the political 
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arena. AK Party’s foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue is important due to a 
couple of other developments. First Israel’s attacks on Gaza and Jenin were seen as 
unacceptable in Turkish public opinion. Secondly, the 9/11 attacks made the issue more 
critical for Muslim and western countries in an age of global and state-sponsored 
terrorism. Since Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit443 called Israeli policy towards Palestinian 
civilians' genocide, Turkey’s relations with Israel began to deteriorate.444 Ariel Sharon’s 
Prime Ministry and his assertive policy against the Palestinians were not accepted by 
even a secularist agnostic like Ecevit. The position of AK Party government, which came 
to office after Ecevit, were intensified because he represented the moral sentiment of the 
majority of Turks, as well as the specific discontent of believing Muslims. The first issue 
that involved Turkey and Israel would be the Turkish Al Qaida's attack on the 
Synagogues in Istanbul in November 2003. Erdoğan visited the chief rabbi Ishak Aleva in 
December 2003 becoming the first Turkish premier to visit the Jewish community since 
the establishment of the Turkish Republic.445
Erdoğan’s sympathy towards Turkish Jews, however, did not extend to Israel. 
When Israeli forces shot and killed Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yasin in March 2004 
Erdoğan strongly denounced the attack.
 
446
                                                 
443 Ecevit, a center left politician known for his commited secularism both in his personal and political life, 
led the 57th government between May 1999 and November 2002 before AK Party came to power.  
444 Ecevit openly condemned Israeli attacks to Palestinians as “Genocide.” Zaman newspaper April, 5 2002; 
Radikal newspaper April, 5 2002.  
445 Friedmann 2007, 623. 
446 Robins 2007b; Akcakoca 2009. 
 The same strong language continued when 
Israeli incursions into Gaza in May 2004 caused an outrage in the country. Erdoğan 
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called Israel’s Gaza policy “state sponsored terrorism.”447 It would be a year before 
Erdoğan made a visit to Sharon in Israel. In the visit, both showed their tough side by 
focusing on the Palestinian issue. Erdoğan's innovative political style even made Ariel 
Sharon surprised, as he offered novel solutions to the conflict.448
This kind of political maneuvering in controversial areas resembles neither the 
policies of any Muslim grassroots movement nor the National View movement that 
preceded the Justice and Development Party. It is uniquely a product of the Justice and 
Development Party government and the pragmatic leadership of Erdoğan. Among 
grassroots Muslim movements there is only one that has engaged Israel in a comparable 
manner. The followers of Fethullah Gülen, with their highly institutionalized media 
outlets and non-profit organizations, have established positive relations with their Israeli 
counterparts at the civil society and bureaucracy level. The results of these relations 
repaired the image of Gülen in the eyes of the Israelis. Even in the semi-pro-Israeli 
journals like Middle East Forum and Meria there were positive articles calling Gülen the 
face of liberal Islam in Turkey.
 In the case of his 
remarks in Israel, at the time it was not made public but later in September of the same 
year Turkey mediated a deal between Israel and Pakistan, which did not have official 
relationship.  
449
                                                 
447 For a critical reading of the Neo-Ottomanism and Turkey’s relations with Palestinians see Rubin 2004. 
448 Soon after the meeting, Israel established first ever official relations with Pakistan with the help of 
Erdogan government. 
449 Aras 1998; Aras and Caha, 2000. 
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The honeymoon between Israel and Turkey, however, did not last long, especially 
after the Israeli incursions into Gaza after the Hamas victory and its attacks on Hezbollah 
in Lebanon, resulting in a high number of civilian casualties. The Justice and 
Development Party government clearly sided with Hamas after the January 2006 election 
victory and argued that there cannot be a solution to the Palestinian problem without 
considering Hamas. Supporting Hamas and establishing direct contacts with Hezbollah 
have been the most risky political decisions in the Justice and Development Party 
engagement in the region where even Iranian and Arab leadership worry about being 
represented as terrorist by the US. It created an aura of suspicion around the Justice and 
Development Party leadership about a hidden Islamist agenda. For some it was a clear 
sign that Islamists were only superficially pro-western. They critically argued that the 
Justice and Development Party’s “Zero Problem with neighbors approach” did not 
include Israel.  
The determinants of what makes AK Party’s ideology come down to its unique 
treatment of of Islam. It is evident that AK Party is proud of its Muslim past. However its 
identity is not confrontational in the sense that secularism is viewed as a threat. Their 
Neo-Ottomanism does not use religion as an ideological weapon to get power or 
intimidate opponents into sunmission; it is a representation of Turkish identity. While 
practicing the religion on their own, side by side with their political or professional 
activities, AK Party elite recognized that the rhetorical use of Islam has only limited 
benefits and has to be accompanied or substituted by direct and effective action.  
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Chapter VII: CONCLUSION 
Islam has been understood, articulated, and practiced in as many ways as there are 
Muslims. It has both a shared history as well as many different specific histories.450 
According to Piscatori “if we want to know about Islam today, we must think of it more 
as conduct than as theology and doctrine”451 because what Muslims understand of the 
sacred texts and traditions and how they represent their religion is relative to place, time, 
and context.452
The saliency of the Islamic movements and their different approaches to politics 
in Turkey has to be recaptured in analyzing the transformation of Islam and politics in 
Turkey. The Naqshbandi tradition constantly tried to influence the political decision 
making from without while Islamist National View, although a Naqshbandi movement, 
argued for direct involvement in politics. Nur-Gülen movement, the third approach that 
examined in this work, had a strictly apolitical position by focusing on religious service 
at the public level. Opening educational institutions eventually had political implications 
 This study has been concerned with organizing and presenting a typology 
of Turkish Islamists using a religious source, a saying of prophet Muhammad, the Hadith 
of Gabriel, as the conceptual framework. The analysis concluded with the newest and 
undoubtedly most successful Islamist actor in Turkey, the Justice and Development 
Party. After coming into power in a landslide election in 2002 the Justice and 
Development Party, comprised mainly of self-professed Muslim politicians, had to deal 
with the pressure of identifying with Islam in a reactionary secular state.  
                                                 
450 Felipe Fernandez-Armesto speaks about “Civilization” in a similar way in Hall and Jackson 2007, 1. 
451 Piscatori 1988, 10. 
452 Piscatori 1988. 
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when people inspired by Nursi’s and Gülen messages began to influence politics. All of 
these groups had access to the Justice and Development Party ranks to variying degrees. 
However, none of the Islamic groups studied above has more than a limited influence on 
the Justice and Development Party. The leaders of the Justice and Development Party are 
conscious of the influences upon them, and appreciative of those sources of thought and 
inspiration, but are not dependent on them in any way.  
Justice and Development Party leaders were underestimated in their ability to deal 
with secular issues as well as over-exaggerated in terms of their religious allegiances.453
                                                 
453 None of the ‘founding fathers’ of the Justice and Development Party has direct Naqshbandi or Nur-
Gülen connection. 
 
They were a product of late Ottoman thinking but not a direct continuation of it. The 
diversity in the Islamic approaches as in the typology developed here is personified in the 
Justice and Development Party’s mixed identity. From the place of religion in politics to 
the treatment of state as a secular apparatus Justice and Development Party tried to 
synthesize a vast legacy in a turbulent time. The term Neo-Ottomanism, therefore, is 
appropriate in defining Justice and Development Party’s position. Neo-Ottomanism puts 
less emphasis on the state as an agent of change in society. In Neo-Ottomanism, more 
attention was paid to the development of individuals and promoting a social environment 
wherein plurality of Ottoman legacy was practiced. When it comes to relations with EU 
or Israel, often the Justice and Development Party gave conflicting messages. This 
quality of the Justice and Development Party can only be addressed within the eclectic 
framework of Neo-Ottomanism. Neo-Ottomanism enables us to look at both the actors 
and their environments rather than given primacy to one over the other.  
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Serif Mardin has written about an Islamic core based in the sacred texts and 
religious practices of Muslims.454
“… the specifics of Turkish history have endowed the Ottomans and the 
Turkish Republic with characteristics that have worked cumulatively to 
create a special setting for Islam, a setting where secularism and Islam 
interpenetrate, which of course is quite different from saying that Islam 
and secularism have fused. This interpenetration or overlap is the real 
methodological obstacle that faces the investigator of Islamic modernism 
in Turkey. It establishes a field for study that shows much more 
complexity than the research based on the essentialism of Islam, the core 
of contemporary studies of “political” Islam in Turkey and elsewhere.” 
 To him, the special characteristics of the Turkish-
Ottoman case requires a renewed focus. As Mardin states  
455
The Turkish context that enabled the ‘interpenetration’ of Islam and Secularism 
has not been dealt with in any detail in the primary literature on religion and politics in 
Turkey. The greater part of the scholarship on the Justice and Development Party 
erroneously attributes its origins to Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist National View 
Movement. This argument limits the scope of Islam’s experience with politics in Turkey 
to one political movement because of Justice and Development Party's association with 
Islamist National View Movement. In fact, the Justice and Development Party is unique 
in that it has been influenced by many types of Islam in Turkey. One reason for the 
success of the Justice and Development Party is that they have balanced their deep faith 
in Islam and commitment to Islamic causes such as justice and peace with the political 
and social requirements of a secular life in a secularist state. They have made themselves 
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455 Mardin 2006. 
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indespensible to the welfare of secularism in Turkey while also acting as model Muslim 
politicians.  
The typological framework offered above based on the Hadith of Gabriel divided 
the Islamic experience into three broad categories. The first is that of Shariah, the 
outward manifestation of Islam. It was described by the prophet Muhammad in terms of 
the five pillars, or minimal obligations of all Muslims. The second sphere was that of 
Iman, or tariqah. It was described as a deeper internalization of faith and the belief in the 
articles of faith. I used the religious orders as examples of Iman because they have 
traditionally institutionalized the spirituality of Iman in the form of Sufi brotherhoods. 
Lastly, there was the haqiqah, described as worshipping God as if one could see Him. 
This is the highest level of religious expression in Islam and it has been manifested in 
Turkish society in the persons of Said Nursi and Fethullah Gülen.  
This view of the Justice and Development Party as merely an extension of the 
National View Movement, having an “other based” anti-western identity, assumes that 
the influence and role of Islam in Turkey is external and generic, rather than authentically 
Turkish. I would argue, alternatively, that secularism is a structural force introduced from 
without, yet exercising an unrepresentative role on Turkish life and identity. Secular 
notions of nationalism entered the common imagination of Turkish people mostly in the 
last two centuries, though most scholars in the Western world consider it to be constant 
and normative, rather than as part of an unsettled debate within Turkish society.  
This study showed that contrary to the fundamental reforms and secularization 
projects Islam is still a constant in the minds and hearts of the Turkish people. Contrary 
to all the changes in the republican era “the influence of the moral culture of Islam, its 
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voice, was still around as an autonomous force given the lackluster ethical message of the 
Republic.”456
Turkish political history shows us that Islam has been an integral part of the 
political and social imagination among Turks, though after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire and the establishment of the Republic that voice had been systematically 
suppressed by the state. It can be argued that no viable long-term social or political 
imagination can exist in Turkey without having to merge or coexist in some way with 
Islamic actors and their ever-present voice. Much of the scholarly literature on Turkey in 
the modern era has normativized the effects and status of secularism, even where that 
system has been repressive and ineffectual. As Mardin argues “[w]hat we still need today 
is a reconstitution of the process that led to the emergence of the AKP [Justice and 
Development Party]”
 The modern imagination of the Republican era was not able to fill the 
ethical or the moral void that the Turkish society had felt for decades. Hence it was the 
moral culture which shaped Islamic grassroots movements for decades which many 
Justice and Development Party members embraced after they separated from the National 
View Movement. 
457
This dissertation followed a more agency-centered analysis focusing on the identities 
and the internal dynamics of the actors. The legacy and the impact of the Turkish Islamic 
movements in response to the changes and challenges typified in the Republican period led to 
the construction of the Turkish Islamic political identity and the change and continuity of this 
 for which, this dissertation argues structural analyses are 
inadequate.  
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457 Mardin 2005, 146. Italics are original. 
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identity in different periods among different groups. In this sense, based on the differences 
within and among different Islamic groups, this dissertation argued that, à la Wendt,458
                                                 
458 Wendt 1992. 
 
Islam is what Muslims make of it. 
As a result, I criticized the fixed definition of Islamic identity where the 
institutional-essentialist scholars argue that there is an essential unchanging Islam. For 
these scholars, Islam has frozen in time fourteen hundred years ago and cannot 
accommodate the environment of the modern world. For them, Islam needs and seeks 
power to exercise control over others, as if Muslims are always looking outward. The 
power-seeking radicals who often times use even democratic processes clearly represent 
Islam’s reactionary nature. The Justice and Development Party’s unique actions certainly 
do not fit into this picture. However, in any given religion there are different features of 
the religion that even the political actors can adhere to. The Hadith of Gabriel provided 
the type used for this study to show the plurality of the Islamic movements and in which 
ways they influenced the Justice and Development Party governments. 
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